

Taming The Monster of Terrorism and Exploring the Imperative of Security Sector Reform in Nigeria

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Abstract

This paper assesses the impact of Boko Haram terrorism manifested in forms of religiously inspired sacrilege for western education and influence; they specialized in bombing, violent, horror killing and raping women. Terrorists' activities have caused severe destruction of human lives, properties, educational institutions and infrastructures. These potent threats have signalled a looming doom and negatively affected the socio-economic and political landscape of Nigerian society with grave security implications. The direct impact of terrorism includes the colossal loss of properties worth billions of Naira and 2,184,254 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) with 13.5 million out of school children and 1.7 million deaths. The security apparatuses have been overwhelmed in curtailing these menaces for a decade despite over 10 trillion of Naira spent. Nigerians are vulnerable to attacks in which the security forces are helpless. There is the need to close this gap on security sector to tackle this debacle created by lack of modern equipment, human resource and professionalism in Nigeria. There is the need for intensive Security Sector Reform (SSR), as a panacea to peace and security in Nigeria. The main objective of the paper is to create the intellectual and practical consciousness on how to mitigate the threat posed by Boko Haram. The paper adopted qualitative, documentary/content analytical technique, ex-post facto research design and collective security theory to interrogate the nature, magnitude and intensity of these phenomena. With the fading national cohesion and rising regional agitation for independence, the research calls for a more co-ordinate and systematic planned counter-terrorism action to restore human security in Nigeria by exploring the recommendation for Security Sector Reform (SSR). This is for a long-term global peace and security interest in curbing terrorism.

Keywords: Democratic peace; reform; security; security sector; terrorism

Introduction

No meaningful development can take place in an atmosphere characterized by rancor and anarchy. Thus, security is a *sine qua non* for peace and sustainable development which can only thrive in a serene atmosphere. This is the reason behind every government making efforts to provide security as the basic necessity and the primary responsibility and purpose of governance. Nigeria since independence in 1960 has been bedeviled with several glaring threat to its security that are both internal and external. The country's historical experience in the last one and half decade is awash with various degrees of Boko Haram threats and unrests-ranging from the killing of their founder Muhammed Yusuf (Yusufiyya) in 2009 and the emergence of Abubakar Shekau signaled

an initially soft target approach but progressively grappled with suicide bombing in 2011 of police building, defence headquarter, UN office, Madala, Nyanya in Abuja and twin bombing in Jos among others have raised serious security problems in Nigeria.

Most often, these crises have aggravated and degenerated into unimaginable proportions due to the leadership ineptitude and lack of professionalism on the part of the security agencies to quickly nib such crises in the bud. The unprecedented upsurge in the activities of Boko Haram onslaught is intertwined with sporadic gunfire of unarmed, blameless and innocent citizens, burning of police stations and churches, raping, kidnapping and abduction of hundreds of school girls in Chibok, Dapchi, Tegna and Bethel Baptist secondary school among others.

The inability of the security agencies to act proactively and professionally has led to the growth of multiple security threats on a sustained scale that has relegated the country to a state of hopelessness and despair. Indeed, from all indications, there is a general decay in the security architecture in dire needs of urgent reforms. In the absence of functioning security institutions in the state as the only unit with the monopoly use of violent force; stability, rule of law, security, equity and human rights are threatened. Therefore, with the unmatched upsurge in these monstrous crimes as well as the degree of sophistry with which they carry out these heinous atrocities, created a wide gap that makes reform of the security apparatuses inevitable to be better equipped with modern state of the art and advanced sophisticated weapons to march the demands of contemporary security threats in the country. This paper is subdivided into different sections ranging from introduction, conceptual clarification and understanding the terms, an overview of the impediment to exploring security sector yearning for reforms in Nigeria, the current security situation and ways to narrow the gap, recommendation and finally cap it with conclusion.

Collective Security Theory

The proponents of 'collective security' are men such as Michael Joseph Savage, Martin Wight, Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson, are deemed to apply interests in security in a broad manner. The concept of collective security is an idealistic perspective focused on the avoidance of warfare through the formation of an effective and overwhelming military power by member states to discourage violence or deter

aggression and by implication to launch a reprisal attack capable of crushing the recalcitrant member. Collective Security connotes the institutionalization of a multinational global police force against abuse and threat that may lead to breaches of peace and security. It is contained in the former League of Nations Article X of the covenant of the League of Nations which states that all nations could be secure if each state guarantees its territorial integrity and existing political independence against external aggression by any state or group of states, and the United Nations Article 49 of the United Nations Charter which states that; The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the members of the United Nations or by some representatives, as the Security Council may determine. Collective security theory may essentially be interpreted as a global or regional, political and economic arrangement in which each state in the framework agrees or accepts that security of one is the concern of all, and therefore commit to a collective response to threat and breaches to peace that addresses a wide range of possible threats like 'terrorism'.

Key Assumptions of the theory

- (a) One for all and all for one: Aggression or war against any one nation is a war against all. Therefore, all the nations are to act collectively response against every war / aggression
- (b) International co-operation established to prevent, promote and maintain global peace and security in which an injury to one is injury to all
- (c) a global or regional, political and economic arrangement in which each state in the system mobilizes resources collectively for peace and security for all,

Understanding the term Terrorism

Terrorism is always been part of violent human behavior. The word 'terror' is derived from the Latin word *terrere*, which literally means to frighten. Throughout history this concept and term were used to explain the use of violence as a tactic- from the campaign of Ivan the Temple in the 16th-century Russia to period of violent political turbulence, such as the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution. In 1789-99, in France, terrorism involved the use of violence *against* the state as well as violence

perpetrated by the state. In addition to the fact that both side used terror (approximately 40 000 people were sent to guillotine in retrospect.

In recent decades, terrorism has become one of the potent and greatest threats not only to global peace and security but also to democracy, regional integration, economic development and respect for human rights which by extension, form the same objective the UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS, and Commonwealth among others were created to achieve. As the conflicts of the Post-Cold War pave way to a paradigm shift towards development and reconstruction in many countries, the emergence of a new phenomenon of terrorism just lethal as conventional armed conflict became manifest.

Terrorism is a socio-political, economy cum religiously inspired ideological believe in killing with impunity that shock the conscious of humanity perpetrated via individuals, groups and states by stabbing, strangulating, maiming and bombing of innocent and armed less citizens with the intention to achieve a predetermined goal. Boko Haram literally means “prohibition of western education” has undoubtedly appeared to have overwhelmed the security agencies and posed a serious security threat to Nigerian government. The US in 2013 designated Boko Haram a terrorist organization. Many of the Boko Haram activities rapidly became widespread in the northern part of the country and which are still increasing in scale and complexity. The facts that they are links with Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP) makes it mostly complex for Nigeria and African regions to manage such threats effectively.

Article 2 of the draft comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism defined terrorism as: any person who commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes: death or serious bodily injury to any person; or serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a state or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act Schmid & Graaf, (1980).

The United Kingdom legislation as contained in the Terrorism Act (2000) defined terrorism as the use or threat of action where the action falls within subsection, the use

or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. The Act states further that action falls within this subsection if it involves serious violence against a person, involves serious damage to property, endangers a person's life, other than that the person committing the action, creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. Terrorism Act (2000).

Terrorism is also construed as the 'use of violence against civilians by non-state actors to attain political goal. The Jonathan Netanyahu Institute in Israel conceived terrorism as the systematic violent murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent in order to instill fear for political ends. For instance, in the area of international terrorism, the September 11, 2001 attacks were perceived to be the devastating result of the newly developing trends and al-Qaeda as the epitome of a 'new terrorist' organization. The terrorist attack on World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 led to the killing of nearly 3,000 citizens including British, German, French, Italian and Indians.

The ever-evolving nature of terrorism tactic and the reasons why it remains a favoured strategy-the threat and motivation are constantly in the state of flux. In other word, the success of terrorism as a tactic is based on the ability of those who are planning future attacks to adapt and include new technical advances, ultimately impacting on the foundation of a satisfactory description. The African Union, in the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, defined an act of terrorism as 'any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environment or cultural heritage'. Consequently, and according to this definition, one can say that a terrorist is any person guilty of an act of terrorism.

The root cause of terrorism in Nigeria

The root cause of the terrorism in Nigeria can be traced to the British economy interest for cash crop production and colonial policy of 'divide and rule' which pave way for primitive accumulation, this intensified the traditional ruling elites-citizens dichotomy, "the have and the have not" which laid the fluid foundation for the politics of non-accommodation, failure on the monopoly use of violence by the colonial state and

subsequently translated into overt avarice and greed within the Commonwealth multiethnic diversity of Nigeria bequeath to us at independence. For six decades now, the post-colonial experience have not altered the definitions between ruling elites-citizens or the rich-poor widening gaps but remain “fluid and sour”. It is also pointed out that part of the conflict is born out of the perceived corruption, unemployment, poverty, weak institutional structure, ethnicity and social frustration that led to the increasing bifurcation of the country and the fight for power, land and natural resources motivated by socio-economic and political grievances. The various acts of Boko Haram terrorism through maiming, bombing and killing in Nigeria led to dwindling economy loss of 1.7 million lives and properties worth billions, discouraging foreign investment, threatening the country’s unity with 2,184,254 IDPs according to International Organization for Migration (IOM) with 13.5 million out of school children in 2021, the highest in the world and FDI according to World Investment Report (WIR) dropped from \$8.9 billion in 2011 to \$7 billion in 2012 and CBN yearly report show a drastic 77.4% decline from \$4.31 billion in 2020 to \$974.1 million in the first quarter of 2021.

For decades, Nigeria remains a killing spree and a fertile ground susceptible to igniting reactions inimical to peace and security. As a result, scene of violent bombing killing, maiming, raping of women as well as destructions of lives and properties abound on daily bases. The Nigerian Government has claimed that these Boko Haram terrorists group have been degraded or wane but obviously, security remained volatile and no sign to reduce its lethality. This is premised on existential security threats accruing from the nation's political and multiethnic milieu that turned into one of the worst humanitarian crisis in the African continent. Accordingly, the strategies deployed by the counter-terrorism measures in the bid to restore security were ineffective and inefficient because of the logistics, financial and expert personnel challenges suffered by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) as well as the religious politics and the Interest of International Partners in Nigeria in which their refusal to assist in time of great need have undermined the position of the security agencies and weakening the strategies its deployed, thereby rendering the terrorists activities intractable and protracting it.

The recent terrorism incident erupted in 2009 due to the perceived neglect, that eventually snowball into a sustained armed terrorists groups comprising mainly of Fulani/Hausa initiated as a Muslim youth organization with the persistent intent of rebellion against the influence of Western secular practice, called Boko Haram, which

since inception, has metamorphose to international terrorists group labeled as the Islamic States of West African Province (ISWAP) sect with established links with Al-Qa`ida, Al-Shabab and ISIS operating in Nigeria, Benin, Chad, Niger and Cameroon. The manifestation of terrorist activities in Nigeria cannot be seen in isolation to other conflict around the globe but one that is deeply anchored on the character of the state policy. So far, efforts in taming the menace of terrorism in Nigeria have already gulped over 10 trillion naira with little or no hope in sight.

Empirical clarification, experiences and precondition for security sector reform

Many scholars in the field of security have attempted a clarification of the concepts. For Buzan (1991), notes that security in territorial term is the protection of core national value has gone beyond the state and has expanded the concept beyond its realist state- centric views and conventional posture seen as a “derivative of power” to non-conventional posture. In his book, “People, States and Fear”, Barry Buzan points out that the concept of security was “too narrowly founded”, “low priority of security”, “grossly underdeveloped” and therefore, offer a “broader framework of security” incorporating concepts that were not previously considered to be part of the security dilemma such as regional security, or the societal and environmental sectors of security. His approach was ground breaking as he looks at security from micro to macro angles, and addressing the social aspects of security on how people or societies construct or “securitize” threats.

Buzan deepened and expanded the discourse to five security sectors (Political, Military, Economic, Societal, and Environmental) might affect the “periphery” based on changes in the “center” and insisted that the “five sectors do not operate in isolation from each other in a way never considered in threats calculus by the militaristic and state centric paradigm. The concept also encompassed instead a wide range of non-state actors, such as individuals, ethnic and cultural groups, regional economic blocs, multinational corporations (MNCs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and just about all humankind.

In Nigeria, the Constitution serve as a guide to coordinate the functioning of the National Security framework headed by the Executive President and Commander in-Chief of the armed forces, aided by his cabinet and Service Chiefs; with secretariat staff forming part of the nomenclature. With these formidable structures however, it is regrettable that

security decision had not grown beyond the paper instruments to be effective in securing the country from Boko Haram. Besides, most of the actors were not adequately prepared for the roles, thereby leading to ineptitude and the Council's meeting was relegated to informal gathering which robbed it of the strategic importance that it deserves. With these shortcomings security cannot guarantee the effectiveness of this statutory institution and others attached to it. These staggering revelations may as well explain the endemic corruption in the Security Sector of the country as outlined in the Think security Africa report; and justifies its emphasis on the sincerity and commitment of Nigerians saddle with the onerous responsibilities of providing security to all the citizens. Think security Africa (2011)

Before we proceed to examine the preconditions for security sector reform in Nigeria, let us first and foremost examine what security sector reform entails. Security sector is a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. These can include defence, law enforcement institutions, correctional centers, intelligence service, border management, and customs, elements of the judicial sector management and oversight bodies, civil society groups and other non-state actors among other elements. Security sector reform (SSR) refers to the process of transforming the security sector – those institutions that safeguard a country and its citizen from security threats to ensure the provision of effective security to both the state and its people within a framework of accountable democratic governance. Security sector reform therefore aims to develop a security environment based on development, rule of law, good governance and local ownership of security actors. The concept SSR is based on the rebuilding of a state security sector. It starts where a dysfunctional security sector is unable to provide security to the state and its people effectively under democratic principles. Parallel to that, the security sector can be a source of widespread insecurity by itself.

Security Sector Reform is a paradigm in a relatively recent concept in state transformation, development and post-conflict peace building and peace transformation of societies. As a result, human security and poverty reduction programmes have recently find a place in security thinking (UNDP 1994; commission on human development 2003; Ball and Brzoska 2002; Ball and et'al 2003). Conflict scholars globally are preoccupied with implication of armed conflict, terrorism, regional conflict, fail states, violent crime and human rights abuses. The people centered concept of human security ideally

compliments, but often contrast and compete sharply with the notion of state security, or more narrowly the security of the political elites. Those conceptual changes in the security debate in favour of reforms, take place primarily in advanced country. SSR addresses problems confronting security issues and tries to improve the situation through institutional reforms. Security and peace are seen as a public good Mendez (1999).

SSR must be understood as a broad concept, which also concerns a more efficient use of scarce resources to improve the enduring citizen's welfare. Transparent and accountable democratic civilian control over security forces is crucial for the provision of security in the interest of the population. Ball et'al (2003; 268), Postulates that the crux of the security sector reform is the development of effective civil oversight as well as creation of institution capable of providing security to volatile communities in Nigeria is sacrosanct for peaceful co-existence. Nigeria is one of the countries in dire need of SSR.

Bendix and Stanley (2008) attributed the emergence of the Security Sector reform in Nigeria to the policy of the UK based Department for International Development (DFID) to provide assistance to country that were hitherto excluded from such supports by the imperative of the Cold War, "as well as to the new challenges posed by demands for an effective donor role in conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, and anti-terrorism" with the aim of linking these challenges with opportunity and as enlightened the stakeholders that "a security sector which promotes human development, helps to reduce poverty and allows people including poor people – to expand their options in life". They anchored the relevance of the project to African countries on "the continuing universality of violent conflict and other threats to security", scholars relate current security problems to the specific nature of the African state and its institutions as legacies of colonialism; a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence was never achieved by the colonial state – nor was this indeed necessary for the purposes of extraction and military and political control, and would seem "an appropriate concept for African states aiming to reform their security sectors in such a way as to enhance democratic control, strengthen the security of the poor, reduce the risk of violent conflict and free resources for social change". The success of SSR is evident in South Africa, Sierra Leone and Liberia.

During the cold war, SSR was seen as secondary agenda to which sides ruling elites took in the East-West conflict (Global Felicitation Network for Security Sector Reform, GFN-SSR, 2013). Since the end of the cold war and subsequent collapse of Berlin Wall,

concerns have changed among the super powers as impediment to security became more complex. It is now recognized that states have often failed to fulfill their security obligations, or have even actively compromised the security of their own people. Consequently, the security agenda has broadened to include the well-being of population and human rights, SSR being part of the wider “human society” framework. In this context, security and development have become increasingly linked. Nigeria remained one of the world poorest and the poverty capital with least stable regions in the world where activities of Boko Haram terrorism are daily melodies. This challenge saddled with poor strategic detection of early warning signals, lack of effective, accountable policing, a perceived rubber stamp and limited legislatives oversight as well as a weak central governments have characterized its recent past detrimental to peace and security in the region.

Nigeria sees herself as West Africa super power posture economically, militarily and as the heart of Africa as composed in the largest part of regional intervention in Liberia, Sierra Leone Angola among others inter-states conflicts. However, Nigeria is still at embryonic stage in addressing critical major challenges pose by terrorism include dealing with endemic police corruption, incompetence and the crises of public security. The gaps created in the provision of security led to the formation and consolidation of non-state actors such as anti-terrorism movement called “civilian Joint Task Force (JTF), neighborhood watch/vigilante movements, private security companies, Eastern Security Network ESN/ Ebube Agu, Amotekun and ethnic armed militias. Many of these non-state actors have become increasingly popular, politicized and co-opted by federal state structures. The current security challenges facing Nigeria today are deeply rooted in its socio-political and economic institutions over the years cannot be disengage from it colonial heritage.

The challenges of massive corruption, poverty, poor governance, near-zero or moribund industrial bases, a one-track economic sector and high rate of unemployment have been exploited to be the breeding ground for Boko Haram terrorism which continues to plague the nation leading to rising levels of dwindling economy and insecurity. The poor governance crisis in a nut-shell, resulted to the Nigerian defective security architecture manifested in the: Niger Delta Crisis, the carnage between ethnic groups and political violence after every election, the ongoing pro-Biafran secessionist agitators and the recurring spate of hopeless in Boko Haram activities that was

categorized by the United States as the world fourth deadliest terrorist organization in 2013.

Over the years, the unpalatable security situation in Nigeria degenerated to its worst magnitude on daily bases that the country was captured by Purris (2012) in the following words: “for the last two years, Nigeria was categorized as the 14th worst states out of 177 countries ranked by multiple factors in the Fund for Peace (PFF) failed state index”. His submission vividly captures the current prevailing security situation in the country epitomized by the ongoing war against insurgency and the apparent inability of the security agencies to contain the strangling heinous and almost intractable Boko Haram onslaught. Nigeria was also rated as the third worst governed state after Zimbabwe and Venezuela. The attitude and character of officers and men of the security sector have not shown the structure of personnel with pledge to service in their fatherland. In Nigeria today, there have been various violent conflicts ranging from religion, ethnic, political and resource allocation in the recent past but the security has not at any period shown professionalism by curtailing any of the conflicts from degeneration to loss of lives and properties.

The general decay in the country cannot encourage one to totally attribute the blame to the security sector, because the sector is part of the general society and is not immune from the effects of its challenges. Notwithstanding, the attitude and response of the security to crisis situation have shown an ill-equipped, poorly trained and unprofessional extermination of hostile community by security agencies particularly in Zaki Biam and Aliade, Benue State, and in the various elections conducted in the country in recently, the security sector has been accused of been used by those in power and those than can afford to finance them to cast vote and intimidate their perceived political opponents. This was attested to in the various post-election tribunals across the country vividly display misconduct that needs urgent attention to be whitewash by reform.

An overview of the impediment to exploring security sector yearning for reform in Nigeria

One of the impediments is the lack of political will for reform even when Nigeria has recently been active in promoting Security Sector Reform, sponsoring the first Security Council Resolution on SSR, Resolution 2151, in April 2014. This has led to a tactical proliferation, commercialization and unnecessary expansion of the security sector without a corresponding effort in achieving the primary purpose of securing the lives and

property as well as protecting the state from multiple security threat. State governors now depended on private security that can be easily manipulated under the pretense of addressing unemployment and legitimize agitation for state police.

Failure to address endemic corruption; A successful effort in combatting corruption in Nigeria will return trillions money looted abroad and at home back into the government coffers. The prudent use of such monies will enable government to pay particular attention to security sector reforms including the training and state of the art equipping of security institutions and agencies (judiciary, police, prisons, immigration, customs, and other organs) charged with guaranteeing internal security by curbing uprising and increasing the operational effectiveness of security institutions in light of the fight against Boko Haram onslaughts. However, the reform of the Nigerian security apparatus continues to be hampered by allegations of corruption. In December 2015, former National Security Adviser Sambo Dasuki was arrested for allegedly diverting up to \$2 billion from the National Treasury, creating 'phantom' contracts for a variety of procurement programmes. Transparency International places Nigeria's military in the second highest risk category for corruption in the security sector. A large part of this inauspicious assessment derives from the fact that the majority of military procurement is not subject to legislative scrutiny, as such funding comes from an 'off-budget facility' rather than the Ministry of Defense budget. Such practices have permitted the level of corruption seen under military rule to continue unchecked. Addressing this remains the key challenge facing defence reform efforts in Nigeria.

Professional misconduct and operational mistake in the Nigerian Joint Task Force (JTF) have been identified for their brutality and cruelty, inciting a level of fear among the population somewhat comparable to the insurgents they are combating and seen as a disvirgination of their profession role to secure the people and to some extent turn the gun against itself. Human Rights Watch estimated that nearly half of the casualties attributed to Boko Haram have – in fact – been caused by the Nigerian security forces. There is also a civilian JTF (CJTF) made up of a disparate group of people 'fighting' Boko Haram as well as providing security to camps housing internally displaced persons. The group however lacks cohesion and has been accused of a catalogue of human rights abuses. This co-existence along formal security establishments of non-state security providers which respond to security needs beyond the purview of the federal government have led to different degrees of legitimacy by citizens and groups thus losing

both a significant portion of its monopoly on the use of force as well as a degree of its legitimacy as a security provider. This has resulted to major criticism from regional civil society organization regarding the obvious and abysmal failure of all operations: 'crocodile smile', 'Python dance', 'harbindaji', 'harbinkunama' and 'operation 'lafiya dole' among others.

The major mandate for security sector reform has been to ensure that the military observe the supremacy of democratic institutions and respect civilians and their human rights. The reforms desired by the Nigerian people postulated that the military should be detached from politics and should perform its constitutional role in all areas regarding civil-military relations. Nigeria's persistent security challenges continued to be a thorn in the economy reflecting our social-political colonial history. Dire security conditions persist resulting in recent ENDSARS in which lives and properties worth billions of naira was lost. In the northeast and around the country, Boko Haram and Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) continue to conduct scorch earth deadly attacks on civilian and military targets remain protracted and unresolved.

The security vote regimes have attracted the elite's interest in slugging the money where reform is extremely needed. The failure of the Nigeria security agencies range from strategic and operational mistakes, to gross human rights violations, endemic corruption – including widespread procurement fraud – and racketeering by deployed soldiers and police. Top officials are unwilling to acknowledge their own failings or remedy these long-apparent weaknesses, but instead cling to the excuses that they are overstretched, under-resourced and neglected by international partners. Much of the responsibility for this can be laid at the feet of Nigeria's political leaders. Instead of properly training and equipping soldiers and police, politicians have created an alphabet soup of overlapping security agencies and vigilante groups. In doing so, they created new opportunities to enrich themselves through patronage, fuelled bureaucratic rivalry, increased overhead costs, and diluted the operational impact of security expenditure, thereby losses billions of naira via procurement fraud, slush funds in the security votes, and through outright theft and embezzlement by top officers.

Lack of a robust legislative oversight; the military and police are rarely held accountable for malfeasance or for perpetrating human rights violations like the 2015 Zaria Massacre that left over 300 dead and scorched earth extermination of some community in Zaki Biam and Aliade Benue State. Since Nigeria's return to civilian rule in

1999, its political leaders have allowed – and even encouraged – the military to take over maintaining of internal security duties from the country's increasingly incapable and predatory police force that led to end Special Anti-Robbery Squat (ENDSARS) protest in 2020. Nigeria's security agencies are apparently seen as becoming more politicized, detaining journalists and civil society members, and appearing more like a tool of regime coercion than at any time since the end of military rule.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the vast extant literature on security studies, scholars are unanimous in their view at the desirability of security sector reform (SSR). This is predicated on the fact that traditional approaches to solving security challenges posed by Boko Haram terrorism have since become obsolete and grossly inadequate due to the evolving unprecedented upsurge in their heinous crime. A robust and a more dynamic approach are therefore needed urgently to contend swiftly the contemporary global security threat. But what are the obstacles on the way of security sector reform (SSR)? Although the need for security sector reform cannot be overstressed it is never the less hindered by certain socio-political and economic factors. The root of defective security governance in Nigeria can be traced to the affairs of the immediate post-independence years. Any discussion of security sector governance or reform in Nigeria must be seen within the context of long-term military rule witnessed the near complete breakdown of security sector governance in the country including massive human right violations, destruction of *esprit de corps* in the military, debasement of their professional role, corruption and truncation of democratic ideals.

Finally, we concluded by noting that the Boko Haram security challenges confronting Nigeria appears to be intractable because of the defective and decayed security architecture of the state and until the rotten tooth is pull out, the security agencies will continue to be a toothless bulldog in a chaotic situation. In order words, the security sectors or agencies has not shown much patriotism and professionalism in dealing with the security challenges thus necessitating a radical overhaul, restricting and reformation of the security sector to better reposition it to meet the yearning demands of contemporary Boko Haram challenges in the country and restore its lost glory for enduring peaceful co-existence.

Recommendations

The worrying security trends and strategies for mitigation the challenges and the way forward can only be tackled by broad-based security sector reform via the following recommendations.

(a) All reform efforts should be based on the understanding that a security sector that is accountable to civil authorizes and ordinary people is structured to meet security threats to individuals, communities and their country is affordable, promoting not only the security of the country in question, but also the security of the region in which it is located and that at the international community by engaging non-state actors such as CSO, MNCs, etc, in its various manifestations to articulate needs and propose constructive approaches.

(b) For the security agencies to be abreast and alert to its professional responsibility such that will be proactive to nib perceived Boko Haram in the bud, modern sophisticated warfare such as drones and equipment should be provided for the security sectors to match the growing demands of ever evolving contemporary global security challenges of terrorism. The morale of men and officers of our security agencies should be boosted through formation of state police, effective budget utilization, reduce bureaucratic overheads and break down intelligence silos, re-orientation, retraining, adequate remunerations, de-politicizing the military and deepening democracy is a core requirement for building an egalitarian accountable and transparent state for achieving effective security sector reform.

(c) Nigeria was accorded a rare hegemonic status in Africa by Think Security Africa (2011), but the prevalence of security threat of Boko Haram terrorism had rubbished the country's image globally, it is therefore recommended that Nigerian National Security Strategy (NNSS) which compose of both offensive and defensive measure to make sure that Nigerian government move from reactionary to adopting proactive and preventive measures in addressing the menace in Nigeria.

(d) Nigeria's security sector needs greater transparency and better oversight. Its current lack of accountability and opaque budget and procurement practices enable the large-scale corruption that is a major contributing factor to its operational shortcomings, frequent misconduct and poor performance in conflict zones. There is the need to encourage whistle-blower, strategically prohibiting pardon or enlistment of terrorist into

the regular security agencies and banning the use of corruption-prone security votes – widespread at the federal, state and local level.

(e) Nigeria's synergies with the international partners – led by the UK and the US – should advocate for sensible security sector reforms and condition or structure their security assistance in such a way that enables and incentivizes specific reforms. Washington and London cannot continue the posture of silence and be complicit in maintaining the status quo, and should recognize that Nigeria's political and security leaders bear a significant amount of responsibility for fuelling, perpetuating and profiting from the country's insecurity.

(f) The Government should demonstrate its intense fight against Boko Haram by identifying all their financiers, black list as terrorist, arrested and be prosecuted accordingly to deterred other as well as rehabilitating all the victims and giving them free compulsory education up to secondary school level.

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