

Religion Radicalism and Governance Challenges on Development in Nigeria

Ugo Charity Kalu

Social Science/ Peace and Conflict Unit, School of General Studies, University of Nigeria,
Nsukka

Correspondence: ugo.kalu@unn.edu.ng

Abstract

The study examined the correlation between governance and religious consequences on infrastructural development in Nigeria. Exclusively, examine the influence of religion on democratic governance in Nigeria and its effect on infrastructure development. The framework of the analysis is the Marxist instrumentalist theory, which is built on the radical decision-making models of economic policy formulations, and adopts qualitatively descriptive techniques and documentary approaches on data collection. The study discovered that while the restoration of democracy in Nigeria was ostensibly aimed at promoting good governance, political stability, and infrastructural development, the political gimmicks of the elites (cabals), traded the country's equality with a lopsided faith-based policy. These are evidenced by the significant decline in infrastructure, rise in insecurity, and economic destitution. Among other things are the poor supply of social facilities, and the retarded development of human capital. To improve on the situation, the following were recommended: i) Proper orientation of the citizens on the dangers of religious politics and appointment of leaders; ii) adopting a proactive measure to ensure the proper implementation of the existing policies irrespective of the religious affinity of the government in power. Thereby, contributing to accountability in governance, equal distribution of state resources, and overall development of the country to bring reduction in insecurity instigated by religious fanaticism in various regions in Nigeria.

Keywords: federal allocation, governance, religiosity, infrastructure development, internally generated revenue

Introduction

The study examined the connection between governance and religious implications for infrastructure development in Nigeria. Exclusively, examine the influence of religion on democratic governance in the country and its effect on infrastructure development. The restoration of democracy is ostensibly aimed at promoting good governance, development, religious tolerance, and political stability, but reverse is the case in Nigeria, due to poor leadership, grown out of the self-interest of the elites' political ambitions at the expense of the total populace. The outcomes are surrounded by the on-going carnage of innocent citizens, propelled by extremists from various part of Africa and beyond, in the bid to replace the circular status of Nigeria with

their preferred religion irrespective of the country's ethnic diversity and belief, significant decline in infrastructure, and economic retrogression. Others are the poor provision of social facilities and retarded human capital development are also observed. Making the issue of governance in emerging countries like Nigeria, somewhat challenging. For instance, in 2019, the North-west geopolitical zone of Nigeria, with seven (7) states recorded the highest number of poverty level beyond the 40.1% national average. Out of the seven states, Jigawa recorded 87% of its poverty rate; Sokoto - 87.7% and Zamfara – 74% respectively. Then, about 4 million were without basic healthcare and 29.7% had no the formal education. In spite of these regional condition of the people, its governance by different states were linked to corruption and misappropriation of public coffers ((ICP-AR, No. 288, 2020 pp. 1-2).

The effects are on the dilapidated and lacking infrastructural progress of majority of the six geopolitical regions of the country, lack of policy implementation and poor resource allocations. The interpretation and implementation of some policies and development programmes are often linked to the religious affinity of the political class or government in power. The absurdity of good governance, explains the irretrievable danger to democracy if left unresolved in Nigeria. Importantly, the huge decay in infrastructure at the federal, state, and local levels explains the demand for an overhaul, reintegration, and restructuring of the country's policies. These thought-provoking circumstances are the result of the government's deficiency in its methodical tactics, federation, mechanism, and management of society. Basically, the difficult state of infrastructure development is due to the fact that society does not have access to an administrative power associated with acknowledging the exact project, conducting some feasibility studies, and pushing ahead with the physical development of the projects (Oyedele, 2012).

In Nigeria, the issue of governance has experienced overwhelming controversy, especially since its establishment as an independent state, even more so in this democratic dispensation. As the most populous sub-Saharan African country of approximately 200 million people, for over fifty (50) decades of independence and a republic, government and infrastructure have faced devastating challenges due to inconsistent policies, economic hardship, religious prejudice, and poor governance that have hampered infrastructure development. Poor infrastructure development, abandonment of awarded projects in some regions, lack of transparency in governance, unequal distribution of resources, and corruption have shaped Nigerian governance based on religious

sentiments. Depending on the region, infrastructure features are numerous, services are massive and have received increased attention with national and global economic advances. The global focus has so far been on approaches to stimulate growth and improve the quality of life for all citizens but was denied due to the prevailing one-sided political-religious mood. According to Oyedele (2012), infrastructure is the technical framework that collaborates an existing society, such as roads, water supply, sewerage, national electrical grids, and telecommunications, among others. It is also described as the development of the basic facilities, services, and installations required for a society to function. Consequently, the main purpose of a country's infrastructure progress is to improve development for more conducive economic progress and the well-being of society. In this context, the question arises: Why does the religious affiliation of political elites undermine the impartial allocation of development projects and infrastructure in some regions of Nigeria? Answering this question is the aim of the work.

Conceptualization

Over the years, some attempts have been made at both national and regional levels to offer solutions to some of these development problems. In 1972, the African Development Bank was founded by donor countries with a board from six different countries. This institution aims to contribute to the promotion of economic and social development. The fund was to be replenished every three years by the member countries without an interest being charged on this loan. These loans were project loans with a term of 50 years. The Nigeria Trust Fund was also established in 1976 with the aim of using the country's resources to fund projects of national and regional importance. These loans were intended to support further economic and social development in Nigeria (Kumar & Scott, 2011). However, these efforts are yielding little or no results for the intent for which they were set up, due to seemingly endemic bottlenecks from inconsistent and poor policy implementation, lobbying, looting, and corruption that are rampant in Africa. However, studies have shown that a 1% increase in the stock of infrastructure investment in core sectors can boost GDP growth by up to 1 percentage point. Given these facts, African infrastructure development has been a key component of the banks' strategic direction (AIFPN, 2010). Most of the governance and infrastructure development issues have been identified by some researchers.

The efforts of these authors to get the connection right fall into two perspectives. GTI (nd); AIFPN (2010, p. 12); Kumar & Scott, (2011, p. 3); UNESCAP (end p. 1) focused their analyzes on the

impact of governance on infrastructure planning, sector upgrades as tools to achieve socio-economic development and to create productive jobs. Other researchers such as Oyedele (2012 p.3); Elu (2000 p. 60); PLAC (nd); pointed out the challenges of infrastructure decay and development. These include poor funding and execution of funded projects, lack of technological advancement for development, poor maintenance culture, the widespread art of kickbacks, and embezzlement of resources that have led to mismanagement and waste. On the other hand, Khan (2010) writes that governance skills are closely related to state-supported promotion strategies. To this end, this study is based on the Marxist instrumentalist theory of Karl Marx.

Theoretical Framework

For this study, the Marxist instrumentalist theory of Karl Marx (1818-1883) was adopted. The theoretical basis and its logical orientations derive from the scholarly legacy of 19th-century political thinkers such as Paul Sweezy. He argues that a country is a government-influenced instrument that enforces and inherently guarantees the constancy of elite organizations. Miliband, on the other hand, recognized the governmental power of a capitalist social order that owns and pedals the source of production and, because of the financial control it has been delegated, is able to use the country as an apparatus for exercising social dominance (structuralism vs. instrumentalism - what is the difference? | WikiDiff). Within this idiosyncratic theory, the state function is assumed to be the instrumental demonstration of authority by strategically positioned individuals, either through direct state manipulation of policy or through indirect pressure on the state (Gold, Lo, & Wright, 1975a, p. 34). .

The central claim of Marxist instrumentalist theory is that countries pursue the interests of the capitalist class because the state explicitly controls that class. Miliband and Domhoff (1967) attempted to isolate the system by which the capitalist class adopts the state as an instrument to promote and defend its class interests. However, Domhoff distinguished four of these systems as follows: (i) the candidate selection; (ii) the special interest; (iii) the ideological legitimation; (iv) and the policy planning. Based on these processes, McGowan and Walker (1984) contend that interest is often associated with decision-makers being influenced by interest groups, particularly the powerful industrialists, to adopt certain policies and development paradigms that broaden their interests, or, to circumvent rules and development plans, to jeopardize the interests pursued. They

also point out that these rules and plans enable the capitalist class to assent, defend, and justify a precise path of exploratory certainty, thorough investigation, and identification of specific individuals and ideas.

The appendage of Marxist instrumentalist inquiry concerns the formation and provision of society. This method of analysis uses the country's machinery to further its general interest. The main position of Marxist instrumentalist theories is explicit that in a capitalist society the interest of the ruling class comes first and not that of the entire population because of their direct participation in various kinds of state machinery and economic processes. In other words, the special interest process involves lobbying of decision-makers by interest groups, including religious extremists in the political class, to either adopt specific policies or initiate their preferred general development paradigm. The ideological legitimation process involves the creation, dissemination, and enforcement of certain values. These are values that claim that a particular development is the best of all available strategies. Therefore, Marxist instrumentalist theory focuses on the links between the ruling class and the key actors in a regime's political institutions to show that the state lacks independence or initiatory role since its power is fully anchored in the subjugated economy and from which political class is controlled.

In addition, it includes the influence of the neo-colonialists on the country's domestic manufacturing process over the ruling class, so as not to undermine the interest of multinationals in a developing economy. It also includes the establishment of special political approvals by impressive commissions and working clusters of industrialists and associations that do not impede the services of expatriates (neo-colonialists) in key positions in specific sectors of the economy

Poor Infrastructure Development and Religious Play

Without a question, Nigeria's economic development has been slow and insufficient. The uptrend is also much diminished by the absence of more advanced infrastructure, in addition to being significantly dependent on foreign assistance and politics for its development ambitions. For instance, the Nigeria Bureau of Statistics (NBS) categorizes the following manufacturing businesses in Nigeria: (i) cement manufacture; (ii) oil refining; and others. These industries make up a negligible five percent (5%) of the GDP of the economy's entire manufacturing sector, which is penalized mostly by inadequate infrastructure and is undersized due to reliance on growth-inhibiting characteristics. Particularly in the areas where the majority of Nigeria's resources are

found. For instance, the little percentage of GDP devoted to manufacturing perpetuates the dreadful picture of a sector that has been restrained for a number of years due to pervasive growth limitations and the poor condition of physical infrastructure. The multiple taxes and charges are also known as Transitional Inputs, which create a hostile business environment (NBS, 2010, p. 7). For instance, during this time, the value-added of industrial events increased to almost 600,12,3 billion naira (N612.3 billion) in 2009 from 585,6 billion (N585.6 billion) in 2008. However, from eight-point-nine percent (8.89%) in 2008 to seven-point-eighty-five percent (7.85%) in 2009, the industrial value-added rate decreased. While the rate of premium growth in the same industry was about equal to zero point thirty-two percent (0.32%) of total GDP in 2008, in 2009 the rate climbed by six point forty-six percent (6.46%), compared to zero point thirty-six percent (0.36%) of real GDP growth. Economically speaking, this industry contributes 4.17 percent (4.17%) more to real GDP in 2009 than it did in 2008 (4.14 percent). Nevertheless, in 2010, the value-added of industrial activities climbed from 600,12,3 (N\$612.3) billion at current exchange rates in 2009 to 647,82 (N\$647.82) billion. Manufacturing's real growth rate was particularly poor in 2010, as a result of a reduction in bank financing for the industry and a drop in total domestic demand.

Conclusion

The largely poor performance of the government in power over the years reflects in part the continued lack of infrastructural support from the central authority, particularly where religious affiliation is not established. Obviously, Nigeria's greatest precarious experience is its inability to keep up with maintaining the existing infrastructures in the economy-based centers for dynamic development progress, economic growth, and implementation of adopted policies. For example, most small and medium-sized industries face irregular power supply, poor road network, poor access to drinking water supply, and other problems. The test cases used here are supposed examples to systematically illustrate this perspective. All this has contributed to a significant decline in technological and economic progress. Human capital retardation has also been observed as a consequence of the poor provision of social facilities. To improve the situation, this was recommended: the adoption of a systematic approach to regulating poor policy implementation, which contributes to unilateral infrastructural support of certain regions due to religious affinity in governance. To this end, increase transparency and accountability in the country's governance and economic progress, and reduce skirmishes caused by religiosity, waste of resources, and others.

References

- Ayodeji, L. O. & Lasisi, F. A. (2015). The interface between government policies, human capital development and poverty reduction in Nigeria. *European Journal of Business and Innovative Research*. <http://www.eajournals.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Interface-Betwe-en-Government-Policies-Human-Capital-Development-And-Poverty-Reduction-In-Nigeria.pdf>
- Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report and Statement of Account (2002).
- Central Bank of Nigeria Economic and Financial Review (2010).
- Central Bank of Nigeria Economic and Financial Review (2011).
- Central Bank of Nigeria Economic and Financial Review (2012).
- Choy C. L. (1983). *Multinational Business and National Development*, Singapore: Maruzen Asia.
- Chukwuemeka, E., Anazodo, R. and Nzewi H. (2011). "African Underdevelopment and the Multinationals. A Political Commentary." *Journal of Sustainable Development*, 4(4). www.cosnet.org/jsd
- Dayo, F.B. (1999). Nigeria case study: *UNIDO Project is Y/RAF/99/415 Triple*. 'E' Systems Associates Limited, Lagos.
- Gottman, J. M., McFall, R. M. and Barnett, J. T. (nd). Design and analysis or research using time series. *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 72, No. 4, 2999-306.
- Obadina, T. (1999). Nigeria's economy at the crossroad. *Africa Recovery*. <http://www.un.org/en/africarenewal/subjindx/subpdfs/131nigr.pdf> (22/01/2016).
- Oviasuyi, P.O, Idada, W and Isiraojie, L (2010). Constraints of local government administration in Nigeria: *Journal of Social Sciences*, 24(2): 81-86. <http://krepublishers.com/02-Journals/JSS/JSS-24-0-000-10-Web/JSS-24-2-000-10-Abst-PDF/JSS-24-2-81-10-1041-Oviasuyi-P-O/JSS-24-2-81-10-1041-Oviasuyi-P-O-Tt.pdf>
- Pfarrer, M.D, Pollock, T. G. and Rinda, V. P (2010). A tale of two assets: The effects of firm reputation and celebrity on earnings surprises and investors' reactions. *Academy of Management Journal 2010*, Vol. 53, No. 5, 1131-1152. <https://media.terry.uga.edu/socrates/publications/2011/07/A20Tale20of20Two20Assets2028AMJ202010291.pdf>
- Duru, M. (2012). New challenges for industrial policy in Nigeria". *Universal Journal of Management and Social Sciences*.
- Economy Overview (Tuesday, 21st April, 2015). Nigeria High Commission, London, UK 9, Northumberland Avenue, London Wc2n 5bx, United Kingdom Telephone (Chancery): +(44) 207 839 124408712210073.
- Federal Ministry of Trade and Investment (2011). *Sponsored by UNIDO*. Retrieved from <http://www.fmti.gov.ng/component/content/article/52-fdi-news/131-fg-created-14million-jobs-in-12-months.html>.
- Goh, A. (2006). Towards an innovation-driven economy through industrial policy-making: An evolutionary analysis of Singapore. *The Public Sector Innovation Journal*, Vol. 10(3). Article 34.

- Government of Ghana, Ministry of Trade and Industry (2011). *Ghana industrial policy*. Retrieved from: www.ghanachamber.org/.../national-policy/documents?...industrial
- Ikelegbe, A.O. (1996). *Public policy-making and analysis*. Benin-City: Uri Publishing Ltd.
- Industry to sustainable development in Nigeria: *A Report Prepared For UNIDO*, For The Rio +10 Assessment Environmental Resource Managers Limited. 107a Imam Abibu Adetoro.
- Karingi, S., Oulmane, N., Sadni-Jallab, M., Lang, R., Pérez, R. (2006). ATPC assessment of the impact of the economic partnership agreement between the COMESA countries and the European Union. *ATPC Work in Progress*. No. 37 African Trade Policy Centre (November). Economic Commission for Africa.
- Kerlinger, F.M. (1964). *Foundations of behavioral research*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winstron.
- Kilpatrick, D. G (2000). Definitions of public policy and law: *National violence Against Women Prevention Research Center Medical University of South Carolina*. <https://mainweb-v.musc.edu/vawprevention/policy/definition.shtml> 24/2/2015.
- Merriam, S. B. (2002). *Introduction to qualitative research*. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
- National Population Commission (NPC, 2012).
- National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2010). *Annual Abstract of Statistics*.
- National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2010). *National Manpower Stock and Employment Generation Survey*.
- National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2011). *Third Quarter Report*.
- Nigeria Labour Congress. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigeria_Labour_Congress.
- Nigeria's path to sustainable development through green economy: *A report prepared for UNIDO*, for the Rio+20 Summit. June, 2012.
- Ojo, A. S. and Ololade, O. F. (2014). An assessment of the Nigerian manufacturing sector in the era of globalization. *American Journal of Social and Management Sciences* ISSN print: 2156-1540, ISSN Online: 2151-1559, doi:10.5251/ajsms.2014.5.1.27.32 © 2014, ScienceHub. Retrieved from <http://www.scihub.org/AJSMS> (2/3/2016).
- Patton, M. Q. (2002). *Qualitative research and evaluation methods* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA:SAGE Publications.
- Rebuilding confidence: Big challenges remain for President Obasanjo's reforming administration, but investor belief in Africa's most populous nation is growing. *World Report International Limited*. Retrieved from info@worldreport-ind.com. London
- Wong P. K. (1995). Technology transfer and development inducement by foreign MNC's: The experience of Singapore, 130-159. In K. Y.Leong and M. H. Kwack (Eds), *Industrial strategy for global competitiveness of Korea industries*. Korea Economic Research Institute.
- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD,2013).*Trade and development report*. Retrieved from unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/tdr2013_en.pdf.