

Domestic Terrorism, Religious Insurgency, and the National Security Question in Nigeria

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Abstract

The paper reports the findings of a study on domestic terrorism and religious insurgency in Nigeria. It focused on the impacts of the religious insurgency and the ongoing war on terrorism. It applied accidental sampling technique due to the tension and insecurity atmosphere in the study area the Northeast of Nigeria, and used other administered questionnaire to sample 250 respondents who were in a mood to respond to investigation. The findings indicate that the activities of Boko Haram terrorist group are strong enough to stretch the ability of the Nigeria military and equally threaten the sovereignty of the state. It further found that the current strategies adopted by the Nigerian government to combat terrorism have reduced the fighting powers of the terrorism but the war is still ongoing, taking both military and civilian casualties and many refugees are still in camps. The paper recommends the importance of inter-religious committees, redressing palpable social inequality and to open communication to dialogue with the terrorists.

Keywords: Terrorism, Religion, Nigeria, Fanaticism, Insecurity.

Introduction

Towards the end of the 20th Century, there were numerous highlighted acts of terrorism targeted against foreign embassies, soldiers, politicians, religious leaders, economic investments, social infrastructures, worship places and defenseless members of the public (Ugwuoke, Ngwu & Iziga, 2016: 92). The sovereignty of the Nigerian State was threatened following the emergency of a terrorist group known as Boko Haram, which conquered a substantial part of Northeast Nigeria, using modern military hardware such as bombs, rockets, military tanks and high caliber machine guns (Ugwuoke et al, 2016). The most global impact and awareness on terrorist activities came to light during the attack on World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York, on September 11, 2001 (Lyman, 2011; Miller, Hess & Orthmann, 2011; Oyeniyi, 2010; Hoffman & Graham, 2006). Today, many countries in the

world are in military combat against terrorism. The ISIS confronts governments of Turkey, Syria and Iraq in the Middle East and extends its operations to European countries. Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tunisia, Kenya, Mali etc, are equally on terror war. The world at present is in the age of terrorism. Terrorists have utilized all known new technologies of the modern world in areas of ballistics, aviation, marine, automobile, locatives, pharmaceutical, financial institutions, communication, chemical and the cyberspace (Ugwuoke et al, 2016: 92).

It is common knowledge that Nigeria since her return to civil rule in 1999, has faced some national security challenges across the six geo-political zones in the country. The spate of kidnappings, pipeline vandalisation, armed robbery, political assassinations, and recently bomb blasts in various parts of the country are emerging trends of domestic terrorism. While the high rate of kidnappings, armed robbery and political assassinations, are added dimensions to the security challenges, which are stretching the nation to its limits. The outbreak of the religious insurgency known as Boko Haram in the Northeast Nigeria in July 2009 marked yet another phase in the recurring pattern that domestic terrorism has assumed in Nigeria. Given the heterogeneous nature of Nigerian society, the religious sensitivity of Nigerians, and the prolonged military rule that ended with the advent of civil rule in 1999, (but during which a significant section of the society was highly militarized), the situation could perhaps not have been different (Adesoji, 2010). According to the author, aside from the continued loss of lives and property, the growing fear and animosities among Nigerians, particularly about the threatened secularity of the Nigerian state, and the likelihood of recurrence given the growing religious revivalism around the world are enough justification for a careful consideration and documentation of the phenomenon that the Boko Haram uprising represents.

The regularity, intensity and potency of terrorist attacks in Nigeria, especially in the northern parts of the country dominate news headlines (Wakaso, 2022; Umar, 2022;

Benjamin, 2022; David, 2022; Matazu & Isamotu, 2022). The federal government, with the support of the international community, has launched many initiatives to combat the threat posed by the insurgency. Indeed, considerable amount of money and political capital have been invested in new and continuing programmes to enhance security and contain the threat of insurgents in Nigeria. Ostensibly in realization of the futility of earlier efforts at combating the religious insurgency, the federal government of Nigeria had in 2013-2014 declared emergency rule in the three North-Eastern states of Nigeria namely: Yobe, Borno and Adamawa, where the activities of the insurgents have been most pronounced. The emergency rule in the three states in the Northeast for about one year could not achieve the desired result which helped the opposition party in its campaign to win the presidential election in 2015. The new government in mid 2015, boasted that it would crush the insurgency within four months and ordered the Armed Forces to move their operational headquarters to the theatre of war in the Northeast. Despite the efforts of the government in its full scale military operations in a war against the terrorists, the insecurity caused by the insurgency remains high and widely deadly in Northern Nigeria as depicted by the lamentations below:

Outrage over mass killings in the North... it was one of the worst weeks in the recent history of the stories of blood, tears and sorrow have become common, leaving the North with the unenviable tag of axis mass killings. Celebrants slain at weddings, children, women and men slaughtered in broad day light and traditional rulers taken captives and many others raped, killed and abandoned all in the North. Asif that is not enough, soldiers deployed to take care of others were ambushed and killed... (Hassan-Wuyo, Asemota & Eyoboka, 2020:21).

When President Buhari came to power seven years ago (2015), he promised to wipe out terrorism in four months. Despite the stepping up of military offensives against the terrorists, the terrorists have remained unbeaten. Boko Haram terrorists have utilized the vast nature of Northern Nigeria which results to massive areas of ungoverned spaces to remain potent armed group to be reckoned with. The strength of the terrorists is measured by their exploits ranging from sacking villages after villages, invasion of military barracks and deadly

ambushes. The resultant impacts account for high rate of casualties ranging from top military generals down to the ranks, thousands of citizens and still counting (Nanlong, Hassan-Wuyo & Abubakar, 2022; Masadomis, 2022; Onani, 2021; Odeniyi & Bitrus, 2021; Olanrewaju, 2020). It is against this background that this study examines the impact of domestic terrorism and religious insurgency in Nigeria with major emphasis on the activities of the dreaded Islamic sect, Boko Haram.

Literature

The 2017 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) rated Nigeria as the third most terrorized nation in the world behind Iraq and Afghanistan in first and second positions respectively (Olaniyi, 2017). GTI (2022) noted that; Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 48% of global terrorism deaths. Terrorism has existed for at least 2,000 years and is likely to remain a fixture on political agendas, both domestic and international, for years to come (Abimbola and Adesote, 2012). Historically, the first known acts of what we now call terrorism were perpetrated by a radical offshoot of the Zealots, a Jewish sect active in Judea during the 1st century AD. The Zealots resisted the Roman Empire's rule of what is today Israel through a determined campaign primarily involving assassination. Zealot fighters used the sica, a primitive dagger, to attack their enemies in broad daylight, often in crowded market places or on feast days-essentially wherever there were people to witness the violence. The Jewish zealots used terrorism to resist the Romans by killing many Roman soldiers and destroying Roman property (Abimbola and Adesote, 2012). Between 1090 and 1272 an Islamic movement known as the Assassins used similar tactics in their struggle against the Christian Crusaders who had invaded what is today part of Syria. The Assassins embraced the same notions of self-sacrifice and suicidal martyrdom evident in some Islamic terrorist groups today. They regarded violence as a sacramental or divine act that ensured its perpetrators

would ascend to a glorious heaven should they perish during the task (Rapport 1984). According to him, until the French Revolution (1789-1799), religion provided the main justification for the use of terrorism. This situation changed, however, as nationalism, anarchism, Marxism and other secular political movements emerged during the 1800s to challenge divine rule by monarchs.

In the 18th century, the word terrorism was first used in France to describe a new system of government adopted during the French Revolution (1789-1799). During this period, Maximilien Robespierre of France introduced government sponsored terrorism in order to maintain power and suppress opposition to the government. The regime de la terreur (Reign of Terror) was intended to promote democracy and popular rule by ridding the revolution of its enemies and thereby purifying it. The reign of terror in which over 400, 000 “suspects (including women and children) had been imprisoned, hanged, and guillotined came to an end but the seminal concepts of terror tactics as part of political strategy grew out of these bloody episodes (Simonsen, 2004). However, the oppression and violent excesses of the terror transformed it into a feared instrument of the state (Hoffman, 1998). From that time on, terrorism has had a decidedly negative connotation. Meanwhile, the word, did not gain wider popularity until the early 20th century when it was adopted by a group of Russian revolutionaries during the Soviet Revolution in 1917 to describe their violent struggle against tsarist rule. Thus, Lenin and Stalin, evolved government sponsored terrorism as a useful tool to maintain government control. These two important personalities systematically used the act of terrorism to intimidate and frighten the entire society. According to them, both terror and fear were veritable instruments for governmental operations (Danjibo, 2009) During the 1920s and 1930s, terrorism became associated more with the repressive practices employed by dictatorial states than with the violence of non-state groups like the anarchists (Ojukwu, 2011). These show that terrorism is as old as centuries of civilization.

The Emergence of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria has commonly been traced to a group of radical Islamist youths who worshipped at the Alhaji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri over a decade ago hence in 2002, an offshoot of this youth group (not yet known as Boko Haram) declared the city and the Islamic establishment to be intolerably corrupt and irredeemable. Thus, the group declared that it was embarking on *hijra* (a withdrawal along the lines of the Prophet Muhammad's withdrawal from Mecca to Medina) and moved from Maiduguri to a village called Kanama, Yobe State, near the border with Niger, to set up a separatist community run on hard-line Islamic principles. Its leader, Mohammed Ali, espoused anti-state ideology and called on other Muslims to join the group and return to a life under "true" Islamic law, with the aim of making a more perfect society away from the corrupt establishment (Anyadike, 2013). This popular view about the origin of the group has however been challenged by some commentators prompting Alozieuwa (2012) to comment that the confusion not only reflects in the narratives about the exact date, and who the actual founder was, but also as to the true source of these expositions. Adibe (2012) similarly observed that while the popular belief is that it was founded around 2001 or 2002, its origin has been traced as far back as 1995, and argues that, one Lawan Abubakar, who later left for further studies at the University of Medina, Saudi Arabia, actually founded the Boko Haram sect. According to this view, under Abubakar, the sect was known as Sahaba, (Madike 2011 cited in Adibe, (2012: 50). Elsewhere, these expositions have been credited to Shehu Sani, a civil right activist in northern Nigeria and a sitting Nigerian senator who helped broker the first peace deal with the sect which failed.

Before the introduction of emergency rules in three Northeast States where the activities of the insurgents have been most pronounced, observers said that the group had established a "state within a state," hoisting a sovereign flag, with a cabinet, its own religious police, a large farm, and attracting more and more people under its control by offering

welfare handouts, food, and shelter. Many of the people the group attracted were said to be refugees from the wars over the border in Chad and jobless Nigerian youths. It is not yet clear how the group funds its activities but part of the theories is that while he was alive, Yusuf received funds from Salafist contacts in Saudi Arabia following two hajj trips that Yusuf made during the time. Another possible source of funding during this period was donations from wealthy northern Nigerians. In 2006, a wealthy northern businessman was arrested by the State Security Services after a group of children alleged that they had been sent by the group to an al-Qaeda training camp in Mauritania. The businessman says his donations to the group were an innocent attempt to contribute *zakat*, an obligation of wealthy Muslims to give charitably (Anyadike, 2013: 18).

Until the June 16, 2011, bombing of the Nigeria Police Headquarters in Abuja, the sect had restricted its terror campaign mostly to the North East part of Nigeria. The sect followed up that attack with the bombing on August 26 of the United Nations House, also in Abuja, a place Shekau described as a “forum of all the global evil,” (Anyadike, 2013: 18). The August 26 attack on the world body’s office, which saw over 23 people dead and more than 78 others injured, left an indelible dent on the security situation in Nigeria. Since then, Boko Haram has either claimed responsibility for or has been credited with most terror activities in the northern part of the country. Its operations have also grown in scale and sophistication (Alozieuwa, 2012). From the foregoing, it is abundantly clear that religious insurgency poses a real and present threat not only to lives and properties of innocent citizens but also puts Nigeria’s corporate existence in jeopardy. Below is a tabular presentation of the major attacks that have been perpetrated by the sect in the past two years.

Some Major Newspaper Reports of Boko Haram Attacks between 2020 - 2022

Newspaper	Date	Attacks, places and number of casualties
<i>The Nation</i>	March 25, 2020	47 soldiers killed in Boko haram ambush: 15 injured An explosion by bomb being ferried in a military vehicle yesterday (March 24) killed 47 soldiers at Gorgi in Alargano Forest area, Borno state. The defence headquarters also said 15 soldiers were injured in the incident which was triggered by an ambush laid by Boko Haram insurgents.
<i>Daily Sun</i>	July 9, 2020	19 soldiers feared killed in another book haram ambush Boko haram have allegedly killed about 19 soldiers when the insurgents ambushed troops of 25 Task Force Brigade, a military operation team, along Maiduguri Damboa road in Borno State, on Tuesday afternoon (July 7).
<i>Daily Sun</i>	October 6, 2020	Saving Zulum from terrorist attacks All well-meaning Nigerians should be seriously concerned about the recent terrorist attacks on the convoy of the Borno state Governor, Prof. Babagana Zulum... The latest deadly ambush, which occurred near Baga town on the shores of Lake Chad, came in form of explosion from multiple improvised explosive devices planted on the road by the terrorists. At least, 18 people died in the incident.
<i>New Telegraph</i>	November 30, 2020	Book Haram: Outrage over farmers' killing Outrage has greeted Saturday's killing of 43 farmers by Boko Haram insurgents in Zabarmari village of Jere Local Government Area of Borno State...tears flowed freely...as Borno State governor Prof. Babagana Zulum, led kinsmen of the slain farmers and others to lay them to rest
<i>New Telegraph</i>	March 15, 2021	Borno attack: How we lost Commanding Officer, 14 soldiers – Military sources There were strong indications over the weekend that the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) may have lost a Commanding Officer (CO) and at least 14 of its gallant troops during an ambush attack by suspected terrorist elements within the Gudumbali general area of Borno State
<i>The Nation</i>	April 27, 2021	Army confirmed killing of six soldiers in Borno Director, Army Public Relations, Brig-Gen. Mohammed Yerima...confirmed the killing on Sunday (April 25) of one officer and six soldiers during the operation to flush out terrorists in Mainok along Maiduguri-Damaturu highway in Borno state... five other soldiers sustained various degrees of injuries. The wounded soldiers have already been evacuated to the military medical facility for treatment.
<i>The Punch</i>	December 3, 2021	21 humanitarian workers, six civil servants abducted in Borno. Six civil servants, fifteen others including unspecified number of humanitarian workers have been kidnapped at different locations in a day at Damboa, Borno State by Boko Haram terrorists

<i>The Punch</i>	December 4, 2021	ISWAP attacks military base in Borno, kills seven soldiers Members of the Islamic State of West Africa Province on Thursday (December 2) killed no fewer than seven members of Operation Hadin Kai in a failed attempt to attack a military base in Borno State
<i>The Punch</i>	December 5, 2021	Terrorists bomb Maiduguri, boy injured, cars, houses destroyed The Borno State Governor, Babagana Zulum, on Saturday (December 4) called on Nigerian military wake up to its responsibility of protecting the country territorial integrity following multiple explosions that rocked Maiduguri, the state capitals from rockets fired by suspected Boko Haram terrorists
<i>The Punch</i>	December 24, 2021	Five killed as terrorists bomb Maiduguri's airport areas ahead of Buhari's visit No fewer than five persons died during multiple bomb explosions in Maiduguri, the Borno State capital, ahead of the President, Major General Muhammadu Buhari's (Rtd) visit to the state...
<i>The Punch</i>	January 1, 2022	821 students kidnapped in 2021, 61 still in captivity The United Nations Children Emergency Fund on Friday (December 31, 2021) decried the high rate of children's abductions, violations among other things in 2021. This was as the UN organization classified Nigeria, Somalia, Congo, Chad, Cameroon and Niger as the countries with the highest cases of verified abductions
<i>Vanguard</i>	February 4, 2022	Terrorism: ISWAP poised to take over Nigeria, Zulum warns Governor Babagana Zulum of Borno State...raised the alarm that the Islamic States of West African Province, ISWAP is poised to take over the country.
<i>Vanguard</i>	February 8, 2022	Terrorists kill 44 villagers in Nigeria Terrorists have again invaded two local government areas in Niger state, killing no fewer than 44 villagers, including blind man while many were abducted
<i>Vanguard</i>	February 8, 2022	Terrorists kidnap Catholic priest, kill aide in Kaduna ...the Chancellor of the Catholic Diocese of Kafanchan, Rev. Fr. Emmanuel Okolo, while confirming the abduction of the priest, yesterday (February 7) said Shekari was kidnapped at about 11:30pm on Sunday from his residence
<i>New Telegraph</i>	March 9, 2022	Terrorists kill 2, abducted Catholic priest in Kaduna community At least two persons have been reportedly killed and a catholic priest, Reverend Father Joseph Akeke abducted by terrorists in Kaduna State. The killings and abduction took place at Kudendan community not far from Nnamdi Azikiwe bye-pass in Kaduna. Residents of the community said the terrorists attacked the area around 11am...
<i>Daily Trust</i>	March 30, 2022	Abuja-Kaduna train bombing: 9 killed, dozens missing; survivors recount ordeal Nigeria is in mourning flowing the Monday (march 28) night bombing

of the Kaduna-bound train by hundreds of terrorists. The train was forced to a halt after the terrorists planted bombs on the tracks...the attackers later surrounded most of the coaches and opened fire before they forcefully gained access, fire at random, which led to the death of some people

<i>Vanguard</i>	April 12, 2022	94 killed by the terrorists, assassins in Plateau, Kaduna, Osun within 24 hours Jos – No fewer than 94 people have been killed in Plateau, Kaduna and Osun states by rampaging terrorists and assassins in the last 24 hours... the number of dead bodies in the bush is unknown and some persons are missing
<i>Daily Trust</i>	July 6, 2022	Two injured as terrorists attack presidential convoy in Katsina An advance team of President Muhammadu Buhari to Katsina State ahead of the Eid-el-Kabir celebrations was yesterday (July 5) attacked by terrorists who have been terrorizing people in the state and environs for long...two persons were reportedly injured in the attack described by the presidency as an ambush
<i>Leadership</i>	July 12, 2022	Terrorists may not allow 2023 elections to hold, says Falae Former secretary to the government of the federation and finance minister, Chief Olu Falae, has expressed fear that terrorists may not allow the 2023 general elections to hold... He said, a few days ago, they still burn down one of INEC offices I the South-East and they have been doing that for a long time

Sources: Some newspaper reportages 2020 - 2022

Theoretical Explanation

Subculture theory is used to explain the study. As a normative system of sub group or groups smaller than the whole society, it includes specific standards of behaviour that are learned and transmitted from one generation to another (Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1982, cited in Conklin, 2001: 200). According to proponents of the theory, certain groups of people carry sets of norms and values that make them more likely to engage in deviance. Since violence is the acceptable form of behaviour, criminality in general, and violence in particular, are appreciated by group members. Situations that normally might simply anger others could provoke violence by those carrying subculture of violence values (Conklin, 2001). According to Erlanger (1974), social institutions contribute to the development and persistence of a

subculture conducive to criminality and violence. For example, the disintegration of particular institutions (like religion, family, and school) denies certain populations the opportunity to learn conventional norms and values. The result of such processes is that certain groups are more likely to use violence in their day-to-day encounters, and violence is seen as a feasible means to solve disputes.

Methodology

The study design adopted in this study was a cross-sectional survey. This is because, the research design can cover a wide spectrum of the society when studying such phenomena like behavioral patterns in terms of attitude and perception (May, 2001; Obikeze, 1990). Also, the method is appropriate when seeking to understand people’s awareness and opinion. The area covered in the study was Maiduguri metropolis, the Borno State capital. The instrument used for data collection was structured questionnaire which was other administered. The procedure used for the collection of the data was accidental technique due to the tension and anxiety in the state that made systematic random procedure of moving from street to street or house to house unsafe due to fear of cross-fire. In the end, 250 respondents across all segments of the population from 18 years and above were interviewed and that was the number used for the computation and analysis of the study.

Findings

Table 1: Distribution of respondents by their perception of the factors that account for the outbreak and persistence of domestic terrorism in Nigeria

Factors	Frequency	Percentage
Religious bigotry	255	62%
Ethno-nationalism	55	22%
High level of unemployment	25	108%
Social inequality	10	4%
Ineffective policing	5	2%
Total	250	100%

Data 2021

Table 1 indicates that 62% of the respondents identified religious bigotry as the single most important factor responsible for the outbreak and persistence of domestic terrorism in Nigeria. 10% of the respondents were of the view that high level of unemployment accounted for the phenomenon. Another 22% opted for ethno-nationalism while 4% and 2% indicated social inequality and ineffective policing respectively. This is clearly in line with the numerous religion-related upheavals that have characterized Nigeria’s political landscape over the years. It also tallies with popular notion that unemployment creates a pool from where terror groups readily draw their foot soldiers. The findings of this study supported some previous which indicated the vitality of ethno-religious elements in fueling socio-political disharmony in Nigeria. One such study reported that:

Since the transfer to civilian rule in 1999, Nigeria has suffered from increasing internal tensions. Ethnic and religious groups compete for political power and control over lucrative resources...Group loyalty and discrimination against members from different groups are common...sometimes erupting in armed violence. Increasing tensions have split the country along religious lines, the North is predominantly Muslim and the South, Christian (John, Mohammed, Pinto & Nkanta, 2007:423).

Table 2: Distribution of respondents by their perception of threat of domestic terrorism to national security in Nigeria

Options	Frequency	Percentages
Very high extent	235	94%
High extent	15	6%
No idea	Nil	0%
Low extent	Nil	0%
Very low extent	Nil	0%
Total	250	100%

Data 2021

Table 2 shows that 94% of the respondents believe that domestic terrorism threatens Nigeria’s national security to a very high extent. While the remaining 6% are also in agreement that it threatens national security to a high extent. Again, this result is in line with the views of experts and concerned citizens who believe that domestic terrorism if left unchecked poses a serious threat to Nigeria’s continued corporate existence. The above

findings are in line with previous study which indicated high level of perceived personal risk by Nigerians:

Overall, 91% of the respondents felt to be at personal risk at one level or the other. This is a clear indication that the terrorist activities had given rise to moral panic in Nigeria: Given the present situation in Nigeria, it can be argued that people in Nigeria are under high risk of personal safety due to the activities of Boko Haram (Ugwuoke et al, 2016. 97).

The insecurity situation remains almost the same. Parts of Northeast Nigeria are still no go areas for the indigenous inhabitants, security personnel, business actors or tourists. This is because of the persistent danger of high level of insecurity in that part of the country as a result of terrorist bombing and ambush on the highways and numerous government security alerts (Daniel, 2017; Ojo, 2017).

Table 3: Distribution of respondents by their perception of the effectiveness of the current strategy adopted to combat the Boko Haram menace in Nigeria

Level of Rating	Frequency	Percentage
Highly effective	80	32%
Effective	130	52%
Don't know	10	4%
Ineffective	25	10%
Highly ineffective	5	2%
Total	250	100%

Data 2021

Table 3 indicates that 52% of the respondents rated the current strategy adopted to fight the Boko Haram insurgency as effective. Another 32% rated it to be very effective. While 10% and 2% rated it ineffective and highly ineffective respectively. The 4% indicated they do not know. This is also a reflection on the improvement of traffic on some major highways which had been abandoned by civilian traffic. However, that does not imply that the citizens have had a return of confidence about their safety on those highways or safe enough for the refugees to return home. The fact is that there is now hope the terrorists will not overrun the entire northern Nigeria as they claimed that they would do in a short time. The military had started to assure the public of its ability to curtail the firepower of the

terrorists (Ojo, 2017). This result is reflection of the relief felt by the residents of Maiduguri metropolis following the introduction of emergency rules which resulted in the dislodging of the Boko Haram operatives from many areas where they had previously held sway. In a sense, it could be said that an endorsement of the emergency rule by the legislative assembly is yielding positive impacts. Overall, 84% agreed that the war on terror is on course.

Table 4: Distribution of respondents by their opinion on the factors militating against the effective combating of domestic terrorism in Nigeria

Options	Frequency	Percentages
Lack of political will	60	24%
Collusion by some unscrupulous government functionaries	30	12%
Sabotage/Incompetence/corruption of security agencies	20	8%
The peculiar nature of the crime of terrorism	50	20%
Lack of public cooperation with law enforcement agents	25	10%
All of the above	65	26%
Total	250	100

Data 2021

Table 4 shows that 24 % of the respondents identified lack of political will as the major factor militating against the effective combating of domestic terrorism in Nigeria. Other 20% identified the nature of the crime, while another 12% think it is due to the collusion by some unscrupulous government functionaries. Meanwhile, 10% of the respondents blamed it on lack of public cooperation with law enforcement agents and 8% say it is due to the incompetence/corruption on the part of security agencies. Meanwhile, 26% believe the situation is as a result of a combination of all of the preceding factors. The above table shows the complex nature of the problems involved in tackling terrorism in Nigeria. A combination of lack of political will, collusion by government officials, corruption by security agents in addition to lack of public co-operation are not the kind of issues that can easily overcome.

Conclusions

The study examined the impact of domestic terrorism and religious insurgency in Nigeria. It focused specifically on the impacts of Boko Haram insurgency in Northeast Nigeria. The war against the terrorists has remained and continues to linger. Refugee problems has remained. Tourism has gone for many years now. Many schools shut many years have remained closed. Health facilities in the affected areas remained abandoned. Agricultural sector paralysed leading to food crisis and insecurity. The resilience and coordinated attacks by the terrorists have continued to enjoy viable media headlines. All these are attestations of the frequency of the terrorist attacks and its related high death figures suffered by the military and the civilians.

The result from the data indicated that religious bigotry is the single most important factor that accounts for the outbreak and persistence of domestic terrorism in Nigeria. This fact was attested to by as many as 62% percent of the respondents surveyed. The above findings are in line with previous literature which indicated that religious fundamentalism has a root in the spread of terrorism worldwide (Emmanuel, 2017; (Omotoso, 2015; Ogunbiyi, 2015; Oloja, 2014; Sookhdeo, 2007; Lyman, 2011; Thio, 2001). This is followed by high level of unemployment and ethno-nationalism with each accounting for 28% and 14% respectively. One can argue that ethno-nationalism constitutes a strong political foundation on which terrorism springs worldwide. As the data indicated in this study, previous literature equally highlighted on the elements of ethno-nationalism as a strong motivator for terrorism as is the case in Nigeria (White, 2014; Siegel, 2010; Crenshaw, 2009). From the findings, the conclusion is that domestic terrorism constitutes the single most serious security challenge the Nigerian State is facing at the moment. Boko Haram activities impact on the entire fabric of the national life, affecting the economy, national unity and other areas of service delivery like health, education, transport, agriculture and even sports. More disturbing is the heating

up of the polity along religious dichotomy in a nation of high religious sensitivity like Nigeria. This can be seen from the high level of nationwide socio-political tensions that had not been seen in the country for the past 50 years since the end of Biafra-Nigeria civil war. These tensions had heightened a series of agitations for political restructuring of the country and even some calling for separate independent states. This obviously reflects an endorsement of the enforcement of emergency laws in the three north east states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe.

However, the war on terrorism is still ongoing. Military and civilian casualties have not stopped. Worship places and markets are still under attacks by suicide bombers. Government admitted that the war on terror is not over notwithstanding appreciable progress in the prosecution of the war as Nigeria continues to battle its domestic terrorism and religious insurgency for nearly a decade and the end is not in sight as the leader of Boko Haram Abubakar Shekau, whom the military had claimed to have killed several times recently released a recorded video message boasting and mocking the military and the government. The study indicates that the strategies for the effectiveness of the war on terror are yielding positive impacts. The fact that about 84% agreed that the government is succeeding in the war against Boko Haram is a positive development. As a result of the improvement on security situation, many highways that had been closed due to numerous ambushes have been opened to agitated/conscious traffic while the war continues.

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