The Nigerian State and Management of Terrorism

Okoye, Anthony Chukwuebuka
Department of Political Science, Federal University Otuoke, Bayelsa State
&
Nwosu, Ikechukwu Jude Donald
Department of Political Science, Imo State University, Owerri
&
Okafor, Goddy
Department of Public Administration and Local Government, University of Nigeria, Nsukka

Abstract

The Nigerian state has for decades been infested with the various forms of terrorist challenges. Indeed, the country's return to the democratic path has witnessed the emergence of various ethnic militia groups, increased Niger Delta militancy and now the Boko Haram insurgency, among others. The activities of these terrorist elements have earned the country the character of a state that is at war with itself. Consequent upon this, the Nigerian State has responded to these threats primarily through the use of military force in an attempt to quell the situation and restore order to the society. On this note, the study interrogates the counter-terrorist strategies of the Nigerian state in relation to its effectiveness in handling the terrorist challenge. The study anchored its analysis on some basic propositions emanating from the Marxist political economy. Designed as a desk study, it generated data from secondary sources. The study observed that the stick approach (military force) which the Nigerian state relies more on has not been successful as expected in tackling terrorism in the country as it has for long deceived the state to overlook the economic roots of terrorism in the country as evidenced in poverty, unemployment, socio-political exclusion, horizontal inequality and state repression, among others, that serve as basis for mobilisation, recruitment and radicalisation. It argued that in order to adequately de-escalate and curtail the rising waves of terrorism in the country, the Nigerian state should as a matter of necessity address these concerns.

Keywords: Nigerian State, Socio-economic condition, Poverty, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism

Introduction

For decades now, the Nigerian state has been confronted with various forms of security and terrorist challenges that have raised serious concern to both the citizens and government alike. So serious is the issue that no part of the country is without its own version of the terrorist threat, which undermines the cooperate existence of the country as a sovereign *indivisible and indissoluble* political entity. Indeed, from the country's South to North as well as from East to West one witnesses protests that manifest in extreme cases as militant/insurgent groups or combination of both as ably represented in the Niger Delta militants in the south and Boko Haram in the North. Although these groups are separated by geography and ideology, they are however, united in their ability to adopt and apply terrorist tactics in their operations that usually result in loss of lives, injuries, destruction of properties, and reversal of years of development among others. Besides, the activities of the groups were evidenced in illicit socio-economic actions such as; kidnapping, pipeline vandalism, suicide bombing, blowing up of oil installations/infrastructure, abduction, separatist agitations among others. It was in the face of these dire situations that Nadabo (2013) observes that "today, it is news of a bomb blast. Yesterday, it was a suicide bombing, tomorrow; it may be an assassination and the day after, mass murder. Every day in Nigeria, the news seems to get from bad to worse, as the security situation deteriorates further and further".

The import of the above position is that these acts of terrorism and armed attacks undermine the capacity of the Nigerian state to perform its statutory (core) functions of: imposition of order, provision of social welfare/wellbeing, in addition to promotion of development. The point to note is that terrorism not only induces the reallocation of resources from productive sectors to servicing of wars and military spending. It basically limits the ability of the government to adequately carter and attend

to the basic needs of its citizens. Added to this is the fact, that it triggers human suffering, migration of skilled labour, shutting down of industries, diversion and withdrawal of foreign direct investments (FDIs), non-opening/establishment of new businesses, not to mention displacement, injury and loss of human life. This by extension limit the tax base of the state as well as its ability to generate adequate revenue needed for its general administration. This prompted Awori (cited in Adetula, 2006:383) to state:

> It is now widely accepted that violent conflict is the major hindrance to the development of the African continent. It inflicts human suffering through death, destruction of livelihoods, constant displacement and insecurity. Violent conflicts disrupt the process of production, create conditions for pillage of the countries resources and divert their application from development purposes to servicing war. Violent conflict is thus responsible for perpetuating misery and underdevelopment in the continent.

Besides, the Boko Haram insurgents that have routinely targeted, attacked, destroyed and razed both private and public properties such as schools, churches, mosques, police stations, military checkpoints, prisons, internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps, markets, United Nations building and entertainment centres among others have laid waste the economy of the north eastern region, which is the worst hit. Just as the Niger delta militancy at its peak threatened the economic foundations of the Nigerian state by almost crippling oil production, which is the major foreign exchange earner to the state in addition to forcing a number of multinational oil companies (MNOCs) to relocate from the region. It is in response to the carnage that these terrorist groups and such other ethnic nationalist groupings usually unleash on the country and its citizens that compelled the Nigerian state to initiate strategies aimed at tackling the menace. This study therefore, attempts to examine both the roots cause(s) of terrorist activities in the country and the Nigerian state's response to it.

Theoretical Framework

The study adopted some basic propositions emanating from the Marxist political economy theory as its framework of analysis. The theory as propounded by Karl Marx emphasizes the primacy of material condition (economic determinism) in explaining the socio-political happenings in a given society. In this wise, the theory is premised on the notion that the actions and inactions of men are predominantly a function of the economic realities of the people's environment. Hence, in his *Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx (1859:182) observes:

> In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production, which corresponds to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life processes in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.

The point to note from the citation above is that from Marx's view, that which gives meaning, intelligibility, thrust and essence to history is the actual engagement of men and women with their material circumstances, above all with the ever-present necessity to recreate the material requirements of their own continuance. From such a materialist angle, ideas are anchored in, rather than existing independently of, the material setting of history. However much these ideas may act on and shape the material setting, they must in the first instance, be produced within it, and must in some general sense be compatible with it (Heilbroner, 1980). Besides, in his explanation of the centrality of the material realities towards the comprehension of the social processes and dynamics in human society; Ake (1981:1-2) states:

> …the implication of this for the students of society is that he must pay particular attention to the economic structure for studying other aspects of the society. Once we understand what the material assets and constraints of a society are, how the society produces goods to meet its material needs, how the goods are distributed, and what types of production, we have come a long way to understanding the culture of that society, its laws, its religious system, its that political system and even its modes of thought.

The implication of the ideas embedded in the Marxist political economy to the present study is that it is the material conditions of people that determine their perception of the world around them and the society they live in. Also, this equally to a large extent informs the nature or morality that obtains in any society in addition to ones involvement in terrorist movements and organization as well as its justification. For instance, the social consciousness that propels and impels terrorist activists within the Nigerian state can be located in the context of poverty, unemployment, government failure, administrative corruption, skewed distribution of natural resources, absence or breakdown of social services and psychopathic leadership that manifests in frustration. Very often, the people's response to these conditions of material wants find expression in violence (aggression) that either pit them against the state and fellow citizens in their struggle for recognition, attention and survival.

This implies that the more the level of dejection, deprivation and hopelessness one becomes in terms of attaining his material requirements; the higher the chances of the person joining militant or insurgent organisations. Besides, following Ekekwe (1986) since the state in Nigeria just like in most other post-colonial or *peripheral capitalist* formations has through its several institutions and apparatuses become a direct instrument for accumulation for the dominant class or its elements, it becomes evident that most citizens who though suffer material want and its vagrancies, which they blame on the state may not necessarily join the terrorists in fighting the state, however, they may refuse to pass-on vital intelligence regarding activities of these terrorist groups and their sponsors to the state and its agents. This to them, serve as their subtle way of registering the grievances and disaffection/dissatisfaction towards the state.

Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Conceptual Clarifications

Terrorism as a concept suffers from definitional problem such that at the moment it has no universally accepted definition [at least within the social sciences]. However, the international community agrees that certain acts constitute terrorist offences; especially when such acts cannot be justified on the grounds of any political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other consideration. It is on this note that the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism as adopted in Cairo, Egypt in 1998 sees terrorism as:

> Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupying or seizing them, or seeking to jeopardize national resources.

Besides, for the UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) terrorism is:

> criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

On its part, the European Union in Art.1 of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002) views terrorism as certain serious criminal offences against persons and property which:

> given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization were committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.

The United States, through its Federal Criminal Code, under Section 2331 of Chapter 113(B), conceive terrorism as:

> …activities that involve violent… or life-threatening acts… that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State and… appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and…(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States…

Meanwhile, Fletcher (2006:894) is of the view that "as the concept of terrorism fulfils multiple functions, the better way to think of terrorism is not as a crime but as a different dimension of crime, a higher, more dangerous version of crime, a kind of super-crime incorporating some of the characteristics of warfare. There are at least eight primary factors that bear on terrorism: the factor of violence; the required intention; the nature of the victims; the connection of the offender to the state; the justice and motive of their cause; the level of organization; the element of theatre; and the absence of guilt".

Piller (2001) explains that there are five elements of terrorism: first, terrorism is a premeditated act. It requires intent and prior decision to commit an act of terrorism. Terrorism doesn't happen by accident; rather, it is the result of an individual's or group's policy or decision. Second, terrorism is purposeful; it is political in its motive to change or challenge the status quo. Religiously oriented or national terrorists are driven by social forces or shaped by circumstances specific to their particular religious or nationalistic experiences (Reich, 1998). Third, terrorism is not like a war in which both sides can shoot at one another. Terrorism targets noncombatants, such as civilians who cannot defend themselves against the violence. The direct targets of terrorist activity are not the main targets. Fourth, terrorism is usually carried out by subnational groups or clandestine agents. If uniformed military soldiers attack a group, it is considered an act of war; an attack conducted by nongovernmental perpetrators is considered terrorism. Individuals acting alone may also commit terrorism. Finally, terrorism includes the threat of violence. It does not involve only terrorist acts that may have occurred; it also involves the potential for future attacks. Indeed, Leon-Guerrero (2011) identified six basic tactics that account for about ninety-five percent (95%) of all terrorist incidents: bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, kidnapping, hijackings, and other kinds of hostage seizures.

Counter-Terrorism

Counter terrorism encompasses laws, police, security, and military powers and measures directed at what states determine are terrorist threats (http://statecrime.org/state-crime-research/a-critical-introduction-to-counter-terrorism-and-state-crime/).

Preemption forms the basis of contemporary counter terrorism. Preemptive measures include a spectrum of coercive state practices, including surveillance, stop and search, control orders, coercive questioning, detention without charge or trial, shoot-to-kill, and military invasion (McCulloch & Pickering, 2009).

As Cortright (2011:13) stated:

Countering-terrorism requires not only improved security but better efforts to address the underlying conditions that give rise to terrorism. Resolving conflicts, ending foreign occupations, overcoming oppression, eradicating poverty, supporting sustainable development, empowering the marginalized, defending human rights, promoting good governance- all are vital to the struggle against terrorism, yet addressing these challenges is made more difficult by repressive counterterrorism policies.

Strategic approaches to counterterrorism often encompass several objectives, addressing different chronological stages in the occurrence of terrorism. These objectives can be broadly categorized as:

❖ Preventing men and women from becoming terrorists;
❖ Providing opportunities and support to individuals on a path to, or involved in, VERLT (Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism) to disengage;
❖ Denying terrorism suspects the support, resources and means to organize themselves or to plan and carry out attacks;
❖ Preparing for, and protecting against, terrorist attacks, in order to decrease the vulnerability of potential targets, in particular critical infrastructure;
❖ Pursuing terrorist suspects to apprehend them and bring them to justice; and
❖ Responding to terrorist attacks through proportionate measures to mitigate the impact of such attacks and to assist victims (OSCE, 2014:31).

Economic Roots of Terrorism in Nigeria: An Exploration

In all fields of the Social Sciences, ranging from anthropology to economics, geography to *religion*, sociology to social works, philosophy to psychology, public administration to political science various aspects and factors that predispose people to acts of terrorism are daily being discussed. However, any serious academic discourse on the roots/causes of terrorism in Nigeria must necessarily be located on the poverty-terrorism nexus (this does not mean that other factors – be it political, religious and ideological etc; do not contribute, however, there is a primacy of economic factors in terrorist gaming). Hence the issue this section seeks to highlight is on whether poverty is linked to terrorism in Nigeria? This brings to the fore, what Engels mean when he writes in *Anti-Duhring* that:

> …, the ultimate causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in the minds of men, in their increasing insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the mode of production and exchange; they are to be sought not in the philosophy but in the *economics* of the epoch concerned (Engels, Cited in Burns, 1935:279).

The import of the Engels's assertion is such that it links the conditions of material want and the perceptions of the people in addition to their attitude towards both the society and the state. An attitude they extend to any other person they arguably perceive to be part of the system that oppresses them.

Meanwhile existing scholarship is not yet settled on whether poverty causes terrorism or not. However, there exists at the moment a predominance of literature, which argues that the conditions of poverty either predispose someone to terrorist activities or enhance the goals of terrorism (Abadie, 2004; Whitehead, 2007; Aftab, 2008, and Ibaba, 2013; Raimi & Akubor, 2015). The above scholars were of the view that poverty standing alone cannot cause terrorism but can be a strong contributory factor to the menace of terrorism. However, Piazza (2006, 2011) was of the view that poverty and economic inequality do cause terrorism - a claim he demonstrated with the list of 10 countries worst hit by terrorist events using GDP per capita and HDI (Ibaba, 2013). Besides, Ibaba (2013) observed that poverty can hardly be disconnected from domestic terrorism. He stated that poverty without freedom and good governance can support terrorism, just as poverty within the context of a failed, fragile or failing state may trigger terrorism. The table below presents the causes of terrorism in selected countries.

Table 1: Causes of Terrorism in Selected Countries

Cause (s)	Country
Communities struck by poverty, disease, illiteracy, bitter hopelessness	Armenia
Social inequality, marginalization and exclusion	Benin
Political oppression, extreme poverty and the violation of basic rights	Costa Rica
Injustices, misery, starvation, drugs, exclusion, prejudices, despair for lack of perspectives	Dominican Republic
Inequality and oppression	Finland
Oppression	Malaysia
Alienation of the young in situations of economic deprivation and political tension and uncertainty, sense of injustice and lack of hope	New Zealand
Rejection of the West with all its cultural dimensions	Palestine
Hunger, poverty, deprivation, fear, despair, absence of sense of belonging to the human family	Namibia
Situations which lead to misery, exclusion, reclusion, the injustices which lead to growing frustration, desperation and exasperation	Senegal

Source: Schmid (2010:2).

On this note we observe that poverty acting alone in itself (that is in the absence of other socio-political factors such as resource allocation, political repression, political exclusion *et cetera*) is not and can never be neither a necessary nor sufficient conditions for terrorism. The question that remains is whether poverty coincides with other factors in Nigeria to trigger terrorism. The position of the study on the issue is an emphatic yes! For instance, scholars like Osaghe (2013), Animasawun (2013), Seidu (2013), Ibeh (2013) among others have identified and highlighted various pull and push factors that predispose people to militant and insurgent groups that adopt terrorist tactics in the country, as presented in the table below.

Table 2: Selected causes of terrorism in Nigeria

Cause of terrorism in Nigeria	Scholar
Militarism and military experiences, ethnic/religious pluralism, unemployment, poverty and failure of governance, socio-economic inequalities and demographic factors, small arms and ammunition trafficking, migration and indigene question	Nweke, 2004
Poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalization	Ojolo, 2013
Ethnicity, religion, regionalism, poverty, marginalization, exclusion, state failure, Islamic Puritanism	Osaghae 2013
Political thuggery, ethnicity, criminal gangs, perceived injustice, high unemployment rate, corruption, discrimination, battle for resource control and fighting among political gladiators	Seidu, 2013
Collective feeling of being oppressed by the state and its agents, collective sense of being alienated from the commonwealth of the country	Ibeh, 2013
Widespread poverty, illiteracy, high rate of youth unemployment and youth anger	Raimi & Akubor, 2015

Source: Authors compilation

The point to note is that poverty does not stand alone as monolithic cause and hotbed for terrorist generation in the country. Rather it in conjunction with other socio-political realities obtainable in the country serve as a conducive ground for the incubation, spread and propagation of terrorist psychologies/ideologies that engage both the Nigerian state and its citizens.

Corroborating this viewpoint, Okereke (2013:2) observes:

> Beyond the guise of religion and politics, there must be some compelling force that can galvanize an individual to waste his life and that of others as a suicide bomber or a terrorist. *Abysmal poverty, hopelessness/frustration, and joblessness have the potency to do this.* They say a hungry man is an angry man. It will take an amazing brain-washing dexterity to convince a gainfully employed young man or somebody with a thriving career to abandon the frills of his endeavor and be a slavish stooge for terrorism.

On this note, one can arguable posit that the high wired acts of militancy in the pre-amnesty Niger Delta as well as the current Boko Haram insurgent threat in the North East are both manifestations of admixture of poverty and political exclusion among other variables. For instance, in terms of absolute poverty by geo-political zone, the North-East since 1985 is the poorest zone in the country, with the highest incidence of poverty (ranging between 54.9% - 72.2%) (Laden, 2012). A similar trend was evident in the pre-1999 South West; post 2011 general election violence in the Northern parts of the country and the agitation in the South Eastern part of the country, where the Igbo's are being systematically alienated and excluded from both the economic and political structures of the country. Hence, Piazza (2011), in a study on poverty, minority economic discrimination and domestic terrorism observed that countries whose minority communities are affected by economic discrimination are more vulnerable to domestic terrorism. Highlighting the Nigerian case, Forrest (2012:31) posits:

> ... Many kinds of grievances can lead to schisms between the state and its citizens, and sometimes these can result in various forms of political violence, including insurgency and terrorism. Throughout Africa, one of the most common areas of a population's animosity toward the state has involved bad governance.....governance in Africa has often been based on very narrow, parochial interests—including tribal, clan, or family loyalties—to which collective interests of the general citizenry are subordinated......in Nigeria there is truly an abundance of problems that challenge most people's basic quality of life.... and many of them are a result of policy decisions made by government leaders.......the most common and salient grievances include corruption among political and economic elites, economic disparity, barriers to social and educational opportunity, energy poverty, environmental destruction, human insecurity, and injustice.

The study is not making the argument that there is a cause-effect relationship between poverty and terrorism. Rather the point is that the causal analysis of terrorism in Nigeria, and by extension counter terrorism policy, cannot overlook grievances emanating from material wants that the ideology of terrorist resonate in as well as render people vulnerable to recruitment/mobilisation by terrorist organisations like the 'Boko Haram' or kidnapping gangs whose activities qualify as terrorist acts in Nigeria (Ibaba & Okoye, 2015). Hence, Ibaba (2013:189) while highlighting the possible nexus between poverty line and the geography of terrorist organisations as well as their activities in the country, observe:

> The dominance of the poor in the membership of the protest movements that engage in terrorism, as evidenced by the poor socio-economic status of those arrested on allegations of terrorism and the concentration of these groups (protest movements) in poorer neighbourhoods, highlights poverty as a factor which should be investigated via terrorism studies in Nigeria.

Counter-Terrorist Approaches of the Nigerian State

The Nigerian state had over the years used various measures and tactics in its attempt to quell the terrorist challenges and disturbances in the country. This section highlights and discusses these responses.

Legislative Approach/Measures

In its fight against the hydra headed monster of terrorism in the country, the Nigerian state had initiated and applied a number of legislative measures that were aimed at curtailing and eliminating the menace of terrorism in the country. This it did through the criminalization of terrorism in the country as evidenced in the drafting, passage and signing into law on June 3rd – the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) 2011, the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2011, the Money Laundering Prohibition Act, 2011, the Amendment of the Terrorism Prevent Act (2012), which is aimed at strengthening the legal framework for fighting terrorism; as well as the Terrorism Prevention Amendment Act 2013**,** which provide measures for the prevention, prohibition and combating of acts of terrorism, the financing of terrorism in Nigeria and for the effective implementation of the prevention and combating terrorism, presenting penalties for violating any of its provisions. The Act has made provisions for various ways that terrorism could likely be committed and their punishment thereto.

Besides, the Nigerian government had equally created the position of a counter-terrorism Coordinator in the National Security Advisers Office that is to coordinate the activities and plans of the counter-terrorism unit in all security agencies (Obuseh, 2013).

State of Emergency

A state of emergency is a governmental declaration that may suspend some normal functions of the executive, legislative and judicial powers, alert citizens to change their normal behaviours. It can be used as a rationale for suspending rights and freedoms, even if guaranteed under the Constitution. Such declaration usually comes during a time of natural or man-made disasters, during periods of civil unrest or following a declaration of war or situation of international or internal armed conflict. Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides for the proclamation and imposition of a state of emergency covering the whole country or in any part of it. This section empowers the President to issue a proclamation of a state of emergency by way of official Gazette. Specifically, section 305(1) observes: "Subject to the provision of the Constitution the President may by instrument published in the official Gazette of the Government of the Federation issue a proclamation of a state of emergency in the Federation or any part thereof".

Under an emergency rule, where the security of lives and property is threatened; elected political office holders could be suspended; as in the case of Governor Joshua Dariye of Plateau State during President Obasanjo's administration. Besides, on May 14th 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan appropriating the provisions of the Section 305(1) declared a state of emergency on the three states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states citing the insecurity and terrorist threats from the Boko Haram sect as the reason for the action in a national broadcast. He specifically stated that:

> Following recent developments in the affected states, it has become necessary for Government to take extraordinary measures to restore normalcy. After wide consultations, and in exercise of the powers conferred on me by the provisions of Section 305, sub-section 1 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended, I hereby declare a State of Emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states (Goodluck, 2013).

Ditto to the fact that the President had earlier in December 2011, proclaimed a state of emergency in some local governments in some northern states. Under the emergency rule, the military and the police take over ensuring security of the declared areas in the state or country. They could take control of strategic places within the state, man check points at several places, conduct detailed stop and search of individuals who may try to smuggle in weapons of any sorts into such areas to further escalate the unrest (Adedeji, n.d.) http://thelawyerschronicle.com/state-of-emergency-in-nigeria-a-means-or-an-end/).

Negotiation and Amnesty

The fourth republic governments of the Nigerian State (1999-2007, 2007-2009, 2009-2015 and 2015-date) have been using negotiation as one of its anti-terrorist strategies wherein it meets, engages

and dialogues with the terrorist elements (militant and insurgents). In this wise, the Goodluck Jonathan administration constituted a negotiation team known as the Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee that held peace talks with some "Boko Haram Commanders" in Cote d'Ivoire, with support of the its 'GOC' – Shekau, which was aimed at achieving ceasefire. Again, following his appointment as the National Security Adviser (NSA), Sambo Dasuki in his official capacity as the NSA made a direct call to Shekau in an attempt to broker peaceful negotiation between the parties.

Moreover, soon after inauguration and assumption of office, the administration of President Buhari as ably represented by its spokesman in the person of Femi Adesina while fielding answers in an interview with British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) noted that the administration was open to negotiation with Boko Haram. In fact, his clarification on the Boko Haram negotiation issue is worth quoting in extenso:

> Most wars, however furious or vicious, often end around the negotiation table. So, if Boko Haram opts for negotiation, the government will not be averse to it. Government will, however, not be negotiating from a position of weakness, but that of strength. The machinery put in place, and which will be set in motion soon, can only devastate and decapitate insurgency. It is multinational in nature, and relief is on the way for Nigeria and her neighbours. President Muhammadu Buhari is resolute. He has battled and won insurgency before, he is poised to win again. It is a promise he made to Nigerians, and he is a promise keeper. But I say again, if the insurgents want to negotiate, no decent government will be averse to such. Didn't the Taliban and Americans also negotiate in Afghanistan? (cited in Ndibe, 2015).

The point to note from the above assertion is that the Buhari government right from its inception has negotiation as one of its pillars for handling the Boko Haram challenge. In a more concrete term the Minister of Information, Lai Mohammed, had in his September 16, 2016 statement to the public, observed that the Federal Government had through the Department for State Services, opened negotiation with the group holding the abducted Chibok school girls July 17, 2015. Meanwhile, the state has equally used the amnesty package in its quest to overcome the militant-styled terrorist activities in the oil rich Niger Delta region by the administration of late President Musa Yar'Adua. For this to happen, the President, through the then Vice-President, Goodluck Jonathan met and negotiated with militant leaders, elders and other stakeholders in the area, as well as Henry Okah, the leader to the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which paved the way for the Presidential proclamation of amnesty for "repentant militants in the Niger Delta" on June 25th, 2009 through the instrumentality of Section 175 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Again, in an attempt to stem the spate of the incessant and mindless terrorist attacks by the Boko Haram insurgent group the Nigerian government under Joanthan's administration equally tinkered with the idea of extending the amnesty packages to the members of the Boko Haram, as was evidenced in the 26-member amnesty committee of April 17th 2013, which was headed by Kabiru Turaki the then Minister of Special Duties. In a more concrete term Durutoye (2013) observed that: The report of the committee renamed the Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee, submitted to the president on 5 November, said many insurgents ―positively responded to contacts and have accepted the dialogue options [as being] capable of full resolution of the conflict.

Hostage-Prisoners Swap

Another technique that has been utilized by the Nigerian state in managing the menace and trauma of terrorism in the country is practice of hostage-prisoner swap deal as was evidenced in the case of the Chibok school girls. The idea of swapping the abducted girls in exchange for some captured Boko Haram members in detention was said to have been initiated by the administration of former President Goodluck Jonathan. Meanwhile, the Buhari administration on July 17, 2015, established another negotiation with the insurgents who demanded the release of its members in government prisons as part of the conditions for releasing the girls. Besides, the Minister of Information, Lai Mohammed stated that between July 2015 and August 2015, the Nigerian Army and the Air Force sent their

specialists to commence the arrangement for the swap, which according to him include among other things the number of girls and detainees to be swapped; safety of persons and the location of the swap (Cooljoe, 2016). This culminated in the recent swap deal between the federal government on the one hand and the Boko Haram terrorist sect on the other, in which detained member of the terrorist sect where traded for the release of eighty two (82) of the Chibok school girls abducted from their school on April 14, 2014 by the sect.

Military campaign/civilian vigilantes (Fire-for-Fire Approach)
The fire for fire approach of the Nigerian state towards the management of terrorist activities in the country represents the "*Stick method*" of the practical approach of Nigeria's fight against terrorism. The approach is basically characterized by military operations targeted at pre-empting, preventing and destroying the hideouts of the insurgents/militant groups as well as decimating their capacity to plan, coordinate and execute attacks around the country not to mention being in control of any parts of the country.

Meanwhile, the approach is composed of three distinct mechanisms namely: the Joint Task Force (JTF); the civilian vigilante; and the Multinational Joint Task force (MNJTF) an anti-terrorist alliance that include Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and non-military representation from Benin republic. Indeed, the Joint Task force (JTF) is comprised of special unit of the Nigerian Military, Police and the State Security (Secret) Services. The body is tasked with the responsibility of bringing to an end all the activities of terrorist groups across the country. For instance, in order to stem the militancy in the Niger Delta a joint taskforce codenamed – Operation Pulo Shield (OPS) was instituted, which was later disbanded and replaced with Operation Delta Safe (ODS) in the face of the challenge by militant group named the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA). The military had equally carried out "Operation Crocodile Smile", and "Operation Crocodile Tears" in the region. Similarly, the Joint task force in the Northeast that is combating the dreadful Boko Haram insurgent groups had been variously codenamed such as operation BOYONA, Operation Lafiya Dole, "Operation Crackdown", "Operation Gama Aiki". Again, the lingering and terrorist style security threats between Plateau and Bauchi, equally witnessed the establishment of such military operation code named "Operation Safe Haven" (OPSH). Beside the military operations in the activities of the JTF in the fight against the Boko Haram is evidenced in the deployment of 3,600 personnel to Maiduguri and other major towns in the Northeast in 2011. Again, between 11th – 12th May 2011, additional 2000 security personnel and military equipment were sent to Maiduguri. Primally as a means to ensuring both efficiency and quick response to emergency situations the 7th Division of the Nigerian Army was established on August 19th 2013, which became operational on 22nd August 2013. Interestingly, on assumption of office as the President and Grand Commander of Federal Republic, Buhari ordered the immediate relocation of the defence headquarters from Abuja to Maiduguri.

Meanwhile, the Nigerian government and that of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin republics have instituted a Joint Multinational Taskforce that started operation on July 30th 2015, with a planned strength of 8,700 personnel. Indeed, Nigeria, under President Jonathan pledged to cover the main cost of funding the MNJTF, which President Buhari renewed on June 11th 2015 with a deposit of $100 million (Vanguard, 2015, and Thisday, 2015) with the insistence that the post of the MNJTF's commander is to be held by a Nigerian until the end of the Boko Haram challenge.

The last leg of the stick approach towards the management of terrorism in the country especially in relation to the Boko Haram terrorist activities in the Northeast is the use of Civilian vigilante's (aka – civilian JTF) in combating, routing and arresting Boko Haram or suspected Boko Haram members. In line with the saying "new broom sweeps clean but old broom knows the corner"; the civilian vigilante groups and hunters armed with machete, bow and arrows, swords and daggers, *et cetera* in addition to their versed knowledge of the nook and cranies of the area have been assisting the military JTF in its fights against the Boko Haram terrorist elements in the Northeast.

Meanwhile, despite all its gains and successes, the question remains – has the military campaign as the primal counter-terrorist measure of the Nigerian state succeeded in exterminating the terrorists challenge in the country? The study does not think so. The reason for this position among other things can be summed up in the assertion of the McGregor (2015) wherein he observes: Expectations that the

election of new Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari would lead to effective military measures against northeast Nigeria's Boko Haram militants have been dashed in recent weeks as the terrorist group carried out strikes on Chad and Niger, in addition to an intensified campaign of suicide bombings within Nigeria.

The study does not in any way underestimates the successes recorded so far by the military in their fight against terrorist elements around the country. However, the point to note is that the *continuous coordinated* strikes in the country by terrorist elements such as BH with accuracy that often result in loss of human lives, injuries, displacements and destruction of property is a pointer that there is need for change of strategy in our fight against terrorism in the country.

Managing Terrorism in Nigeria: IS There A Need for Paradigm Shift?

Has the Nigerian state been combating terrorist activities in the country? Yes!! Is the method capable of achieving the desired result? We don't think so! In fact our answer is both yes and no. yes in the sense that the military campaign and operations which is the primal technique of the Nigerian government had been able to decimate insurgent groups around the country most especially the Boko Haram sect; but the same cannot be said of the terrorist element of the phenomena. The point being made is that while insurgent groups threatens, questions and contest both the authority and legitimacy of constituted authority in addition to laying claim (sovereignty) over parts of the territory of the government it fights – as was evidenced in the activities of the BH in the Northeast as well as during the heydays of the Niger Delta Militancy. Terrorism on the other hand is but a tactics used by militant and insurgent groups in their struggle. In fact, terrorism can be adopted and applied by anybody. For instance, while the military force had dislodged the BH insurgents from their strongholds in the Northeast most especially the dreaded Sambisa forest; it had not been able to preempt and prevent the series of suicide bombings and clandestine attacks at such public places like market, mosques, churches, IDP's camps, eateries, entertainment centre's et cetera. This seem to call into question the claim by the Nigerian military that it has "wiped out" all known Boko Haram terror camps and cells in the northeast and that the Islamist insurgents were so militarily defeated and weakened that they could never hold territory in any part of the country again Specifically the spokesman of the Nigerian Defence, Co Rabe Abubakar stated during a press conference at the Defense Headquarters in Abuja, observed:

> As I am speaking to you, all the terrorists' camps have completely been wiped out. So, right now they are completely in disarray, having no command and control of where to plan. We have even taken over the camps that most of them have even abandoned their bases and blended within towns and communities, …We are making a lot of headways and a lot of achievements and people should know that Boko Haram is no longer strong enough to hold ground. Very soon this issue of whether they are in control of any territory in Nigeria or not will come to the open (Winsor, 2015) http://www.ibtimes.com/boko-haram-camps-wiped-out-northeast-nigeria-military-says-2090757).

Moreover, the Chief of Army Staff, Buratai while assuring Nigerians and the people of northeast in particular that their lives, businesses and properties will experience changes in the right direction in 2016 stated:

> Since Mr President's mandate, we have done a lot to defeat these criminals; we have degraded them in such a manner that they can no longer hold any ground in our country. They can no longer coordinate any attacks; we will, in the coming few days, completely close in on them, so the outlook for 2016 is bright. I want to assure Nigerians, especially the Northeast, that 2016 will be more peaceful (Buratai, 2015).

Contrarily, a number of comments and arguments have been directed at the claims by the Nigerian government, and the Nigerian military that it had decimated the Boko Haram terrorist group in the face of post-presidential deadline for the military to route and completely destroy the terrorist

elements by December 2015 (Boko Haram). Indeed, Fayose, the Governor of Ekiti state while commiserating with the Governors of Borno and Adamawa State, and the families that lost their loved ones in addition to those that were injured during a December 2015 BH attacks; in a statement issued by his Special Assistant on Public Communications and New Media, Lere Olayinka, posits:

> If Boko Haram had indeed been technically defeated as Lai Mohammed made Nigerians believe, what do we call the Sunday and Monday attacks in Maiduguri, Borno State capital and Madagali, Adamawa State? Should we say that the 'technically' defeated Boko Haram insurgents 'manually' attacked Borno and Adamawa States, killing close to 100 Nigerians and injuring several others? Only Lai Mohammed who told Nigerians that Boko Haram had been technically defeated can tell us what happened and he must have to explain how 'technically defeated' insurgents could carry out such deadly attacks (Balogun, 2015 - http://sunnewsonline.com/new/explain-borno-adamawa-attacks-fayose-tells-lai-mohammed/).

On a similar note, former Military Head of State, Gen. Gowon equally faulted President Muhammadu Buhari and the Nigerian military over the December deadline for ending the Boko Haram insurgency. Although, he noted that the military would do its best to meet the December deadline, expressing "absolute confidence" in the ability of the Nigerian armed forces to defeat Boko Haram. He however warned that no person can confidently talk about the particular time a military operation would end (Eze, 2015).

It is on this note that the study seeks to understand why it has been difficult for the military campaign to put to rest the issue of terrorism in the country. The reason for this is again, twofold! First, terrorism unlike insurgency or militancy naturally assumes the nature of lone-wolf or guerrilla warfare. As a result of its hide and seek character; terrorist attacks usually incorporate the elements of surprise and unconventional strategies of war like hit and run in their activities. The implication is such that since the military are technically and tactically trained for conventional wars - it thus becomes difficult for them to gainfully confront and win the war on terrorism without applying the "*carrot approach*" to a reasonable extent. Though, we are not by any mean saying that the military are not doing a good job. Our argument however, is that military option alone cannot fundamentally address the problem of terrorism in the country. Besides, the former Senate President, David Mark held a similar view when he observed that:

> Our response to terrorism cannot depend on might and military force alone. The bigger challenge is to win the hearts and minds of the locals from whom the fanatics recruit their foot soldiers. To win hearts and reshape attitudes, we must identify and address the root causes of this extremism and sectarian hate (Mark cited in Hassan, 2013).

It is therefore at the face of seeming failure of the military option that we propose and interrogate the second aspect of the change in the country's anti-terrorist strategies. In order to adequately capture and present our second argument which also doubles as our proposed shift in paradigm. Let us recollect from the propositions in our theoretical construct that; ….it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness (Marx, 1859).

A number of ideas can be gleaned from the citation above especially as it relates to the fight against terrorism in Nigeria. First, is that terrorism does not evolve or endure in a vacuum; rather it finds expression in the material conditions (social reality) of the people, which propels/predispose them to indulge in violent acts. The point is that in Nigeria today, despite the country's over abundance (in relation to most other third world countries) in human and natural resources the people co-habit side by side with abject poverty justifying the notion of the paradox of poverty amidst plenty as is evidenced in the Human Development Index (HDI) record of the country that is occasioned by absence of good governance, deficient public services and official corruption that have continually placed the country at the precipice or threshold of failing state group of countries. The multiplier effects of which is captured

in the high rate of joblessness, unemployment, hopelessness, sectionalism, ethnic politics *et cetera* and by implication rising wave of crime and violence that peaks at acts of terrorism targeted at the state. The point to note is that it is under this condition of material poverty, rising unemployment, widening gap between the rich and the poor, infrastructural decay, absence/dysfunctional public services, political repression and exclusion that terrorism festers around the country. Hence, poverty and unemployment prepares both the youths and a particular section (ethnic group) in the country to either accept to wage or join in terrorist acts against the Nigerian state. This prompted Okereke (2013:2) to observe:

> The Boko Haram miasma is the butterfly-effect of a dysfunctional society. Urgent action must be taken to shrink unprecedented corruption, culture of impunity/arrogance of power, acute poverty, soaring unemployment and whittling radical religious fundamentalism by run-of-the-mill clerics. Our extensive porous border contributes too. Efforts must be geared towards ensuring that every Nigerian irrespective of place of birth or the family he/she is born into has a chance to actualize his or her God-given potentials. Skill acquisition programmes must also be put in place across Nigeria to absorb, engage idle and frustrated youths.

In his account of the economic conditions of ordinary Nigerians that predispose them to terrorism, Adeyemi (2012) stated that, frustration, dejection and hopelessness remain a daily experience in their lives. They can easily be brainwashed and indoctrinated into illegal activities and terrorism. We make bold to say that terrorism, among other challenges, is the price we pay for producing a "reserved army" of depraved, deprived, frustrated and unemployed youths as a consequence of official corruption and a dysfunctional federal system of government.

Indeed, even the Nigerian government just like the "*Utopian Socialists*" of the pre-Marxist era are beginning to cognate and accept that hardship, poverty, economic inequality and rising youth unemployment serve as potential basis for terrorist recruitments. However, what is actually lacking is the political and leadership will to practically address those social problems. It was on this note that President, Goodluck Jonathan aptly stated that "I agree totally that until we create jobs, until Nigerians can wake up and find food to eat, until Nigerians sick can walk to the hospitals and get treatment, the economic indices may not mean much to us" (Jonathan cited in Wakili, 2013). Just as Nwolise (2013) had observed that there is an urgent need for change in strategy. There is need now to lay more emphasis on (early) dialogue, global justice, and war against poverty.

Conclusion/Recommendations

It may be argued that the state as the only institution that is saddled with the primary responsibility to impose and maintain order in the human society is at liberty to use its coercive apparatus in doing this, whenever and wherever it deem necessary. However, socio-political wisdom equally teaches that military might and force alone does not usually win all types of wars. The position was supported by the former Governor of CBN Mallam Sanusi Lamido Sanusi when during the flag off of the CBN Financial Inclusion Strategy Pilot Implementation Programme, in Maiduguri, argued that "I believe that at the heart of Boko Haram crisis in Borno and other parts of the country is unemployment and poverty and we can never fix security until we fix economy" (*The Economist*, 2013). This implicates the fact that when the economy is in order and people are gainfully employed and rewarded, in addition to satisfying their material needs; it will be difficult for the terrorist to easily recruit and radicalise people into their rank and file.

Arising from the preceding line of argument is the fact that a state of emergency should be declared on poverty and unemployment in the country. Again, our leaders and other high placed public servants should shun corrupt practices while enthroning good governance, which will ensure social justice, democratic dividends and insure patriotism on the part of the citizens. Through this, the citizens will not only believe they have a stake in the Nigerian state but will complement and assist the military in their fight against terrorism in the country.

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