

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF
AFRICAN STUDIES
30, 1-2 (2008), pp. 1-10
DOI: 10.1080/00222180802222222

US PRESIDENT OBAMA AND THE DIPLOMACY OF GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY IN AFRICA

Ifesinachi, Ken, Ph.D
Senior Lecturer
Department of Political Science
University of Nigeria, Nsukka

Abstract

This study examines US President Barack Obama's transformational diplomacy of growth and opportunity for Africa and the promise it holds for African renaissance. The US government under President Obama construes its African diplomacy in terms of a partnership that rejects the old imperialistic perception of the U.S. and the West as patrons. This study, thus, x-rays US diplomacy under Obama against the backdrop of the structural imperatives of the global economy. Deriving from the Marxian theory of social production, the potentials of change in vibrant youthful energy resources of Africa and the capacity of democratic political leadership to engineer change is problematised.

Introduction

President Obama's African diplomacy stems from his melancholic recognition of his African heritage and rot, cynicism, despair, disease and conflict that ravage Africa. Nevertheless, he sees Africa as a participant in global politics that will also contribute to changes in our 21st century world. He sees US-African partnership to devolve on much responsibility in which Africa's future is up to Africans with the strength of African democracy helping to advance human rights for people everywhere (Obama, 2009). During Obama's visit to Ghana, he noted that in the first decades of independence in African states, much effort was made in the area of development with Africa's political icons such as Nkrumah, Kenyatta, etc, but these earlier gains have been lost as Africa has become badly outpaced in development indices.

While acknowledging the link between tribalism and patronage in African development, President Obama sought to shift the blame of African development away from the West to African leaders who had the responsibility to manage affairs after independence (Obama, 2009). However, in view of the global interconnectedness of the global economy and structure of international division of labour and unequal exchange, extant literature construe it illogical for major world actors like the US government and businesses to be absolved from complicity in the fortunes of Africa and the African dilemma. The Obama charge to African societies

DONATED BY AMB. DR. KINGSLEY EBENYI
TO THE
DEPT. OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
NAPSS EXCO 2011/2012

Ifesinachi, Ken, Ph.D

33

and their leadership, however, derive from the exigencies of the creation struggle and the capacity of leaders to transform their society in spite of the constraints of prevalent structural imperatives. The import of the US diplomacy is that despite US government overtures, linkages and commitments, it still boils down to what African societies and leaders can do with them.

In this light, Obama sees African development as a responsibility to be met by Africans based on good governance. While pledging substantial increases in foreign assistance, he stated that US aid is not to help Africa scrape by but to forge a partnership in building the capacity for transformational change (Obama, 2009). With respect to mutual responsibility as the foundation of US-African relations, the US government identified democracy, opportunity, health, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. On US African policy, Hillary Clinton had earlier outlined Obama's African policy to be rooted in security, political, economic and humanitarian interests (Corey, 2009:1). Clinton stated that the Obama administration's foreign policy objectives for Africa also include "combating al-Qaeda's efforts to seek safe havens in failed states in the Horn of Africa; helping African nations to conserve their natural resources and reap fair benefits from them; stopping the war in Congo DR, ending autocracy in Zimbabwe and human devastation in Darfur. Hillary Clinton added that the Obama administration "recognises that even when we cannot fully agree with some governments, we share a bond of humanity with their people. Thus, she stressed that "we must work hard with our African friends to reach the Millennium Development Goals in health, education and economic opportunities". Hillary Clinton also referred to a set of goals set out by the United Nations that seek to end poverty and hunger; instill universal education, gender equality, child and maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS and promote environmental sustainability and global partnerships (Corey, 2009:1).

Similarly at the 8th Forum of AGOA in Nairobi Kenya 2009, Hillary Clinton mentioned four areas in which concrete opportunities can be seized to include: trade, development, good governance, and women (Clinton, 2009). In the light of the foreign policy position of the Obama administration towards Africa, this study shall attempt to explain the prospects and potentials of the Obama African policy in the light of the structural imperatives of globalisation and its neoliberal framework in which the African economies are expected to thrive. In other words, is US President Obama's transformational diplomacy of growth and opportunity for Africa through the review of AGOA capable of engendering the development Africa needs?

Theoretical Perspective

The analysis of the potentials of U.S. President Obama's diplomacy of growth and opportunity for Africa is assessed under the analytic context of the Marxian theory of social production given the neoliberal dynamics of the global

political economy and globalisation. The Marxian theory of social production sees the inevitability of contradictions and crisis in capitalist class societies. The crisis in capitalist society is seen to stem from the material production of use value in which labour produces value beyond its subsistence with the surplus going to the owners of capital. This implies that in African peripheral nexus of neoliberal capitalist production, the African surplus goes to the U.S. and the West, owners of capital. The socialisation of production and private expropriation of surplus emanating from socialised production is perceived as the primary contradiction leading to crisis as evident in the contradiction between national and international accumulation (Marx, 1970b).

This capitalist development contradiction refers to the fact that multilateral finance and credit agencies, the IMF, World Bank, MNCs, World Trade Organisation (WTO), Banks, Stock Exchangers, the London and Paris Clubs of creditors, African businessmen and government agents interact to produce a highly integrated but unequal global capitalist economy. The level of Africa's control over the world economy, extent of Africa's dependence on the world market and the capacity to expropriate surplus from abroad for national production, defines the African crisis and the prospect of transformational change of the Obama diplomacy of revitalising AGOA.

The point is that the African post-colonial neoliberal economy is externally determined. Africans were never consulted as to whether they wanted liberal economies or not. African governments opened up their economies to reckless deregulated neoliberal reforms and became like an international market place where any firm, agency, group or person would go in and out without restriction in spite of the deleterious consequences (Mueni, 2008:88). As a result of the crisis that developed from the imposition of neoliberal reforms, international financial institutions and non-governmental organisations have progressively become the major political actors in Africa contributing to the deepening malaise. The ensuing malaise in its economic, political, institutional, social and cultural manifestation is explained by Chinweizu (cited in Mueni, 2008:88) thus: "The sole purpose of the West and its agencies in Africa is not to introduce democracy or development, but ... to buy cheap and sell dear and thus make the maximum profit."

Reckless deregulated neoliberal reforms in Africa aggravated the African condition typically. Reinsert (2007:28) acknowledges that the response of state economies to the orthodox prescription and the enthusiastic implementation of reforms have been dismal even as the Chinese economy is quickly assuming the centre of the global economy without mainstream conventional precepts. The cacophony of ideas, confusion and muddle arising from the permutations of *laissez-faire* economics, Ricardian trade theory, neoliberalism and Washington Consensus in development theory has been laid threadbare. Neoliberal economics apparently genetically cloned from the free market mantras of Adam Smith has been ridiculed

by the global economic crisis. The capacity of institutions to provide economic incentives rather than the institutional form of globalisation is taking centre stage (Reinert, 2007:128).

The central pathology of neoliberal economic theory is the privileging of formal mathematical modeling unable to capture qualitative economic activities that end up as quantitative differences in income and missing out the synergies, linkages and systemic effects that constitute the glue, that bonds economies and societies together (Reinert, 2007:28). Unequal economic exchange has proven a handicap to economic mathematisation in national economic accounting. Flying in the face of current orthodoxies, restriction in capital flows, state run industrialisation and nascent industry protection in market economies of Ireland, Chile and Peru has proved to stimulate economic development (Taylor, 2008:545).

In the 1960s and 1970s, per capita income in Latin America was growing at 3.1% per year, slightly faster than the developing country average. With neoliberalism in the 1980s, Latin America has been growing at less than one-third of the rate of the "bad old days" (Chang, 2008:28). The government of Britain, while an ardent advocate of free trade, achieved its economic supremacy through high tariffs and extensive subsidies (Chang, 2008:16). An unholy trinity of interest groups, politicians and bureaucrats in pursuit of personal interest has been alluded to (Rodrik, 2007:240) as the harbinger of flawed policies. This is typified by the interests of Western powers and their agents, political leaders and the bureaucracy in Africa that convey cyclical contradictions into the African political economy.

While developing countries are cajoled and blackmailed into short term institutional economic reform to address long term contradictions, the government of the United States, to take a particular telling example, was hardly a paragon of free-trade virtue while catching up with and surpassing the government of Britain (Rodrik, 2007:240). With respect to the fortunes of poor countries and their failure to thrive, Collier (2007) identifies four crucial traps, to wit:

- The conflict trap;
- Natural resources trap;
- The trap of being landlocked with bad neighbours; and
- The trap of bad governance (Collier, 2007:79).

Collier (2007:64) argues that governance and policy help a country to realize its opportunities, but they cannot generate opportunities where none exist and they cannot defy gravity. African societies are mired by the debt trap and economic woes propelled by a corruption reinforcing structure of the global movement of capital reproducing and accentuating bad governance. Such an institutional framework of endemic debt and bad governance cannot create opportunities nor can it be driven by it. Collier (2007) argues for the infusion of a combination of aid, security, laws and charters into ailing economies with natural resources. He argues that a charter between commodity purchasers encouraging greater transparency in the use of

export revenues might help to empower morally courageous reformers within these countries with the G8 the most fitting institution to achieve it (Collier, 2007:83). Taylor (2008:554) however argues that governments will take the recommendations that are politically convenient and discard the rest. With respect to governments and policy decisions, it is important to note that while regional economic integration among African states is more favourable to their economies, patron-based linkages now refurbished as partnership is encouraged and is more dominant.

Meeting priority needs, creating opportunities, advancing African unity, self-determination, freedom from conflict, fear and hunger has always been aggravated by Western partnership beginning from the civilising mission, the dual mandate and globalisation. African leaders who attempted to radically transform their society Kwame Nkrumah, Patrice Lumumba, Modibo Keita, Thomas Sankara, Marien N'Gouabi, Samora Machel fell to international conspiracy that fingers the complicity of the West.

In Colin Leys and John Saul's analysis of Global Capitalism in Sub-Saharan Africa, they pose the question: Is Africa a victim of exploitation or of marginalisation? This question they answer in the affirmative.

The short answer must be both. In the popular meaning of exploitation, Africa suffers acutely from exploitation; every packet of cheap Kenyan tea sold in New York, every overpriced tractor exported to Nigeria, every dollar of interest on ill-conceived and negligently supervised loans to African governments (interest that accrues to Western banks) not to mention every diamond illegally purchased from warlords in Sierra Leone or Angola benefits people in the West at the expense of Africa's impoverished populations (Saul, 2005:20-21).

The views of Leys and Saul (2005) speak volumes on Africa-West partnership and mutual responsibility. The essential features of the African postcolonial state have been explained by Smith (2003) in these words:

The bankrupt African state is no longer able to meet its commitment and to fulfil its obligations towards its people. In Africa, the flip side of the weak state is authoritarian dictatorship that cannot distinguish between private and public revenues (Smith, 2003:67-82).

Recent events in Mozambique and elsewhere, according to Plank (1993), suggest that the most likely successor to post-colonial sovereignty will be neo-colonial vassalage, in which the Western powers assume direct and open-ended control over administration, security and economic policies under the banner of the UN and various donors (Plank, 1993:429-430). This study, thus, applies the Marxian theory of social reproduction and its implications for African neo-liberal economies, the global political economy, and state autonomy in economic decisions, to explain US

government partnership with Africa intended to advance growth and opportunity. It is to these issues that we now turn.

President Barrack Obama's Africa Policy

U.S. President Obama's Africa policy hinges on what he called a partnership relationship rather than one of patronage. US partnership is geared, according to Obama, to building the capacity for transformational change that will unlock Africa's potential. Obama pointedly delivered his Africa policy in his official visit to sub-Saharan Africa in Ghana in 2009 (Obama, 2009:2). The responsibility for change in Africa, he said, has to be met by Africans, by the young people brimming with talent and energy and hope who can claim the future that the past generations of African giants dreamed but never had. A future anchored on the ingredients of development and upon good governance. The foundation of US-Africa partnership he explained in terms of mutual responsibility in four areas that are critical to the future of Africa and the entire developing world, to wit:

- Democracy;
- Opportunity;
- Health; and
- The peaceful resolution of conflict (Obama, 2009:2-3).

On democracy in Africa, Obama stressed that African peoples must support strong sustainable democratic governments. He stated that each nation gives life to democracy in its own way and in line with its own traditions. He, however, candidly reminds Africans that governments that are more prosperous, more stable, and more successful are the ones that respect the will of their own people as borne out by historical experience.

Obama sees democracy in Africa to be more than holding elections but about also what happens between them. He stated that African peoples should eschew various forms of repression, brutality, tyranny and corruption that condemn the people to poverty. With emphasis on people's lives, he sees democracy to be given life by strong institutional political frameworks such as:

- Strong parliaments;
- Honest police force;
- Independent judges;
- Independent journalists;
- Vibrant private sector; and
- Vibrant civil society (Obama, 2009:3).

While noting that Africa needs strong political institutions rather than strong men, Obama saw the coming together of civil society and business in Kenya to help

stop post-election violence; in South Africa where over three quarters of the country voted on its fourth election after the end of apartheid; in Zimbabwe where the Election Support Network braved brutal repression to stand up for the principle of the sacred right of a person's vote; to be positive democratic trends in Africa. Obama also acknowledged political leaders who accept defeat graciously and victors who resist calls to wield power against the opposition choosing constitutional rule over autocracy as in Ghana.

To advance the course of U.S. foreign policy on democracy and good governance in Africa, Obama reiterated that the U.S. government is committed to increasing assistance for responsible individuals and institutions with a focus on supporting good governance notably:

- On parliaments, which check abuses of power and ensure that opposition voices are heard;
- On the rule of law, which ensures the equal administration of justice;
- On civic participation so that young people will get involved; and
- On concrete solutions to corruption like forensic accounting, automating services, strengthening hotlines, and protecting whistle-blowers to advance transparency and accountability (Obama, 2009:4).

In the second area of partnership, the US government is billed to focus on supporting development that provides opportunity for more people. The thrust of US commitment is to inspire investment in the people and infrastructure, promotion of multiple export industries, development of a skilled workforce, and creating space for small and medium-sized businesses that create jobs. Obama focuses on training people to do things for themselves through US \$3.5 billion food security initiative focused on new methods and technologies for farmers. The US government is also committed to broaden prosperity through public-private partnerships that invest in better roads and electricity, capacity building that trains people to grow in business and financial services that reach poor and rural areas based on micro-finance initiative.

The US government sees energy as an area that holds out both undeniable peril and extraordinary promise. In this area, the US government plans to help countries increase access to power while skipping the dirtier phase of development. This it hopes to achieve by helping to harness Africa's bountiful wind and solar power, geothermal energy and bio-fuels (Obama, 2009:5).

The U.S. government expressed its commitment to strengthening public health through a comprehensive global health strategy. In this area, the U.S. government committed \$63 billion to fight HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and eradicating polio, neglected tropical diseases as well as promoting wellness and the health of mothers and children (Obama, 2009:5).


On conflicts in Africa, the U.S. government welcomes the steps that are being taken by organisations like the African Union and ECOWAS to better resolve conflicts and keep the peace. The US government encourages the vision of a strong, regional security architecture that can bring effective, transnational force to bear when needed. Obama stated that the US government will use its Africa Command to confront common challenges and strengthen African capacity in genocide in Darfur, terrorists in Somalia through diplomacy, technical assistance and logistical support (Obama, 2009:6).

With respect to the major thrust of US President Obama's diplomacy in Africa, there is no doubt that political will and good intentions can hardly explain the inevitability of crisis in capitalist societies or the tendency for surplus to accrue to the owners of capital. In the long run, without concerted internal social transformation and total overhaul of the structure of social production, African democracy will remain a mirage in which concocted subterfuge of elections and *de facto* single party systems operate in the face of multipartism. US overture will nevertheless contend with the structures of Africa's neoliberal capitalist economies, which in its present configuration is crisis-prone holding little promise.

Obama and AGOA

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) passed in May 2000 and signed by U.S. President Bill Clinton, aims to increase trade between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 1: Total Trade between US and AGOA Countries



Source: http://www.agoa.info/index.php?view=trade_stats&story=all_trade

As shown in the trade graph between the US and AGOA countries from 2004, a total of 41 sub-Saharan African countries qualify for the trade benefits offered by AGOA. Based on US trade data, aggregate trade between the US and AGOA-eligible countries have increased significantly since pre-AGOA times. However, there was a substantial drop in the 2001/2002 period, although this was reversed as indicated by the release of full-year data for 2003. 2004 aggregate trade between AGOA countries and the US is substantially higher than in previous years, but includes the contribution of Angola which became eligible at the start of 2004. Angola's share of the 'total exports' value was U.S. \$3.9bn in that year. The value of aggregate trade flows naturally obscures the composition of trade, and requires a closer analysis to readily draw conclusions with regard to, for example, the benefits of trade to the countries concerned. To highlight this point, a substantial portion of the value of SSA countries' combined exports to the U.S. consists of 'energy-related' products, which comprise mainly of oil and natural gas. Items from the various manufacturing sectors, on the other hand, dominate US exports to sub-Saharan African countries. Bi-lateral disaggregated trade statistics between the US and AGOA-qualified countries is contained in *Appendix A*. Each country's overall trade with the US is presented for the past 5 years. Eligibility for trade benefits requires a country to make substantial progress in the areas of:

- Market-based reforms;
- The rule of law;
- Reducing barriers to U.S. trade and investment;
- Emplacing policies to reduce poverty, labour standards and anti-corruption measures (<http://www.cfr.org>).

The legislation expanded the number of tariff-free goods from textiles to agricultural products to motor vehicle components that countries in the region could export to the United States. Eligible countries receive trade benefits that expand the list of duty-free goods they can export to the United States. In the past African countries received US aid from the President's Emergency Programme for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and tariff-free goods from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programme aimed at expanding trade between the United States and the developing world. AGOA added 1,800 products to the duty-free list under the GSP. The duty-free benefits of about seven thousand products including motor vehicle components, wine, footwear and some agricultural products sugar, tobacco, peanuts and beef with better African competitive advantage is prohibited by the protective legislation of the US Congress (<http://www.cfr.org>).

AGOA imports were \$5.1 billion in 2007, and has created 150,000 textile apparel related industry jobs in eligible countries. AGOA calls for the United States

to meet annually with AGOA countries to discuss trade capacity building issues and requests the U.S. government to provide technical assistance to AGOA through USAID and the Overseas Private Development Corporation (OPIC). It suggests that the United States work toward free-trade agreements with interested African countries. In 2007, apparel and textile provisions in the AGOA legislation originally meant to last for 10 years was extended to 2015. In 2007, petroleum accounted for about 80% of total AGOA exports and minerals and metals accounted for 7%, while majority of US imports from Africa came mainly from Nigeria, Angola, South Africa and Congo DR (<http://www.cfr.org>).

According to the *U.S. Congressional Research Service* (2008), 11 AGOA countries each exported less than \$1 million in goods, 3 countries exported nothing or better still could not export what they do not have. Florizelle Liser, US trade representative to Africa, reports that all of sub-Saharan Africa produced 2.3% of US apparel imports in 2007 (*US Congressional Research Service*, 2008). Due to the small size of the apparel industry in most African countries and factors limiting their ability to ramp up production quickly, African countries have not been able to meet demand. The *2008 USTR Report* indicates that leather products, cut flowers, and prepared seafood from sub-Saharan African also increased between 2001 and 2007. However, the Multi Fiber Agreement in 2005, a worldwide system of tariffs on apparel put the rest of the world on equal footing with African apparel producers negating the advantage of AGOA.

In 2007, the United States government provided \$505 million trade assistance to sub-Saharan Africa under AGOA. The primary channel for such assistance is the US-African Global Competitiveness Initiative, a \$200-million five-year initiative that is implemented by USAID and ends in 2010. This programme supports four regional trade hubs in Ghana, Senegal, Kenya and Botswana that work to link US and African businesses as well as improve the trade environment in their regions (<http://www.cfr.org>). *The Sullivan Foundation*, an organisation that promotes entrepreneurship in Africa, reported in 2008 that US businesses continue to be resistant to investing in African industries that are not related to resource extraction. In 2008, the *US Congressional Research Service* reported that few US small businesses are even aware of AGOA's existence.

Similarly, Erastus Mwencha, the African Union Deputy Chairman, reported that stringent quality and lengthy certification processes had prevented many African producers from exporting to the United States under the lucrative trade preference legislation of AGOA (*Business Daily* (Kenya), 06/08/2009). The point is that in the final analysis, Africa's trade with the US will boil down to the items that can be produced in Africa, as well as the ones protective U.S. legislation can permit to thrive. With the US emphasis being still placed on extractive industries and trade in natural resources, the chances of growth and creation of new opportunity will suffer a still birth.

Conclusion

This study examines U.S. President Obama's diplomacy of growth and opportunity in, and the promise it holds for African renaissance. The study problematised the potentials of vibrant youthful energy resources of Africa and democratic political leadership to engineer change. The neoliberal imperatives of the Marxian theory of social production are brought to bear on appreciating the prospects of Obama's African diplomacy which seem to suggest a shift from patronage to partnership. Drawing from Marxian dialectics, the study sees the reckless deregulated neoliberal reforms in Africa to aggravate the condition of African democracies. The cacophony of ideas, confusion and muddle arising from the permutations of laissez-faire economics is laid threadbare. The study sees neoliberal economics apparently genetically cloned from the free market mantras of Adam Smith to be ridiculed by the global economic crisis.

The prospects of the Obama diplomacy of transformation, growth and opportunity in Africa is perceived from the prism of the unholy trinity of interest groups, politicians, bureaucrats typified by the dominance of Western capital and their external and internal agents that convey cyclical contradictions into the African political economy.

The study sees the refurbished patron linkages partnership with the West rather than regional economic integration, to strangulate growth and opportunity in Africa. The study found meeting priority needs, creating opportunities, advancing African unity, self-determination, freedom from conflict, fear and hunger, to have been aggravated by Western partnership. In this case, African leaders who attempted to radically transform their society Kwame Nkrumah, Patrice Lumumba, Modibo Keita, Thomas Sankara, Samora Machel, etc., fell to international conspiracy that fingers the complicity of the West. The absence of robust political leadership and resilient democratic political institutions in Africa is easily linked to the dominance of foreign capital, Western tutelage, and its neoliberal repercussions.

In Nairobi Kenya at the 8th Forum of AGOA in 2009, US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, reiterated US commitment to enhance on-going efforts to build trade capacity across Africa. She stated that the US government will provide assistance to help new industries take advantage of access to US markets. What is generally discernible is that US President Obama's Africa policy on growth and opportunity has not proven to be a magical elixir for development and transformational change as predicted. The AGOA policy took off during the Clinton era and continued under Bush without definite impact as indicated in the scorecard of AGOA. The US International Trade Commission (USITC) data 2009 indicates that trade between Africa and the US is still dominated by export of natural resources. This leaves 90% of the \$56 billion that Africa earned in 2008 in the hands of four oil-producing countries. The USITC data shows that Africa's export of crude oil, precious metals,

DONATED BY AMB. DR. KINGSLEY EBENYI
TO THE
DEPT. OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
NAPSS EXCO 2011/2012

Ifesinachi, Ken, Ph.D

43

medicinal chemical, oil seeds, steel grew steadily while exports of motor vehicle parts, computer peripherals, consumer electronics, lumber and apparel dropped (<http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/18550.html>).

U.S. diplomacy expresses much enthusiasm and optimism which provokes the desire but actually takes away the performance. Traditional relations between Africa and the West have always been based on the export of primary products and this is what has been the bane of such relationships. Where this trend is replicated in current US policy, what is there to celebrate? On productive industries most African states rely on the West for technical assistance, funds, technology, capital goods and equipment all of which are based on agreements crafted in juridical casuistry and conditionality, the net result being unequal exchange and debt overhang. The few agricultural cash crops that can even generate competitive advantage for Africa are prohibited in the US by the Farm Bill. Again, the Obama policy is predicated on the capacity of African youths to become entrepreneurs and drive democratic change through civil society networks and resistance.

The youths are yoked with their society through patron-client chains in a corruption reinforcing structure in which the youths are mobilised to squander their future. The youths that are already co-opted into the neoliberal state structure in Africa abandon their progressive ideas to imbibe the conservative stranglehold of elite politics and elite circulation. Change that transforms is going to be a product of the entire society; including the leaderships that are faced with a future in which they can neither forge ahead nor retreat. Africa is already marching inexorably to eminent change that will neither be tranquil nor good for neoliberal dominance, control and exploitation of Africa. That is the change that Africa wants; change that looks like the Chinese in 1949. In the short run, it will create radical reforms to be later embraced in the long run like the Chinese that incubates and fosters growth and opportunity. Strong political institutions in Africa as envisaged by Obama cannot thrive in a vacuum but mirrors the complex contradictions of the accumulation process in Africa. Strong political institutions in Africa in the long run rest on the sovereignty of internal economic forces rather than neoliberal capitalist external tutelage.

Bibliography

- Chang, H. (2008) *Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism*. New York: Bloomsbury Press.
- Clinton, H. (2009) Speech at the 8th Forum of AGOA in Nairobi, Kenya.
[Http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/August/20090805140804eaifas0.9767877.html](http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/August/20090805140804eaifas0.9767877.html)
- Collier, P. (2007) *The Bottom Billion: Why The Poorest Countries Are Failing And What Can Be Done About It*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Corey, C.W. (2009) Hillary Clinton Outlines Obama's Africa Policy.
[Http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2009/January](http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2009/January)
- Liser, F. (2008) "US Africa Trade under AGOA" *US Congressional Research Service*.
- Marx, K. (1970) *Capital*, Vol. III, Chapter 13. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- Mueni, W.M. (2008) "Civilisation on Trial: The Colonial and Postcolonial State in Africa". *Journal of Third World Studies*, Vol. XXV, No. 1, Spring.
- Mwencha, E. (2009) "Africa: Continent Wants U.S. to Review AGOA Pact". *Business Daily (Kenya)*, 06/08/2009.
- Obama, B. (2009) President Obama's Presidential Speech in Ghana.
[Http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-07-11-obama-ghana-speech-text_N.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-07-11-obama-ghana-speech-text_N.htm)
- Plank, D. (1993) "Aid, Debt and the End of Sovereignty: Mozambique and its Donors". *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 31(3):429-430.
- Reinert, E.S. (2007) *How Rich Countries Got Rich...And Why Poor Countries Stay Poor*. New York: Carroll and Graff Publishers.
- Rodrik, D. (2007) *One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth*. Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Saul, J.S. (2005) *The Next Liberation Struggle: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy in Southern Africa*. Scottville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
- Smith, S. (2003) *Negrologie: Pourquoi L'Afrique Meurt*. Paris: Calmann-Levy.
- Taylor, M.M. (2008) "Development Economics in the Wake of the Washington Consensus: From Smith to Smithereens". *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 29, No. 5, November, 543-556.
- US International Trade Commission (USITC) Data, 2009.

Appendix A

Bi-lateral Disaggregated Trade Statistics between the U.S. and AGOA-Qualified Countries, September 2009 (Unit: '000 U.S. Dollars)

Country	2006	2007	2008	2008 ytd	2009
Angola:					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	1 542 655	1 263 965	2 093 546	876 710	734 695
Imports (i.e., US imports)	11 513 833	12 210 961	18 763 434	12 107 295	5 272 012
Trade Balance	-9 971 178	-10 946 996	-16 669 888	-11 230 586	-4 537 317
Benin:					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	109 158	280 339	832 319	486 803	178 381
Imports (i.e., US imports)	555	5 076	31 010	300	209
Trade Balance	108 603	275 263	801 309	486 503	178 172
Botswana:					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	26 700	52 452	61 111	35 693	35 757
Imports (i.e., US imports)	252 107	187 453	218 845	139 125	74 043
Trade Balance	-225 408	-135 001	-157 734	-103 432	-38 286
Burkina Faso:					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	17 901	32 321	23 844	11 195	13 437
Imports (i.e., US imports)	1 020	1 466	585	454	525
Trade Balance	16 881	30 854	23 260	10 741	12 911
Burundi:					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	6 438	6 874	6 982	1 724	2 271
Imports (i.e., US imports)	1 866	1 111	2 843	2 066	3 541
Trade Balance	4 572	5 763	4 139	-342	-1 270
Cameroon:					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	117 243	131 476	123 619	57 623	81 442
Imports (i.e., US imports)	223 517	306 742	626 414	518 967	159 450
Trade Balance	-106 274	-175 266	-502 796	-461 344	-78 008
Cape Verde:					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	12 714	4 965	11 962	6 151	3 202
Imports (i.e., US imports)	965	2 193	397	332	353
Trade Balance	11 750	2 772	11 565	5 818	2 849
Chad:					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	60 128	70 963	61 158	26 646	31 748
Imports (i.e., US imports)	1 904 713	2 238 277	3 320 248	1 821 898	898 005
Trade Balance	-1 844 585	-2 167 314	-3 259 090	-1 795 252	-866 257
Comoros:					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	67	215	420	263	380
Imports (i.e., US imports)	1 487	485	925	318	275
Trade Balance	-1 420	-269	-505	-54	105
Congo (DROC):					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	69 942	110 301	125 713	67 832	42 131
Imports (i.e., US imports)	85 111	206 404	266 750	239 402	84 242
Trade Balance	-15 168	-96 103	-141 037	-171 569	-42 111

Appendix A Contd.

Congo (ROC):

Exports (i.e., US exports)	137 310	138 798	183 113	85 222	161 299
Imports (i.e., US imports)	3 045 473	3 098 745	5 044 286	3 530 206	1 381 337
Trade Balance	-2 908 163	-2 959 948	-4 861 173	-3 444 984	-1 220 039

Djibouti:

Exports (i.e., US exports)	47 458	58 051	139 873	39 193	118 477
Imports (i.e., US imports)	3 295	4 484	7 037	4 696	2 138
Trade Balance	44 163	53 566	132 836	34 497	116 339

Ethiopia:

Exports (i.e., US exports)	135 574	165 949	299 374	175 202	115 437
Imports (i.e., US imports)	81 120	88 236	152 243	89 821	64 860
Trade Balance	54 453	77 714	147 131	85 381	50 577

Gabon:

Exports (i.e., US exports)	133 501	473 689	280 881	116 989	117 256
Imports (i.e., US imports)	1 330 984	2 146 911	2 263 512	1 305 834	845 416
Trade Balance	-1 197 483	-1 673 222	-1 982 631	-1 188 844	-728 160

Gambia:

Exports (i.e., US exports)	20 169	19 064	27 555	17 156	21 311
Imports (i.e., US imports)	287	148	641	287	23
Trade Balance	19 882	18 916	26 913	16 869	21 288

Ghana:

Exports (i.e., US exports)	282 424	403 928	594 337	339 082	303 502
Imports (i.e., US imports)	192 228	198 652	222 362	154 429	75 383
Trade Balance	90 196	205 275	371 975	184 652	228 118

Guinea:

Exports (i.e., US exports)	63 113	71 589	99 012	62 483	63 449
Imports (i.e., US imports)	91 689	95 748	105 964	67 726	35 949
Trade Balance	-28 576	-24 159	-6 952	-5 243	27 500

Guinea-Bissau:

Exports (i.e., US exports)	5 491	6 524	1 941	964	696
Imports (i.e., US imports)	470	38	164	156	0
Trade Balance	5 021	6 487	1 777	807	696

Kenya:

Exports (i.e., US exports)	516 103	576 220	440 744	196 197	398 841
Imports (i.e., US imports)	352 804	326 086	343 533	185 063	171 216
Trade Balance	163 299	250 134	97 211	11 134	227 625

Lesotho:

Exports (i.e., US exports)	4 029	7 506	1 299	1 110	16 242
Imports (i.e., US imports)	408 407	443 018	374 098	203 336	180 252
Trade Balance	-404 379	-435 512	-372 799	-202 227	-164 011

Liberia:

Exports (i.e., US exports)	66 624	72 754	150 970	66 314	58 645
Imports (i.e., US imports)	139 832	115 303	143 462	80 420	42 063
Trade Balance	-73 208	-42 549	7 508	-14 106	16 582

Appendix A Contd.

Madagascar:					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	44 560	31 842	70 167	35 506	118 718
Imports (i.e., US imports)	281 065	337 895	324 262	176 670	149 853
Trade Balance	-236 505	-306 053	-254 095	-141 164	-31 135
Malawi:					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	45 386	50 873	44 433	26 802	20 170
Imports (i.e., US imports)	79 010	69 007	52 557	22 324	47 582
Trade Balance	-33 624	-18 133	-8 124	4 478	-27 412
Mali:					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	41 767	30 352	30 252	22 032	18 106
Imports (i.e., US imports)	7 851	9 712	5 129	3 160	2 469
Trade Balance	33 916	20 640	25 123	18 872	15 637
Mauritius:					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	25 057	39 625	38 644	24 630	15 419
Imports (i.e., US imports)	218 649	187 020	176 189	103 891	94 699
Trade Balance	-193 593	-147 395	-137 544	-79 261	-79 280
Mozambique:					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	63 739	113 621	212 461	134 096	117 464
Imports (i.e., US imports)	15 594	5 356	16 800	9 631	26 264
Trade Balance	48 145	108 264	195 661	124 465	91 200
Namibia:					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	113 220	116 383	271 350	150 625	99 528
Imports (i.e., US imports)	115 650	219 743	301 235	103 104	190 273
Trade Balance	-2 429	-103 361	-29 884	47 521	-90 745
Niger:					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	125 491	63 286	45 411	32 394	40 622
Imports (i.e., US imports)	123 695	9 082	44 158	43 318	51 909
Trade Balance	1 797	54 204	1 253	-10 924	-11 287
Nigeria:					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	2 145 636	2 688 619	3 990 603	2 194 573	2 078 017
Imports (i.e., US imports)	27 863 412	32 525 048	38 236 166	25 360 072	8 578 059
Trade Balance	-25 717 777	-29 836 429	-34 245 563	-23 165 499	-6 500 042
Rwanda:					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	11 341	14 241	18 696	11 078	10 165
Imports (i.e., US imports)	8 854	12 675	13 704	3 859	9 420
Trade Balance	2 488	1 566	4 992	7 219	744
Sao Tomé & Prin:					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	3 653	6 741	3 227	2 418	598
Imports (i.e., US imports)	187	393	137	73	146
Trade Balance	3 466	6 348	3 090	2 345	452
Senegal:					
Exports (i.e., US exports)	91 540	150 584	134 677	87 395	63 009
Imports (i.e., US imports)	21 450	18 734	17 942	15 258	5 251
Trade Balance	70 090	131 850	116 735	72 137	57 758

Appendix A Contd.

Seychelles:									
Exports (i.e., US exports)	8 278	9 144	24 457	5 006	31 239				
Imports (i.e., US imports)	10 121	10 332	12 537	3 196	13 549				
Trade Balance	-1 843	-1 188	11 920	1 810	17 690				
Sierra Leone:									
Exports (i.e., US exports)	38 635	54 605	58 023	29 798	23 538				
Imports (i.e., US imports)	35 895	48 104	47 748	21 167	18 365				
Trade Balance	2 741	6 501	10 275	8 632	5 174				
South Africa:									
Exports (i.e., US exports)	4 234 080	5 204 285	6 186 311	3 445 726	2 506 496				
Imports (i.e., US imports)	7 497 257	9 131 863	9 958 670	6 148 306	2 955 391				
Trade Balance	-3 263 178	-3 927 578	-3 772 359	-2 702 580	-448 895				
Swaziland:									
Exports (i.e., US exports)	11 301	28 551	32 116	7 475	5 736				
Imports (i.e., US imports)	15 807	14 963	13 877	7 358	7 140				
Trade Balance	-4 506	-1 412	-1 761	-63 883	-1 405				
Tanzania:									
Exports (i.e., US exports)	1 158 770	1 171 974	1 165 538	81 014	78 127				
Imports (i.e., US imports)	1 34 567	46 196	1 53 801	34 857	37 082				
Trade Balance	-224 203	-225 778	-365 263	46 157	41 045				
Uganda:									
Exports (i.e., US exports)	1 51 200	1 75 434	1 178 468	55 023	84 793				
Imports (i.e., US imports)	1 21 787	1 26 622	1 512 716	44 321	14 718				
Trade Balance	29 413	48 812	265 752	10 701	70 075				
Zambia:									
Exports (i.e., US exports)	1 150 713	1 67 437	1 75 945	47 283	30 919				
Imports (i.e., US imports)	1 428 969	1 48 780	1 51 456	34 409	27 417				
*ytd - Year-to-Date Data to	1 523 1	1 408 4	1 507 1	1 507 1	1 507 1				
September 2009	21 743	18 657	24 489	12 874	23 502				
Trade Balance	-217 256	-211 343	-236 511	-214 126	-206 583				