

Biafra separatism and national security in Nigeria

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Abstract

One of the greatest threats confronting the continued unity of Nigeria currently is the issue of Biafra separatism. This movement has been re-enforced, particularly with the separatist agitation of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), in such a way that Nigeria's security environment appears to have become more volatile than ever before. This resulted in the proscription of IPOB which has also generated more national questions than answers, especially because the action was hurriedly taken, and that federal government of Nigeria (FGN) failed to consider it necessary to include other violent and militia groups such as the militant herdsmen in the list of terrorist organizations in the country. Although this failure remains a contentious issue in Nigeria, it does not remove the fact that IPOB and other separatist movements within the South-East and South-South regions seem to constitute threat to national security in the views of both the state and the FGN. While scholars continue to examine the root causes of Biafra separatism, how the movement constitutes threat to national security in Nigeria is yet to be given satisfactory attention in the existing literature. This paper, therefore, aims to address this gap by investigating how IPOB separatist movement constitute threat to national security in Nigeria. National security complex theory was adopted we relied on secondary source of data such as newspaper reports, official documents, journal articles and many others. The paper discovered that, through their anti-establishment rhetorics, IPOB separatist movement constitutes threat to national security. The paper recommends proactive measures to national security through a multi-faceted soft approach.

Keywords: Biafra separatism, IPOB, national security, separatist movement, secessionist agitation

Introduction

Separatist agitation is one of the greatest threats to national security that currently understands no boundary. Thus, the issue of separatism that used to be a basic feature of the Third World countries is increasingly threatening the unity of even some advanced nations, including those of the Great Britain and Spain. This phenomenon has many dimensions, manifests in different forms and has been described as a new global epidemic (Valaskakis, 2014). From the Catalan and Basque in Spain to the Kurds in Iran, Mizo in

India, Southern Sudan, Southern Philippines, Northern Chad and Southern Cameroun, the ire of separatist agitations remains highly pronounced. The geographical regionalization of these agitations, notwithstanding, their essence remains the same. This is because, “separatism includes ethnic demands for the creation of separate states within the existing state or for a broader measure of regional authority, either for independence or autonomy” (Horowitz, 1981, p.168). These demands according to Wimmer et al (2009) are owing to ethnically based group marginalization which causes grievances against the authorities and helps to reinforce a collective ethnic identity and sense of oneness. Gurr (2000) believes that this sense of oneness based on rejection, which Ibeanu et al (2016) described as collective victimhood, draws community members together and lays the foundation on which collective political action can occur. Apparently, most separatist movements were formed based on this philosophy.

In Nigeria, part of the challenges bedeviling the corporate existence of the country include governance and service delivery deficit (Jonah et al, 2021), religious fundamentalism and terrorism (Onuh et al, 2021) poor state organization and democratization process (Onuh & Nnaji, 2019; Onuh & Ike, 2021), and ethnic politics which has culminated in the question of separatism from Biafra secessionist groups (Onuh, Ike & Nnaji, 2019). Nearly 50 years after the Nigerian – Biafra Civil War (1967-1970), separatist agitation has persisted, thereby putting pressure on the continued unity of Nigeria, and by extension, threatening its national security. Since 2012, Biafra separatist agitation has assumed a more worrisome posture than before through the emergence and activities of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) led by Mazi Nnamdi Kanu. Although there have been other Biafran separatist movements both in Nigeria and in the diaspora, such as Biafra Foundation (BF), Biafra Actualization Forum (BAF), Igbo USA, Ekwe Nche, Biafra Nigeria World (BNW), Biafra Zionist Movement and at the domestic front, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), headed by an Indian-trained lawyer Ralph Uwazuruike; none attracted the attention of Nigerian government more than that of IPOB. However, while MASSOB and other groups believed in non-violent approach to Biafra separatism, Nnamdi Kanu-led IPOB secessionist group favoured approaches that appear to impinge on Nigeria’s national security. Some of these include threat to life, constitution of Biafra Secret Service (BSS) and Biafra National Guard (BNG) within the Nigerian sovereign state, and

calculated hate and inciteful speeches that could elicit violent protest and riot, including addressing the country as a zoo and President Muhammadu Buhari as a terrorist, evil and a pedophile by Nnamdi Kanu (Thompson et al., 2016; Offodille, 2016; Amnesty International, 2016a). With these, IPOB has altered the environment that hitherto defined separatist agitations in Nigeria; thus, propelling the federal government to proscribe the group in September, 2017.

Although studies have highlighted the causes and implications of IPOB separatist movement in Nigeria (Thompson et al., 2016; Offodille, 2016; Amnesty International, 2016a), how the movement constitutes threat to national security in the country, as well as the implication of the proscription to the continued Biafra separatist agitations are yet to be satisfactorily addressed by scholars. Against this backdrop, this paper examines how IPOB separatist movement constitutes threat to national security.

Theoretical Foundation

There is hardly any valid research that has no theoretical foundation. Meanwhile, the essence of theorizing is to explain in order to reach a valid generalization. Against this backdrop, the study adopted the national security complex theory. This is a theory that explains the complexity to national security threats as well as the approach to addressing the threats. National security complex theory is a reductionist version of regional security complex theory (Ugwueze, 2017). It was gleaned from the works of Wolfers (1962), Buzan et al (1990), Buzan (1991), UNDP (1994), Buzan (1998), Buzan *et al* (1998), Buzan and Waever (2003), Nnoli (2006), Buzan (2008) and Ugwueze (2017). The national security complex theory was developed to reflect the complex nature of security in post-Cold War era. National security complex theory questions the primacy of the military elements and the state alone in the conceptualization of security. According to Buzan *et al* (1998), this questioning has come from diverse sources rarely coordinated with each other. Some have come from the policy side, representing organizations (including the state) trying either to achieve recognition for their concerns or adapt themselves to circumstances. National security complex theory surveys the debate between the new and the traditional approaches to security studies with emphasis on people-centered security (Ugwueze, 2017). National security, therefore, comprises everything such as individual empowerment; protection of human rights, including economic, social and

cultural rights; access to education and health care; equal opportunities and good governance (UNDP, 1994). The best path to tackle insecurity, therefore, is to ensure freedom from want and fear for all persons which can only become possible when every individual is considered a critical stakeholder in security matters (UNDP, 1994).

The theory suggests that the state should adopt more diversified agenda in which economic, societal and environmental security issues play alongside military and political ones. The complex nature of security stems from looking at various sectors of the security architecture so as to identify specific types of interaction that guarantees effectiveness in security management. Nnoli (2006, p. 17) argued that 'security demands military power sufficient to dissuade or defeat an attack; but so many non-military elements are required to generate effective military power that a concern for security can never be restricted solely to the final military end product'. In this view, the military sector is about relationships of forceful coercion; the political sector is about relationships of authority, governing status and recognition; the economic sector is about the relationships of trade, production and finance; the societal sector is about relationships of collective identity; and the environmental sector is about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere (Buzan *et al*, 1998).

National security complex theory is useful for three reasons: firstly, it tells us something about the appropriate level of analysis in security studies; secondly, it can organize empirical studies; and thirdly, theory-based scenarios can be established on the basis of the known possible form of, and alternatives to, national security complexes. This third reason opened the space for theoretical application of national security complex in line with the basic assumptions of the theory, among which are:

- Security is both a national, regional and global phenomenon and it will be very difficult to comprehend the security dynamics of one country without inserting it into a broader context and without grasping the conflicting or cooperative patterns that defines the foreign policy of that country with its neighbours. By implication, therefore, the theory assumes that security is a complex phenomenon that must be addressed as such if solutions were to be found.
- The theory assumes that the best way of approaching security problems is through cooperation and integration of various security architectures, including the non-state actors.

- It also assumes that approaching security problems holistically must take into consideration both the traditional military and non-military strategies. This means that security problems would remain in an environment where only military use of force is encouraged in fighting violent crimes.
- The theory assumes that modern approach to security goes beyond the traditional military bombardment to include addressing all the conditions that give rise to insecurity such as poverty, poor governance, human rights violations, political exclusion, religious intolerance, and a host of others.
- The theory assumes that what leads to national security breach are multi-faceted and the approach to addressing the breach are also multi-dimensional.
- Finally, the theory assumes that security is no longer the business of the state alone. It therefore follows that where the state is the only institution responsible for managing national security, insecurity will continually assume preeminence (Ugwueze, 2017, p.46).

The history, manifestation and activities of Biafra separatism and national security in Nigeria are better explained in the light of complexity associated with national security. This framework unravels the relations in IPOB operations and activities that influence national security calculus in Nigeria. The multi-faceted nature of national security breach helps us to understand IPOB separatist movement as a threat to national security in Nigeria.

Anatomy Of the Problem of IPOB Separatist Movement in Nigeria

Among the separatist movements in Nigeria since the end of the Civil War, none has generated the kind of debate, attention (both within and outside Nigeria) and federal government's reactions like that of IPOB. The IPOB separatist movement commanded the largest medium of inciteful information dissemination through the broadcast of Radio Biafra (an online radio used in disseminating inciteful hate speeches against the Nigerian government by Nnamdi Kanu) and it also received the highest mass mobilization, separatist radicalization, sympathy, membership and attraction both locally and internationally (Amnesty International, 2016b).

In addition to its mass mobilization capacity and radicalization through the Radio Biafra, IPOB occupies a centre stage of separatist discourse in Nigeria (Adibe, 2017;

Sobechei, 2017; Ibeanu et al, 2016). The resilience of the followers and the “commando” organizational structure of the group, as well as its mobilization strength and strategy, both locally and internationally, combine to threaten national security in Nigeria (Thisday, 3 May, 2017; Vanguard, 15 September, 2017). However, government’s use of force in quelling IPOB uprising exacerbated violent clashes between the separatists and security agencies; thus, leading to several deaths of the separatists and other innocent citizens (Obi, 2017; Sani, 2017). This has had its far-reaching consequences and scholars have argued that violent repression of separatist movement often ends up being a costly strategy in the long run (Davenport, 2000; Hess and Martin, 2006; Lichback, 1987; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Moore, 1998; Mason and Krane, 1998). Thus, repression may therefore lead to transformation and escalation of separatist agitations into a more heinous organization. Instances abound, including the Boko Haram insurgency which started as an organization of people dissatisfied with government policies to a very dangerous terrorist organization after the killing of its leader Mohammed Yusuf in 2009 (Madunagu, 2011; Campbell, 2012). Nnoli (2006) has also affirmed that security achieved by the use of force or the readiness to use force against others sometimes generates unintended negative consequences.

Before federal government’s proscription of IPOB, violent demonstrations and outright breakdown of law and order have become daily occurrences in Nigeria with heavy casualties on the side of IPOB. Since then, IPOB dominates intellectual debate on separatism in Nigeria. Scholars such as Ojukwu (2008) and Ukiwo (2009) had explored the legacies of the Biafran separatist agitation with emphasis on the issues of violence, identity politics and citizenship questions in Nigeria. Onuoha (2014) and Offodile (2016) also studied separatist agitation from the point of view of Igbo question and Nationalism in post-Civil War Nigeria and Ibeanu et al. (2016) had examined the causes, consequences and remedy of Biafra separatism. While we appreciate the huge contributions from these scholars and more, there appears to be dearth of literature on how IPOB separatist movement constitutes threat to national security in Nigeria. This paper attempts to fill the gap.

IPOB Separatist Movement as a Threat to National Security in Nigeria

According to African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (the body charged with the responsibility to oversee States Parties compliance with the African Charter),

National security examines how the state protects the physical integrity of its citizens from external threats, such as invasion, terrorism and violence. The importance attached to national security as an element of national interest and importance of government is not lost to Nigeria. Section 14 (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) provides that the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of governments and in so doing, the Nigerian government is saddled with the herculean task of responding to any external or internal threat to its national security.

The threat to Nigerian National Security is not so much of an external aggression as it is internal. This is owing to the escalation of separatism in the country. Among world-acclaimed separatist movements, Nigeria plays host to two namely; The Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Table 1 illustrates this point.

Table 1: Showing separatist movement recognized by inter-governmental organizations around the world

S/N	Nationalist Movement	Nation	Territory	Recognized by	Current Power
1.	Khalistan Movement	Khalistan	Punjab, India	OAU, AL	India
2.	Movement for the National Liberation of Comoro	Comorians	Comoro Islands	OAU, AL	Comoros
3.	National Liberation Front of Angola	Angolans	Angola	OAU	Angola
4.	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola	Mbundu	Angola	OAU	Angola
5.	Palestine Liberation Organization	Palestinian people	Palestine	AL, OIC	Israel
6.	Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	Black people	South-West Africa	OAU	South Africa
7.	South West African People's Organization	Namibians	South-West Africa	OAU, UN	Namibia
8.	Southern Cameroon Liberation Movement	Southern Cameroons	Southern Cameroons	UN	Cameroon
9.	Zimbabwe African People's Union	Black people	Southern Rhodesia	OAU	Zimbabwe
10.	Moro National Liberation Front	Moro people	Mindanao	OIC	Philippines
11.	Turkish Muslim Community of Cyprus	Turkish Cypriots	Northern Cyprus	OIC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
12.	Polisario Front	Sahrawi people	Western Sahara	OAU, UN	Spain; Morocco Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
13.	Indigenous People of Biafra	Biafrans	Biafra Region	UN via UNICEF	Nigeria
14.	Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra	Biafrans	Biafra Region	UN via UNICEF	Nigeria Cameroon

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_separatist_movements_recognized_by_intergovernmental_organizations

Among the separatist organizations that are currently threatening national security in Nigeria, IPOB also features. Refer to table 2 for more information on this.

Table 2: Showing separatist organizations that threaten national security in Nigeria

S/N	Separatist organization	Geo-political zone	Reasons for agitation
1.	Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)	South-East	The perceived marginalization of the Igbos in the southeast in terms of political appointments, federal character, allocations and presence. In addition, the constant killing of the Igbos especially in the Northern parts of the country.
2.	Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)	South-East	Calls for the country's restructuring to address the victimization of Igbos in the southeast of Nigeria.
3.	Oodua People's Congress	South-West	Fight for self-determination and ethnic separation from the Nigerian state, by the Yorubas.
4.	Boko Haram Islamic State Movement (BHIS) or Wahabi Group	The North	Pressing for self-determination and a separate existence based on the Islamic religious principles of Sharia.
5.	Arewa Youth Forum (AYF)	The North	Quest to control the majority, if not all governance power, and an overall feeling of entitlement by the Hausa/Fulanis. This is the group that issued quit notice to Igbo people in the northern part of Nigeria to vacate before 1 st October, 2017
6.	Niger Delta Avengers	South-South	Demands for 'resource control' and due recognition in the Nigerian state.
7.	The Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF)	South-South	Attempt to gain more control over the region's vast <u>petroleum</u> resources, particularly in <u>Delta State</u> . The NDPVF has frequently demanded a greater share of the oil wealth from both the state and federal government and has occasionally supported independence for the Delta region.
8.	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)	South-South	Quest for the entire Niger-Delta to become united as a separate entity, independent and apart from the Nigerian state.
9.	Middle Belt Federation (MBF)	North-Central	Struggle towards decoupling themselves from the Nigerian train that has been dangerously and heedlessly driving towards disaster and complete destruction at full speed, with emphasis on the illegality of both the Nigeria 1999 constitution and the social structure/ethnic constitution of the Nigerian state.
10.	Sovereign Republic of Takuruku Movement	North-Central	Seeking the independence of the Republic of Takuruku (made up of the people of the middle belt) from the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Source: Compiled by the researcher.

Apart from the Boko Haram Islamic Sect that has gained more notoriety in the global terrorism index through their heinous activities, no other separatist organization(s) in the country has been perceived to constitute a threat to national security to the extent of being designated a terrorist organization except IPOB. Although militant herdsmen would have perfectly fitted into terrorist organization, they lack leadership and organized structure that could qualify them as an organization. This accounted for why they did not feature in table 2 because they could not be treated as an

organized group. However, in saner climes, the activities of these herdsmen would have been proscribed to permit for easy prosecution of those found culpable of herdsmen attacks. Nevertheless, MASSOB and IPOB are currently the two most visible and often heard separatist organizations seen to be championing the Igbo course in the project Nigeria. However, while MASSOB called for the country's restructuring to address the victimization of the Igbos of the South-East, Nigeria, IPOB has been calling for a referendum that is geared towards dismembering Nigeria.

Through its anti-establishment rhetorics and activities, IPOB claims to be advancing the perceived marginalization of the Igbos in the Southeast in terms of political appointments, federal character, allocations and presence (Okoro, 2017). IPOB has acquired a notorious position in the list of active separatist movements recognized by inter-governmental organizations around the world, owing to its anti-establishment rhetoric and unprecedented inciteful commentaries and activities that could lead to violence of monumental proportion. This position was affirmed by Amnesty International (2016b) and Sahara Reporters (2014). These organizations noted that some of Nnamdi Kanu's interviews, speeches and Radio Biafra broadcasts may constitute incitement to violence. For example, he said in March 2014 "Our promise is very simple. If they fail to give us Biafra, Somalia will look like a paradise, compared to what happened there. It is a promise, it is a threat and also a pledge... We have had enough nonsense ... (Sahara Reporters, 25 March 2014). Similar in an address to the World Igbo Congress on 5th September, 2015, Nnamdi Kanu told the audience "We need guns and we need bullets" (Youtube, 2016) No doubt, these commentaries have the potential to increase the already saturated environment of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) proliferation in Nigeria which, according to Annan (2000), are currently worse than the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that were used in destroying Hiroshima and Nagasaki of Japan during the World War II. Already, the death toll arising from IPOB activities was becoming a source of serious concern; not only to the Nigerian government but to the international community in general. Table 3 summarizes some of these deaths.

Table 3: Death toll arising from IPOB separatist agitations since 2012

S/N	Sources of information	Location	Description of incident/issue
1.	Daily Sun, Monday 23 January, 2012	Onitsha, Anambra state	IPOB said soldiers killed 3 of its members on their way to attend planning meeting for the burial of late Biafran leader, Chukuemeka Ojukwu.
2.	Daily Sun, Wednesday 6 June, 2012.	Onitsha, Anambra state	11 IPOB members were killed and up to 500 others arrested following a raid on the group's offices by the police and state securities.
3.	Daily Sun, Tuesday 3 July, 2012.	Owerri, Imo state	IPOB said over 200 Igbos have been killed in Kano and Kaduna states within the last two months.
4.	Daily Sun, Friday 25 January, 2013.	Awka North LGA, Anambra state	4 bodies suspected to be those of Biafran agitators members surfaced on Ezu River, two days after police evacuated 18 bodies floating on the river.
5.	Sunday Sun, Sunday 9 June, 2013.	Onitsha, Anambra state	2 IPOB members killed when the police tried to forcefully break the sit-at-home order.
6.	Daily Sun, Monday 15 July, 2013.	Onitsha, Anambra state	1 person as allegedly killed when IPOB members invaded the torture camp of the AIYO.
7.	The Nation, Tuesday 21 January, 2014.	Onitsha, Anambra state	IPOB demanded the release of the bodies of 3 of its members allegedly killed by soldiers during a raid on its office at Onitsha-Owerri road.
8.	The Nation, Sunday 9 March, 2014.	Enugu, Enugu state	Security agents killed 1 person following attempts by allegedly armed IPOB men to invade the Enugu state government house.
9.	Daily Sun, Thursday 21 August, 2014.	Okwe, Onuimo LGA, Imo state	4 people were killed following a clash between rival factions of IPOB.
10.	Daily Sun, Monday 14 September, 2015.	Onitsha, Anambra state	Police killed 2 IPOB members during IPOB anniversary celebration.
11.	Daily Sun, Wednesday 21 October, 2015.	Onitsha, Anambra state	Police killed 4 IPOB members during a protest organized by the group
12.	Sunday Sun, Saturday 7 November, 2015	Onitsha, Anambra state	State vigilante group killed one pro-Biafra protester during demonstration organized by IPOB.
13.	The Guardian, Thursday 3 December, 2015	Onitsha, Anambra state	Soldiers allegedly killed 4 IPOB members in an attempt to break protest by group.
14.	Vanguard, Thursday 3 December, 2015	Onitsha, Anambra state	The Joint Task Force (JTF) killed 9 of the protesters while two police officers were reportedly killeuring a protest.
15.	The Guardian, Friday 18 December, 2015	Onitsha, Anambra state	Soldiers allegedly killed 5 IPOB members celebrating purported news of the release of IPOB leader, Nnamdi Kanu, during a clash.
16.	Saturday Sun, Saturday 19 December, 2015	Onitsha, Anambra state	Security agents killed 5 Biafra supporters celebrating the release of IPOB leader, Nnamdi Kanu, during a clash.
17.	Vanguard, Tuesday 19 January, 2016	Aba, Abia states	A joint team of police and army killed 8 people during a protest for the release of Nnamdi Kanu.
18.	Vanguard, Wednesday 1 June, 2016	Onitsha, Anambra state; Oyigbo, Rivers state	82 nd Division of the Nigerian Army confirmed that its officers killed five pro-Biafra protesters, maintaining that the officer acted in self-defense.
19.	Thisday, Wednesday 13 September, 2017	Aba, Abia state	2 persons were feared dead following a clash between IPOB supporters and soldiers.
20.	Daily post, Thursday September 14, 2017	Umuahia, Abia state	4 IPOB members confirmed dead when police opened fire on pro-Biafra agitators.

Source: Compiled by the Researcher.

Table 3 shows that, between 2012 and 2017, about two hundred and ninety-five (295) deaths occurred as a result of IPOB separatist activities in Nigeria. These fatalities usually arise from face-off with security agents. The death toll is a significant figure that could draw the attention of any serious government. However, because the Nigerian government has been seen to be indifferent to the plight of its citizens in many quarters (Evah, 2004; Enahoro, 2017; Adedigba, 2017), the argument has not been whether IPOB poses serious threat to national security but why the organization had to be isolated by the federal government for proscription, in the midst of others also involved in issuing quit notices. They too can threaten national security. This notwithstanding, this study is basically on Biafra separatism in general and IPOB separatist agitation in particular.

Additionally, IPOB style of mass mobilization is also seen to constitute threat to national security in Nigeria (Vanguard, 15 September 2017). This style includes demonstrations and protests without police permit, calling for boycott of election in South-Eastern Nigeria, sit-at-home orders to business men and civil servants, and the use of hate speeches against constituted authorities. Some of these do not constitute security breach in themselves, but the manner IPOB carried them out substantially threatened national security in Nigeria. Refer to tables 4 and 5 for the timeline of some of these activities within and outside Nigeria.

Table 4 showing selected activities of IPOB Style of Mass Mobilization between 2012 and 2017 outside Nigeria

S/N	Date	Location	Description of Incidence
1.	5 th June, 2017	Vatican City	Demands for aid for the liberation of Biafra from the Nigerian state.
2.	23 rd August, 2017	U.N.O building, Pretoria, South Africa	Marching in solidarity for their leader of radio Biafra.
3.	18 th September, 2017	Geneva, Switzerland	Protests over the detention of IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu
4.	19 th September, 2017	47 th Street, Manhattan, New York, USA	Protest to press their demand for the Sovereign State of Biafra and end the killing of IPOB members in the southeast.
5.	20 th September, 2017	UN General Assembly, New York, USA	Protests against the military invasion of southeast states and dehumanization of people in that zone.
6.	21 st September, 2017	Istanbul Central Istikal Avenue, Turkey	Demands for the immediate release of its leader, Nnamdi Kanu.
7.	23 rd September, 2017	Worldwide	Protest against the refusal of Nigerian government for refusing the call for referendum.
8.	23 rd September, 2017	Paris, France	A mega protest was staged in solidarity for Biafra independence.

9.	27 th September, 2017	Tel Aviv, Israel	Demanding for world Aid in obtaining independence from Nigeria.
10.	28 th September, 2017	Berlin, Germany	To protest the Nigerian Army presence in the southeast of Nigeria.
11.	11 th October, 2017	Washington DC, USA	IPOB protest against brutal killing of Igbos by Genocidal Nigerian government.
12.	5 th December, 2017	Brazil	IPOB members in protest against the continuous detention of their leader Nnamdi Kanu.
13.	9 th May, 2016	Moscow, Russia	Protesting against the continuous detention of IPOB leader.
14.	23 rd September, 2016	Johannesburg, South Africa	Demands for the immediate release of IPOB leader, Nnamdi Kanu.
15.	23 rd September, 2016	North Texas, Dallas	A march against the trial of IPOB leader in Nigeria.
16.	23 rd September, 2016	Tokyo, Japan	Demanding the release of their leader Nnamdi Kanu, who is being held over treason and felony charges.
17.	28 th December, 2016	Malaga, Spain	In solidarity with Nnamdi Kanu over charges of treason charges by Nigerian government.
18.	27 th October, 2015	New Delhi, India	Demanding the release of IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu in the next 24 hours.
19.	13 th November, 2015	10 Downing street, London, UK	Demanding support from UK Prime Minister to help actualize Biafra independence.

Source: Compiled by the Researcher.

Table 5 showing selected activities showing IPOB style of mass mobilization between 2012 and 2017 in Nigeria

S/N	Date	Location	Description of Incidence	Casualties/Fatalities
1.	Wednesday, 18 th Jan., 2012	Onitsha, Anambra State	IPOB members engage in unlawful protest, chanting freedom songs.	This led to the arrest of 23 IPOB members.
2.	Monday, 28 th May, 2012	Aba, Abia State	A large group of IPOB members was allegedly caught attempting to disrupt children's day	19 IPOB members were subsequently arrested by the police.
3.	Wednesday, 17 th April, 2013	Onitsha, Anambra State	Fight between IPOB members and members of the Association of Igbo Youths during a rally	12 people were injured and this resulted in disruption of public peace.
4.	Wednesday, 5 th June, 2013	Idemili LGA, Anambra State	IPOB members hold rally to mobilize support for the 8 th June sit-at-home order	10 IPOB members were arrested by the police and injured in the process.
5.	Wednesday 29 th January, 2014	Onitsha, Anambra State	IPOB members and traders clashed during a demonstration at Mgbuka market.	This resulted in injury and hospitalization of 6 people.
6.	Sunday 14 th March, 2015	Enugu, Enugu State Aba, Abia State Abakaliki, Ebonyi State	Protest by IPOB members demanding the resignation of INEC chairman, AttahiruJega.	Soldiers used horse whip to beat IPOB members while the police used teargas to disperse the protesters. This disrupted vehicular movement and many were injured in the ensuing stampede.

7.	Wednesday 21 st October, 2015	Port Harcourt, Rivers State	Pro-Biafra protesters marched through major streets of Port Harcourt, Oyingbo and Ogoni.	This protest led to the disruption of vehicular and human traffic.
8.	Saturday 7 th November, 2015	Yenegoa, Bayelsa State	Scores of IPOB members block Mbiama road, Yenegoa, protesting the continuous detention of their leader.	Police arrested and detained about 100 IPOB members.
9.	Thursday 3 rd December, 2015	Onitsha, Anambra State	Protesting IPOB members block the Niger bridge, thereby obstructing vehicular movements in and out of Onitsha.	The Joint Task Force (JTF) killed 9 of the protesters and injured 18 others, while two police officers were reportedly killed.
10.	Tuesday 19 th January, 2016	Asaba, Delta State Aba, Abia State	Pro-Biafra protesters demanding the release of IPOB leader, Nnamdi Kanu, marched through major streets in Asaba.	This disrupted both vehicular movements and major economic activities.
11.	Wednesday 20 th September, 2017	Aba, Abia State	IPOB members protesting the operation python dance went on rampage, destroying both public and private infrastructure.	This led to the burning of Ariaria police station and a Dangote truck.
12.	Saturday 23 rd September, 2017	Umuahia, Abia State	IPOB members clashed with military personnel, stoning their Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) vehicles.	Many of the members and other civilians were wounded in the clash.

Source: Compiled by the Researcher.

Table 4 shows IPOB style of mass mobilization outside Nigeria and the international attention, publicity and sympathy that it garnered. Table 5 shows that IPOB’s style of mass mobilization in Nigeria has led to casualties and fatalities in many parts of Igboland. This style of mass mobilization range from mammoth crowd gathering for protests and demonstrations without police permit; thus, leading to face-off between IPOB members and security agents, disruption of vehicular movements and economic activities in major cities and towns, and destruction of shops, wares and goods of those that defy their sit-at-home order in Places like Onitsha and Idemili in Anambra state, Aba and Umuahia in Abia state, Abakaliki in Ebonyi state and Port Harcourt in Rivers state (Daily Metro, 2016; Mamah et al., 2017; Nwosu et al., 2017).

Using hate speeches and inciteful commentaries on Radio Biafra to draw support for IPOB course was considered a security breach in Nigeria. In this regard, the federal government continually runs a documentary on various television and radio stations, including Nigeria Television Authority (NTA), Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria

(FRCN), and categorically stating that hate speeches are acts of terrorism for which people must be held accountable. Through the Radio Biafra broadcast, Nnamdi Kanu (IPOB leader) was reported to have said “if they (referring to the leadership in Nigeria) fail to give us Biafra, Somalia will look like a paradise compared to what will happen to that zoo (Nigeria). It is a promise, it is a pledge and it is also a threat to them (Sahara Reporters, 2014). On 28th June, 2015, through his official facebook page, Nnamdi Kanu said, “When we speak, the zoo trembles. That is what happens when a cattle-rearing terrorist is your ruler. Hardcore Biafrans, if you see anyone in your village, kill the baboon, Hausa or Yoruba”. Kanu’s further statement on 21 July 2017 that, “if the government (of Nigeria) does not agree with us on a date for referendum, there will be no election in the south-east starting with Anambra state come November, 2017,” heightened political tension in the South-East and substantially dissuaded people from coming out to cast their votes for fear of molestation from IPOB foot-soldiers. He further boasted on October 1st, 2017 “I will go to Abuja, and when I’m coming back home, I will bring back Buhari’s head. While speaking during world Igbo Congress in Los-Angeles, Nnamdi Kanu said “Anyone who voted or supported Buhari, give me a gun, I will shoot the person dead, and go to prison”. Refer to appendix 1 for other similar inciteful statements.

Another worrisome dimension to IPOB’s separatist movement that impinges on national security was the establishment of parallel security guards in Nigeria different from the Nigerian security formation. It is on record that IPOB leader, Nnamdi Kanu, formed illegal and unlicensed security outfits such as the Biafran Secret Service (BSS) and the Biafran National Guard (BNG) in preparation for the independence of Biafra (Youtube, 15 august 2017). The leader of IPOB also threatened to kill Obasanjo, march with over two million of his men to overrun the nation’s capital, Abuja and has consistently warned that Nigeria would burn (Sahara Reporters, 6 July 2017). Whether by plan or coincidence, on 14th September 2017, suspected members of IPOB destroyed the Ariaria Police Station in Aba, Abia State. In the process, they injured policemen, carted away the pump action rifles, attacked a MOPOL patrol vehicle with Petrol Bomb, destroyed commercial vehicles, set bonfires on the road, attacked a commercial bank, among several other acts of illegalities (Nigerian Bulletin, 14 September 2017). These were considered serious security breaches that considerably impinged on the national security of Nigeria. Thus,

IPOB's anti-establishment rhetoric constitute a serious breach to Nigeria's national security. These activities resulted in the invocation of TPA (2011) as amended in the proscription of IPOB as a terrorist organization.

Conclusion

The paper argues that, through IPOB's anti-establishment rhetoric and activities, including the use of hate speeches against constituted authorities in Nigeria, incitement to violence through the Radio Biafra, use of Biafra insignia to create confusion, as well as creation of BSS and BNG, they constitute threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Nigerian state; thus, substantially impinging on Nigeria's national security.

Arising from these threats, the federal and South-East state governments outlawed IPOB activities by proscribing the group as a terrorist organization in Nigeria. The paper concludes that this proscription has largely de-escalated Biafra secessionist agitations. This accounted for why IPOB leaders went into hiding; there is increasing disappearance of Biafra flags and emblems, as well as the absence of IPOB protests and mass demonstrations, epileptic Radio Biafra broadcast and the disbandment of BSS and BNG. Recognizing the fact that this de-escalation might just be momentous, necessary steps should be taken by the Nigerian government to forestall further breakdown of law and order in the name of Biafra separatism.

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