

Western Civilisation, International Relations and Imperial Politico-Economic Policies: Regards on Globalisation and Politico-Economic Fragilisation of Postcolonial African States

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Abstract

Western civilisation via international relations wittingly propels globalisation that transcends the somehow self-governing states' boundaries. Nevertheless, these relations are essentially the internationalisation of Western sets of values, mostly couched in capitalist exploitation, foisted to fragilise non-Western societies, such as in postcolonial African states. More importantly, these relations and its globalizing trends falsely address issues related to global politics, economics, social, science, technology (especially technological transfer) and culture. Contestably, these relations and globalisation are purveyors for disregarding the basic needs of industrial capabilities beyond states in the Western hemisphere. Therefore, this paper examines the theoretical and empirical trends, characterising these relations and globalisation, as motored by Western civilisation's imperial politico-economic policies, which virtually fragilise economic and political growth in postcolonial African states. Distinguished from benchmarks of human development – good governance, micro and macro-economic growth, and more, Western civilisation is rather framed as the antithesis of development through the deindustrialisation of postcolonial African states. Consequently, using the theory of imperialism, I argue that, relations galvanised by Western civilisation, stimulate states with unstable politico-economic policies, undemocratic political regimes, people's impoverishment and widespread underdevelopment.

Keywords: *Civilisation, International, imperial, politico-economic policies, fragilisation, states*

Introduction

Historically, Western civilisation, even in its core capitalist perspective, beams as a politico-economic and science and technological messiah to non-Western peripheral capitalist societies, through the instrumentality of international relations and globalisation using specific imperial politico-economic policies. To say the least, Western civilisation has acted as the only best pathway, model, or set of vectors and values for all human development. Paradoxically, “these Western civilisations's ravaging values” (Asobie 2002), have been transmitted into other parts of the world through somewhat impervious imperial politico-economic policies, with less concern to human development in other parts of the world. Thus, as Ake (1978) argues, the

bulk of these Western values and mindset foisted into “developing or prismatic areas,” (Riggs 1994) amount to brute imperialism.” attenuates

Definitely, this seemingly alluring posture of Western civilisation, elicits serious questions to determine the veracity of its claims as the only path to human development, hence this compels mounting this paper. The paper examines to discern and show how Western civilisation has rather used international relations and globalisation in distinct imperial politico-economic policies, to fragilise, downgrade and subjugate, rather than strengthen the growth of human development in non-Western peripheral capitalist societies, such as postcolonial African states. The ultimate purpose is, therefore, to reinforce and augment the existing theoretical and empirical knowledge about the maliciousness of Western civilisation’s propagators, who use international relations, and globalisation to foist imperial politico-economic policies that fragilise and stagnate human development in postcolonial African states. Herein, we advocate the attenuation of policies that enforce the mindsets of propagators of Western civilisation; and infers that, such enforcement is essentially an eventual disservice to Western civilisation rather than to postcolonial African states per se. This assertion would become persuasive even to avowed pundits of Western civilisation, who must understand that, Africans will in their numbers radically turn against Western civilisation’s oppression.

Certainly, we are not intellectualising, speculating or advocating violence against any section of humanity, even if as Fanon (1963) asserts that, “violence beget violence”, we are rather stating an empirical unequivocal veracity intrinsic in the antithesis of Western civilisation, which would evolve to contradict, alter or destroy its own very mindset in order to liberate the now subjugated Africans (Karl Marx 1818 – 1883, Gramsci (1891- 1937).

As Mearsheimer (2001) opines, “At the bottom of this Western civilisation’s quest to spread its claims over its civilising values to the rest of humanity, is power, which certainly lies at the heart of international relations and globalisation, yet, which attracts considerable disagreement about what it is; and how to measure it.” Despite these supposed difficulties arising from the apparent differences in knowing what power is, and how it can be measured, nevertheless, from the Western civilisation’s point of view, power is known and can be accurately measured, when it comes to determining the territorial number of neo-colonised and subjugated postcolonial African states and their unparalleled levels of compelled poverty and underdevelopment.

Thus, and specifically, I agree with Mearsheimer (2001: back page) to argue that, power, which Western civilisation parades over the rest of humanity, in the manner rain parades itself over

crops, is based on the acquisition of particular material capabilities by man in his state. Consequently, the ensuing acquisition and balance of power is therefore, a function of owning tangible assets, such as dependable economic bases, capable of producing, sufficient food, armoured vehicles and nuclear weapons, arising from comfortably sustainable politico-economic management, which support vibrant politics, to represent what Western civilisation wangles as parameters of power, over non-Western peripheral capitalist societies, which do not possess these parameters of power, but which eventually would possess them. After-all, as Karl Marx puts it, “knowledge acquisition is not a monopoly of any specific civilisation.”

Thus, this paper undertakes critical reflections on how imperial politico-economic policies, construct unequal commercial, trade and other investment gains; between Western core capitalist and postcolonial peripheral capitalist states, in order to show how Western civilisation perpetuates exploitative international relations and globalisation against postcolonial African states. It proffers a brief history of economic imperialism from early to modern epochs of humanity to demonstrate the persistent economic imperialism in postcolonial African states and the enduring control over non-Western territories wielded by Western civilisation; even after the Cold War. It highlights the significance of understanding the pitfalls of economic imperialism against local strategies, structures, structural-functional relations, the processes and ideas that assist in perpetuating poverty, conflicts and underdevelopment in postcolonial African states. Irrefutably, imperialism is an outgrowth of capitalism, and, as some scholars agree, “...imperialism is the intimate consequence of capitalism, because, capitalist societies engage into overproduction of goods and services, which they cannot all consume on their own, thus, these societies are essentially compelled to seek for market beyond their own national territories to market their excess goods and services. Thus, as Hobson (1858 -1940) affirms, “imperialism is, and remains the precursor of underdevelopment”

Western civilisation, international relations, imperial politico-economic policies and the trajectories of postcolonial African states

Accordingly, the theory of underdevelopment is a concept within the academic discipline of development studies, part of which is pre-occupied in teaching to explaining why economic growth has been elusive in postcolonial countries. Thus, there are two-man theories of underdevelopment, namely:

- (a) The theory of underdevelopment pioneered by Paul Baran views the underdevelopment of the less developed countries as a consequence of the fact that, the developed rich countries

exercise dominance and imperialist assertion over the postcolonial countries, especially those in postcolonial Africa;

- (b) The dependency theory of Hans Prebisch, which posits that underdevelopment is mainly caused by the peripheral position of affected countries in the world capitalist economy. Typically, underdeveloped countries offer cheap labour and raw material on the world market. These resources are sold to advanced economies, which have the means to transform them into finished goods; and which are then sold to poor countries at very high prices.

The theory of underdevelopment became popular during the 1970s within development studies, as an important subfield within the social sciences. It attempts to address the question of why economic growth continues to evade sustainability in postcolonial countries, such as are found in Africa. Two key questions arise from a debate, which wears ideological aprons, namely: (i) Is it primarily because of internal factors, such as local culture of indolence, laziness and overconsumption, lack of ingenuity in scientific and technological skills, lack of dependable national institutions, excessive corruption, and patrimonial relations? (ii) Or is it primarily as the result of external factors, particularly the power relations impelled upon the postcolonial world by Western civilisation's capitalist system dominated by core industrial Western states, which exploit a periphery of poor states in a form of neocolonialism? Indeed, reminiscently, before the 1970s, it was common discourse within the modernisation school of thought, which arose from the propagators of Western civilisation's imperial politico-economic policies – John Maynard Keynes and his neoclassical economic thinking, to regard colonial and postcolonial states as being underdeveloped and insinuating that they may never be developed.

Disturbing projected internal and external factors

Among the two foregoing perspectives, internal factors were emphasised, and developing states were seriously encouraged to follow particular stages of economic growth in order to catch up and develop in the manner similar to that of Western civilisation's industrialised states. This encouragement thronged upon the premises that, the more the postcolonial states were integrated into the world capitalist system, firstly, through incorporation and monetisation of local economies, and secondly, through ways of living - culture, these states would then reap the benefits of increased aids, trade and foreign direct investment. Nonetheless, in sharp contrast to internal factors doctrine, another school of thought emerged, which argued that the postcolonised postcolonial world were actively underdeveloped by its contact with imperial

powers – Western civilisation. Accordingly, Western civilisation worked through international relations, globalisation and imperial politico-economic policies to perpetuate its imperialist doctrine in postcolonial African states. But, according to this underdevelopment perspective, which has close links with the dependency and world systems perspectives, the economies of postcolonial African states were intentionally distorted to meet the needs of emerging capitalism inherent in Western European civilisation. This was particularly so, during the phase of industrialisation, when capitalist firms in competition with each other needed cheap labour, cheap and abundant raw materials, and new markets for their products. The postcolonial regions, became satellites or peripheries of the industrialised states that formed the metropolises of centres of a world system of capitalist expansion, through international economic relations, which persuaded economic dependency.

Accordingly, the theory of underdevelopment arose within Marxism but as a departure from the classical Marxist view that capitalist, while it exploits and destroys, also develops. As Karl Marx (1818-1883) in *Capital* volume 1, state: “The country that is more developed industrially only shows to the less developed the image of its own future.” (1954:19). Thus, as the former USSR, now Russia-born American economist Paul A Baran (1910-1964) wrote in 1957, “...on the contrary, postcolonial societies were blocked from development by the peculiar manner in which they came into contact with industrialised states, first, it is through the Trans-Atlantic Slavery and, secondly, it is through colonialism and subsequent neo-colonialism. Thus, for Baran, the origins of underdevelopment must be traced back to the 1884 Berlin Imperial Conference for the Scramble and Partition of Africa, culminating into the resource plunder and enforced unequal commerce, trade and economic activities of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This was a time, Baran argued that, “...when Western civilisation’s colonisation of the rest of the world began on behalf of merchant capitalists, and latter followed by producers’ capitalism. So, imperialism as famously stated by Vladimir Ilich Lenin, (1870 – 1924), “...is the highest stage of capitalism,” as it grows out of the inevitable tendency toward the creation of monopolies.” This is then accompanied or stimulated by unbridled, obnoxious and mischievous competition among capitalist firms which destroy or swallow the less successful firms in postcolonial areas (Ibeano 1993, Ake 1996, Bade 1996).

Accordingly, Baran further argued that, however, that monopoly capitalism faced a crisis of overproduction due to the lack of effective demand in capitalists’ home countries. The economic surplus generated had to be productively absorbed by the by the capitalism system if a crisis was to be avoided. Parts of this surplus were absorbed through military expansion,

state expenditure for official buildings, roads, citizens' welfare, to prevent the working class at home from revolting, and technological innovation. However, this was not sufficient to absorb the massive surplus and create the conditions for the continued accumulation of capital, which is the motor force of capitalism, which is the accumulation for the sake of accumulation. Capitalism had to conquer new markets and create new investment opportunities, argued, Baran, and this could only be achieved through expansion into new territories in the form of colonialism (political and economic dominance) and neocolonialism (economic dominance over politically independent states).

For Baran, the class interest that comes to dominate within these countries, foreign and local actors benefitted from this state of dependency in various forms and ways. These beneficiaries included domestic landowners, merchant and monopoly capitalists, none of whom had any real interest in the development of a domestic market that would generate a development dynamic within the satellites. Foreign capital in particular was mainly interested in primary resource extraction, where profits are repatriated to the metropolises. This resulted in the development of modern enclaves to serve a very small domestic market composed of expatriates and domestic elites, who aspire to mimic the consumption patterns of the metropolis. The rest of the periphery was composed of an expanding reserve army of cheap labour living in poverty in the countryside and in urban slums.

(i) The theory of cumulative causations

The theory of cumulative causations developed by the Swedish economist and sociologist Gunnar Myrdal (1898–1987) also arose during the 1950s and covered similar ground but from a non-Marxist perspective. Myrdal laid emphasis on the cumulative development path of industrial countries that had made breakthroughs in science, technology, and industrial production. These countries had large domestic markets with a high demand for goods and services, thus attracting capital into their economies. Poor countries, on the other hand, fell into a downward spiral of stagnation and impoverishment due to, among other things, low savings, small domestic markets, and the low skills, poor wages and poor health of the work force. Low tax revenue meant that the governments of poor countries could not invest in gigantically sustainable social and economic infrastructure, except in small export enclaves that mostly benefit foreign capital. These conditions led to rising intra-national as well as international inequality, thus perpetuating the underdevelopment of the periphery.

Thus, while Baran favoured Soviet style state planning to overcome underdevelopment, Myrdal saw the solution in state-led industrialisation and market regulation, where infant industries are protected from foreign competition. These ideas were popularised and refined by a number of neo-Marxist thinkers, such as Andre Gunder Frank (1967), Samir Amin (1970), and Walter Rodney (1971), who argued that the development of Europe rested on the underdevelopment of Africa. This perspective found a ready audience among revolutionary nationalist leaders in the postcolonial Africa, who were not necessarily Marxists. To mitigate the negative impact of neocolonialism and dependency, many countries used the postcolonial state as an active agent of development, with policies ranging from import substitution to a relative delinking from the world capitalist system in the pursuit of self-reliant development (Nnoli 1996). These strategies during the 1960s and 1970s did achieve any considerable successes in growing a domestic market, achieving respectable growth rates, and improving health and education services in many postcolonial African, Latin American, and Asian states. However, these achievements were also accompanied by an overreliance on increasingly authoritarian, corrupt, and unaccountable states, and massive borrowing that resulted in an unsustainable debt crisis beginning in the 1980s. This, and the declining fortunes of Soviet state socialism, helped pave the way for the ideology of “free market” neoliberalism to penetrate the periphery (Masumbe 2019, Okolie 2020).

This period saw the resurgence of modernisation theory, albeit couched in the language of globalisation. During the 1990s, development studies seemed being in crisis, as globalisation theory, and either from the Right or the Left, the claim was that, “a global village of open economies was being created.” National boundaries, it was argued, were being blurred; the state was being replaced by “the market” (that is, private firms) as a key agent of development, and there was no longer an industrialised core in the “first world” and an impoverished periphery in a “third world.” Instead, global inequality was becoming deterritorialised as investment and jobs flowed increasingly to the periphery, leading to increased economic growth and employment, while the industrialised countries experienced greater unemployment and inequality. The only exception is much of sub-Saharan Africa, which remained marginalised from the processes of global integration.

However, the 1997 East Asian economic crisis and subsequent crises elsewhere in the world exposed the vulnerability of the newly industrialising economies, forcing a retreat from neoliberal policies, and the reemergence of the state as a critical actor in development. Writers such as Samir Amin insist that the core-periphery model remains valid even in the professed

increasing employment in alleged 'global village of open economies.' Concretely, only two countries, namely South Korea and Taiwan, have risen out of their periphery status, largely because of the privileges they received as U.S. allies during the Cold War. For the rest, including fast-developing India, rapid industrial growth followed the pattern of enclave development. Consequently, these countries remain the reservoirs of cheap raw materials and labour and seas of extreme poverty. On the other hand, the industrialised "troika" of the US, Canada, the European Union, and Japan continues to dominate the world economy at the core, with the United States performing the hegemonic role with the help of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. These institutions impose rules on underdeveloped countries that undermine efforts at domestic development, in the interests of transnational corporations that remain firmly based in industrialised countries.

Contrasting views between internal and external factors

There is now increased recognition that both internal and external factors are floated as being responsible for the inability of poor countries to come out of their conditions of underdevelopment. Consequently, these poor countries are challenged to democratise internally, develop local capacities, and spread the benefits of economic growth to all citizens. At the same time, they need to act in concert with other countries and civil society organisations to reap the benefits of globalisation. But how can these poor countries reap the so-called benefits of globalisation, when their participation in globalisation is unequal to rich industrialised European countries? Some emphasise regulating capitalism at a global level through transformed global institutions that according to Chandler, (1962) "must be structured to align with strategies and structures reoriented toward the needs of national development, particularly in poor countries. Others urge a focus on strategic delinking, especially from the financial markets dominated by the financial institutions of the triad, in pursuit of a "polycentric negotiated globalisation" that is governed by democracy, disarmament, and a new system of international law that respects national and regional autonomies.

The Dependency Theory

Subsequently, during the 1960s and 1970s, Latin American dependency theorists produced an important challenge to modernization and growth theories of development. Associated with a number of key intellectuals from Latin America, Andre Gunder Frank, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Peter Evans in Latin America, Samir Amin and Walter Rodney in Africa,

the *dependentistas* turned modernization theory upside down by arguing that contact with Western capitalism created (rather than solved) underdevelopment in the Third World. They challenged the Eurocentric notion that development was a "catch-up game" in which a "backward" Third World, mired in "tradition" (and thus outside modern history), could only become developed (like the West) with the help of Western capitalism.

While significant variations within this perspective would emerge, certain central tenets can be identified. Most notably, the *dependentistas* rejected the dual approach to development, arguing for a more global approach that examined unequal terms of trade and the role of Western capital in the perpetuation of these inequalities. At the same time, dependency theorists were unable to break completely from the Eurocentric discourse they were challenging. While critiquing the nation-state focus of modernization theory, their policy prescriptions tended to assert the centrality of the nation-state, with particular attention to state structures, technology, and national economic planning, thereby appropriating many of the key elements in mainstream development's toolkit. This limitation has inspired critiques of dependency writings from many different perspectives.

The Intellectual Roots of Dependency Thinking

The dependency challenge grew out of historical and economic analyses grounded in Latin America's colonial and postcolonial experiences. The historical work of Latin American scholars such as Eric Williams highlighted the links between the colonial plantations and Western economic development, particularly the use of plantation profits to bankroll European industrial development. The plantations were not precapitalist remnants of indigenous economies, they argued, but the result of capitalist penetration. This historical work undermined modernization theory's dual conception of Third World economies, arguing instead for a more integrated approach, one that paid attention to global inequalities and their link to uneven development. This argument greatly influenced the thinking of key dependency theorists, most notably Andre Gunder Frank.

The dependency approach was also influenced by a group of Latin American economists working for the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), a United Nations agency established in Santiago, Chile, in 1948. Led by Raul Hans Prebisch these economists sought to understand why, after years of applying modernisation and growth "solutions" to Latin American economies, so little progress had been made. They began to see the world as divided

into an industrial core and an agrarian periphery. Rather than accepting modernization theory's premise that "backward" economies would gradually move through stages to mass consumption and industrial development, with help from northern capital and development experts (Rostow), the ECLA economists insisted that the core-periphery gap was produced (and reproduced) through patterns of unequal world trade. The very system that was supposed to develop the Third World was leading to its underdevelopment. Prebisch and the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) economists thus challenged neoclassical theories of international trade, called for attention to distribution, and warned that the gap between the core/metropole and the periphery would continue unless there were explicit interventions to challenge structures of international capitalism. Yet, they still believed Latin America's development depended on industrialization and that the domestic capitalist class was the natural leader for that development. Hence, they argued for policies that would nurture this class, encourage import substitution industrialization, and put-up protective tariffs until local manufacturers were ready to compete in the global economy.

Radical Dependency Theorists

Andre Gunder Frank, Peter Sakwe Masumbe and other radical dependency theorists drew on some of these ideas as well as the work of the neo-Marxist Paul Baran to reecho the underdevelopment narratives into the mindsets of postcolonial rulers. For instance, Frank's influential English-language publications adopted the global perspective of the *latifundia* ("large landed estates," "plantations") historians (Williams), as well as Prebisch's focus on unequal terms of trade and his core/periphery model of the world economy, including Masumbe's *The West and Politico-Economic Decline or Growth in sub-Saharan African countries: Focus on Structural Adjustment Programme Policies, (1980 -2018)* drum the hard talk message to develop Africans. However, Frank rejected the ECLA economists' optimistic assessment of Third World elites. Influenced by Baran, Frank and other radical *dependentistas* argued that collusion between Third World elites and monopoly capital in the industrialized countries was one of the leading factors causing underdevelopment in the periphery. They also rejected the dual economy assumptions of modernization theory, arguing that capitalism had penetrated all corners of the globe since its emergence in the sixteenth century. The Third World periphery was not a "backward" region that would catch up with the industrialized world; its underdevelopment was necessary for metropole's prosperity. As Frank

argued, the core and periphery were not separate entities, but, rather, the logical consequence of an integrated global capitalist system. According to Frank:

A mounting body of evidence suggests ... that the expansion of the capitalist system over the past centuries effectively and entirely penetrated even the apparently most isolated sectors of the underdeveloped world. Therefore, the economic, political, social, and cultural institutions and relations we now observe there are the products of the historical development of the capitalist system no less than are the seemingly more modern or capitalist features of the national metropolises of these underdeveloped countries. (p. 18)

Frank and his *dependentista* colleagues challenged the assumption that decolonisation had truly liberated the newly independent nations in the Third World. They argued that, in fact, exploitation had intensified, both between core nations and within Third World countries, and concluded that, the prevailing relationship between peripheral Third World elites and their Western capitalist allies could bring nothing but underdevelopment and despair to the peripheries. Thus, they called for revolutionary action to remove local political elites from power and to establish governments based on socialist ideals and structures. Only then would Third World nations be able to break their bonds of dependency, acquire real science and technological to challenge global capitalist patterns of inequality, and develop as autonomous and true self-reliant nations.

In fact, radical dependency theory influenced thinkers outside Latin America as well in Africa, where it found a welcome audience among intellectuals and many policy-makers. The Guyanese historian Walter Rodney wrote a widely acclaimed analysis blaming Africa's historical underdevelopment on the systemic inequalities resulting from capitalism, colonialism, and imperialism, and Samir Amin, an Egyptian political economist, concluded that Western civilisation had underdeveloped large parts of the African continent during the colonial period. This had led to the creation of dependent peripheral economies characterised by weak and fragile peripheral capitalist sectors focused on small elite luxury markets, with little attention to manufacturing for mass consumption or to promoting links between agriculture and industry. Deeply suspicious of Western civilisation's explanations of the world and believing that Western capitalist structures inevitably and inherently caused underdevelopment in the periphery, Samir Amin has been an ardent advocate of delinking from the West. However, in Amir's thinking, whether this is to be a regional or national project is unclear, but the imperative of delinking is never questioned. In any case, any occurrence of massive fire burning starts from a specific point, thus, I strongly believe that, such delinking

must start from one, two or more postcolonial African states. The examples of Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso are illustrative to the rest of postcolonial African states.

In a similar vein, although non-skeptics of delinking, such as Immanuel Wallerstein has drawn on Frank and other radical *dependentistas* for his own project, analysing commercial relations since the sixteenth century, delinking offers the best chances for the development of postcolonial African states. Wallerstein's 1970's World Systems Theory (WST) expands and complements Frank's ideas, providing a broad global analysis of the way successive emerging cores, their peripheries, and semiperipheries have experienced capitalism over the last few centuries. While seeing capitalism as a zero-sum game, in which winners bring inevitable losers, by advancing the notion of a semiperiphery (rather than a binary world of metropole/periphery) and emphasizing its skepticism toward the benefits of delinking in a global world, World Systems Theory acknowledges the dynamics and dialectics within capitalist development. While many critics find this approach too sweeping, WST continues to have passionate advocates (as well as opponents) around the world.

Reformist Dependency Theory

During the 1970s, the emergence of vibrant economies in some parts of the Third World, especially in countries like South Korea and Taiwan, challenged the radical *dependentistas'* argument for the inevitability of underdevelopment within the capitalist system. Reformist dependency thinking emerged to deal with these contradictions. In particular, the Brazilian social scientist Fernando Cardoso and his colleague, the sociologist Enzo Faletto, while sympathetic to much of radical dependency thinking, rejected the assertion that peripheral underdevelopment was completely determined by the logic of capital accumulation, and argued that Latin America economies were better understood by looking at "forms of local societies, reactions against imperialism, the political dynamics of local societies, and attempts at alternatives" (pp. xv–xvi). Dependency, for them, depended more on local dynamics and the maneuvers of politicians, particularly their willingness to be co-opted by foreign capital, than on the inevitable workings of the world capitalist system. Indeed, they rejected the notion of a world economy, positing instead a world of multiple capitalist systems, with each nation having its own specific social formation and style of capitalism.

Cardoso and Faletto also rejected the radical *dependentistas'* blanket hostility to the national bourgeoisie. Their focus on internal factors highlighted the importance of discovering which groups and classes were willing and able to push for national development. This could include

the national bourgeoisie as well as labour, peasants, ethnic groups, and civil society. No class or group was inevitably seen as inclined to help or hinder national development. Cardoso (1972) posited three ways that nations in the Global South could attain development: (a) gaining political autonomy and using that power to industrialize; (b) developing an export-oriented economy capable of accumulating enough capital to industrialize; and (c) being assisted by multinational capital investments that would foster technology transfer and eventual industrialization (a dependent form of development, however). While accepting the tendency toward dependent development rather than the achievement of economic and political autonomy in the Global South, the reformist dependency theorists stake out a very different position than their radical colleagues. For Cardoso and other reformists, genuine autonomous development can occur in the South if the correct alignment of internal forces, both structural and cultural/ideological, can be set in place.

Critiques of Dependency

Both radical and reformist dependency thinking soon encountered strong opposition. While openly hostile to the radical *dependentistas*, mainstream development policy-makers and practitioners increasingly recognised the validity of some of their arguments about the failures of modernisation "solutions" to Third World underdevelopment. Organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and some large government aid agencies responded to this challenge by emphasising the need to pay more attention to basic human needs and poverty. Reassured by the reformist arguments, some mainstream agencies sought to collaborate with more "reasonable" scholars, such as Cardoso and others who were opposed to delinking and believed in the possibility of working for change within the status quo.

Interestingly, the reformists' focus on the national bourgeoisie and class relations resonated with some of the Marxist critics of the radical *dependentistas*. For example, Ernesto Laclau condemned Frank for focusing on the market rather than class relations, despite his call for a class-based socialist revolution. Bill Warren, in a trenchant, well-researched challenge, questioned the assumption that Third World nations are inevitably caught in a cycle of underdevelopment. Citing various Third World success stories, he argued for a more specific, historical, and class-based analysis of global capitalist relations. Moreover, rather than automatically condemn the national bourgeoisie, he suggested that they could, under the right circumstances, play a crucial role in Third World development. In Africa,

some *dependentistas*, such as Colin Leys, retracted their earlier positions and resurrected the national bourgeoisie as a potential instrument for escape from underdevelopment (see also Kitching).

Some feminists concerned with development issues have applauded dependency theorists for criticizing modernisation theory and for grounding their analysis in Southern experiences and problems. However, dependency thinking has paid little attention to gender in general, preferring the broad sweep of global forces. Gender and development analysts have been particularly disturbed by dependency theorists' failure to pay attention to cultural dimensions of domination. This is particularly problematic for those concerned with gender equality issues because cultural attitudes and practices clearly play a crucial role both in reinforcing and strengthening patriarchal power structures. The focus on structures rather than agencies and culture is, thus, a serious problem for feminists interested in utilising the insights of dependency theory, whether radical or reformist.

Scholars and practitioners concerned with gender, alternative approaches to development, and postcolonial writings argue that in crucial ways dependency thinking has not freed itself from many of the categories of modernization theory. Development is still conceived largely in terms of economic growth, industrialization, and liberal democracy, as an evolutionary process to be led by the correct elites, whether socialist leaders or committed national bourgeoisies. The ecological implications of this growth-oriented model have been ignored, along with the voices and concerns of marginalized peoples. Agency and difference disappear in a world dominated by powerful global forces. The possibility that hegemony is never complete, that the marginal may influence development practice and thinking, is never considered. Moreover, both the discourse and assumptions of dependency theorists focus on national economic plans, with well-developed national targets. Thus, at the level of discourse and practice, dependency perspectives are based on top-down models of development familiar to the most ardent advocates of modernisation.

While there are lessons to be discovered in the writings of dependency theorists, most notably those that pay attention to specific historical forces and their relation to global structures and patterns, the shortcomings of dependency theorists, particularly their inability to move beyond the confines of modernisation theory, remain serious impediments for many who are concerned

with development questions in an increasingly global/local world. At the same time, the early twenty-first-century conjuncture inevitably raises questions about global forces and the potential of dependency theory's global perspective for understanding the present. Creative, but critical, analysis, drawing on dependency thinking as well as other strands of development thought, may well be possible. Certainly, the global focus of the *dependentistas* speaks volumes to us, as we grapple with financial flows and communication systems of an intensity and speed never envisioned in the past. Perhaps useful syntheses will emerge, and, with them, the possibility of reevaluating and using much of the rich scholarship of the dependency perspective.

Indeed, long ago Sir Keith Hancock wrote two volumes on the Commonwealth economic policy. They are still essential reading even today, because these volumes incarnate the philosophy of Western civilisation toward the rest of the world, especially the postcolonial African states. Thus, to greater extent this book is not merely a gloss on Sir Keith's work. But it is now possible to test his opinions against the primary documentation, which he could not have used in the 1930s. Further, his point of view now seems a cogent one, because, he was writing about problems of economic policy in the interwar Commonwealth given that, the Commonwealth incarnated an entity – Western civilisation, which actually have an economic policy directed toward the rest of the world. In this process, international relations and globalisation have become the conduit pipes for fostering Western civilisation.

International relations, Western civilization and underdevelopment in postcolonial Africa

Apparently, popularised as a dominant academic culture, international relations, consciously or unconsciously has been used to undermine peoples' political, economic, social landscapes in most parts of the world, especially those of postcolonial African states, whose scars and scourges from colonialism persist, under incessant neocolonialism. For instance, trends in Western civilisation, spearheaded by globalisation, which claim to be civilising “prismatic areas or transition societies,” (Riggs 1984, Coleman and Almond 1965) in the form of development partners; are essentially couched in fostering international relations with false and misleading theories of globalisation, which fragilise and underdevelop postcolonial African states. The subtle but pernicious devices work through imperial politico-economic policies, in what Western civilisation calls “realpolitik” Machiavelli (1469 -1527).

Actually, as Mearsheimer (2001:1) is apt to lament, “Several decades after the end of the Cold War, policymakers, academics – political scientists, economists, even the layman in either side of the aisles in the Cold War gimmickry, imagined an emergent global era of peace, prosperity, economic and political emancipation of people all over the world. An era where democracy, open trade, and mutual trust would prevail over neo-colonialism, marginalisation, subjugation and exploitation of parts of humanity by another part of humanity.” Rather, escalated mechanisms in international relations via Western civilisation continue to render mankind, especially the postcolonial African miserable, penurious and subjugated (Bade 2007, Olajide 2010).

As Branwen (2005), Fasi (2013) assert, the modern conditions of underdevelopment in Africa must be acknowledged as a global phenomenon, being the outcome of world’s historical processes of social change, which arise from imperially reproduced unpropitiated cock-eyed strategies and structures, through the social, economic and political constructs of international relations imbued in imperial economic policymaking, which are frequently, maliciously and ideologically obscured in most Western academic analysis is foisted to fagilise most parts of the world, especially the postcolonial African states. See for instance, the thinkings of W. W. Rostow’s The Five Stages of Economic Development: A Non-Communist Manifesto (1964), G. Almond and J. Coleman’s The Politics of Developing Countries, (1965), and A. F. K. Organski’s The Stages of Political Development (1965) wherefrom Ake (1978), (1981), Bade (1996) characterise as Western civilisation as imperialistic. Thus, since we are concerned with demonstrating how western civilisation forges international relations via imperial economic policymaking for fragilising and truncating human development in the postcolonial African states, it is pertinent making a brief exploration of the related contours of international relations.

International relations, as an offshoot of the academic discipline of political science, is essentially concerned with the interaction of states in the form of trade, politics, economics, diplomacy, social and cultural underpinnings. Such interactions are almost as old as Western societies, although the oldest states are traced back to China and Ethiopia (Vajra 1995, Payne 2011). Actually, the modern state system emerged in Western Europe following the Westphalian Peace of Treaty in 1648, which ended the Thirty-Year War among the various groups of princes and between political leaders and the Catholic Church over territorial control. International relations and world politics, which are closely related, focus on states as the main

actors. Thus, states are often referred to as nations, and most students of international relations use the terms states and nations interchangeably.

They also use the term nation-state. Definitely, the terms state and nation are related, but they are not exactly the same. Basically, a state is a political entity made of people, in a well-defined territory, a well-organised populace, within a set of governing institutions, exercising overall internal power over all other institutions – sovereignty over its territory. The obvious implication here is that, it is recognised by other states as having the exclusive right to make its own domestic and foreign policies. Said otherwise, it is an independent actor in world politics. A nation on the other hand is generally defined as a group of people, who have strong emotional, cultural, linguistic, religious, and historical affinities live in either one or dispersed territories. Despite, these differences between a state and a nation, the two concepts have become linked in everyday usage, and many scholars and practitioners use the term nation-state to capture this linkage. Thus, international relations revolve on three main questions, namely:

- (i) What are the political, economic, social, cultural and psychological contexts in which states operate; and how do these contexts shape or influence the decisions government make for themselves or other states?
- (ii) What are the major objectives and interests of states in the conduct of international relations and politics, and what strategies do they employ to achieve these strategies?
- (iii) How are the choices made by states explained, ideologically, imperially, subjectively or objectively?
- (iv) What is the relevance and/or irrelevance of power in international relations?

Certainly, at the heart of these questions is the concept of power. Power is defined as the ability to get others to do things they would ordinarily not do or to behave in ways they would prefer to avoid (Payne 2011:2). Of worthy to not is that, central to the core of understanding international relations is the view that, the interactions among states are characterised by the struggle for power (Morgenthau 1948). Thus, the emphasis on states as the dominant, almost very exclusive actors in world politics is referred to as the state-centric model. Ostensibly, the violence and threat of violence that accompanied the emergence of the modern state system led to the pervasive emphasis on military power as the highest priority and form of states' thinking. But history has demonstrated that, military power alone has never brought peace and stability

in international politics rather, it is dialogues and comprises – that is a lot of gives-and-takes (Payne 2011:3, Sashay 2023). This must be noted by the West in its insatiable and nonstop quest to subjugate, exploit and dominate postcolonial African states, economic landscapes.

Certainly, this would become clearer as we attempt proffering answers to delineate the aforesaid questions; while we localise the problem for this paper. To begin with, having emerged within the norms of the 1648 Westphalian Peace Treaty, the fragility of the postcolonial African state is constructed not by an historical accident but by sanely and egocentrically calculated international relations via imperial economic policymaking, championed by Western civilisation and its ravaging Western values, otherwise called globalisation (Asobie 2002, Haggie 2022). Through this imperial economic policymaking, Western mercantilists developed a system of recommendations in the field to regulate foreign economic activities. This system was more flexible and focused on maintaining trade surpluses not only by stimulating internal trade, but also by stimulating production in the Western industrial complexes. Thus, mercantilism corresponded to the era of active growth of industrial production in England, France, and other European countries, while laying the foundation for deconstructing industrialisation spirit in Africa. Thus, the approvals of the early mercantilists, in particular was a total ban on imports of finished goods into the West, to enhance domestic growth of production, trade, insurance and banking.

Therefore, mercantilism provided the leeway for shaping fragile pre- and postcolonial African states, given that Western governments afforded strong instincts in the field of foreign trade regulations, which primarily sidetracked any form of industrial growth in Africa. Essentially, this comprised: (i) conquering foreign markets by producing and selling (not importing) industrial goods, (ii) allowing the import of goods, especially raw materials, while maintaining an active trade balance in home countries, (iii) allowing the export of gold and silver for trade, mediation and investment abroad; in what is now fondly called ‘foreign direct investment.’

According to Karl W. Deutsch (1988), “Our study of international relations in our time is an inquest to the art and science of the survival of mankind. For instance, if civilisation is killed within the next thirty years, it may not be killed only by mere famine or plaques but by rascal and irritant foreign policies and international relations.” Certainly, international relations are that area of human endeavour where inescapable interdependence meets with inadequate

guarantees for necessary and essential controls, although such interdependence has massively been abused by Western civilisation within the tools of imperial politico-economic policies.



Fig. 6: A Schema, showing African within western civilisation, international relations and the trading globalisation business

Source: Landin, R., (2007) *Globalisation and underdevelopment in Africa*, Lagos: PENN Books, p.90

Western civilisation, Globalisation, international relations and underdevelopment in postcolonial Africa

As Ritzer (2008) opines, “Globalisation can be described as the stretching of economic, political, social and cultural relationships in space and time.” In this sense, a manufacturer assembling a product for a distant market, a country submitting to international law, and a language adopting a foreign loan word, or Africans going to stage cultural displays in Britain, France or the United States are all examples of globalisation. Definitely, viewed through this lens, globalisation is thrilling. But Asobie (2002:23) disagrees, as he believes that, “globalisation is the spread of the ravaging Western political, economic, social and even cultural values to other parts of the world, even at the refusal of such parts to accept such values.” Though some writers attempt to group globalisation in several types, essentially, there are three main types of globalisation.

- a) Economic globalisation. Here, the focus is on the integration of international financial markets and the coordination of financial exchange.
- b) Political globalisation.
- c) Cultural globalisation.

Globalisation, integrated or better still, incorporated other parts world’s economies, politics, and cultures into one global movement, irrespective the considerable essentialism and existentialism of the hitherto cultures. Although globalisation had existed in time and space, a

German-born American economist Theodore Levitt has been credited with having coined the term globalisation in his 1983 article titled “The Globalisation of Markets.” The phenomenon is widely considered to have begun in the 19th century following the advent of the Industrial Revolution, but some scholars date it more specifically to about 1870, when exports became a much more significant share of some countries’ gross domestic (GDP). Its continued escalation is largely attributable to the development of new technologies particularly in the fields of communication and transportation and to the adoption of liberal trade policies by countries around the world. Eventually, it is these liberal trade policies that greatly propel globalization which Thomas Munn, an English mercantilist had enunciated earlier. Nevertheless, to some scholars, (Rodney 1972, Dumont 1988, Asobie 2002, 2005), globalisation is pure imperialism because, it operates on non-equal basis of internationalisation of the processes of wealth production. In this direction some scholars hold these opinions about globalisation:

- 1) Social scientists, especially, those with Marxian philosophy have identified some key aspects of globalisation as (i) interconnection, (ii) intensification, (iii) time-space and distanciation (conditions that allow time and space to be organised in a manner that connects presence and absence), (iv) supraterritoriality, time-space compression, action at a distance, and accelerating interdependence.
- 2) Modern World System analysts also conceive of globalisation as a long-term process of deterritorialisation, that is, of social activities (economic, political, and cultural) occurring without regard for geographic location. Thus, globalisation can be defined as the stretching of Western economic, political, and social relationships in space and time. A manufacturer assembling a product for a distant market, a country submitting to international law, and a language adopting a foreign loanword are all examples of globalisation.
- 3) What distinguishes the process of modern globalization from those forms of global integration that preceded it are its pace and extent. According to some academics, three distinct eras of modern globalization can be identified, each of them marked by points of sudden acceleration in international interaction. Under this scheme, the “first globalisation” era refers to the period between approximately 1870 and 1914, during which new transportation and communication technology decreased or eliminated many of the drawbacks to distance.
- 4) The second globalisation era is said to have lasted from roughly 1944 to 1971, a period in which an international monetary system based on the value of the United States dollar facilitated a new level of trade between capitalist countries. And the “third globalization”

era is thought to have begun with the revolutions of 1989–90, which opened the communist Eastern bloc to the flow of capital and coincided with the creation of the World Wide Web. Some scholars argue that a new period of globalization, the “fourth globalization,” is underway, but there is little consensus on when this era began or whether it is truly distinct enough to merit its own designation.

- 5) New levels of interconnectedness fostered by globalization are credited for numerous benefits to humanity. The spread of industrial technology and the resulting increase in productivity have contributed to a reduction in the percentage of the world’s population living in poverty. The sharing of medical knowledge has dramatically decreased the incidence of once-feared diseases and even eliminated smallpox. And economic interdependence among countries discourages war between them.



Fig. 6: Protesters carrying signs in a demonstration against the World Trade Organisation (WTO) meeting in Denpasar, Indonesia, in 2013.

Source:

However, the implementation of globalization has been much criticised, leading to the development of the anti-globalisation movement. Opponents of globalisation or at least, globalisation in its present form, see for instance, neoliberal globalisation, which represents a variety of interests on both the political left and right. Labour unions disdain multinational companies’ ability to move their operations to countries with cheaper labour; indigenous peoples rue the difficulty of maintaining their traditions; and leftists object to the neoliberal character of the new world economy, arguing that the capitalist logic on which they contend globalisation is based leads to asymmetrical power relations (both internationally and domestically) and transforms every aspect of life into a commodity. Right-wing critics of globalisation believe that it threatens both national economies and national identity. They

advocate national control of a country’s economy and rigidly restricted immigration. Globalisation has also produced effects that are more universally worrisome.

Expanded transportation networks facilitate not only increased trade but also the spread of diseases. Undesirable trade, such as human trafficking and poaching, has flourished alongside legitimate commerce. Moreover, the pollution generated by the world’s modernisation has resulted in global warming and climate change, threatening Earth’s very habitability. Whether globalization will adapt to these problems remains to be seen, but it is already changing again. For example, globalization began in the 19th century with an explosion in exports, but, even before the COVID-19 pandemic that swept through the world in 2020 resulted in global lockdowns, trade as a share of many countries’ GDP had fallen. It can be argued that the global supply chains today rely more on knowledge than on labour. And services now constitute a larger share of the global economy than goods. A “fourth globalisation” might indeed be here or at least on the way.



Fig. 7: Factory smokestacks polluting the air as emission of industrial pollution, as an international menace in pursuit of globalization.

Source:



Fig. 5: A schema bearing on types of globalisations

Sources: Adapted from Blaffer (2015) Theories of development and underdevelopment in postcolonial Africa, Lagos: PANA Press, p..60

17.Appadurai identifies 8 types of globalisation, thus:

- a) Social globalisation
- b) Technological globalisation
- c) Financial globalisation
- d) Economic globalisation
- e) Political globalisation
- f) Cultural globalisation
- g) Ecological globalisation
- h) Sociological globalisation

From these 8 types, it is possible to discern how the contemporary world is becoming more integrated on many different levels, even if this integration is highly skewed in favour of developed countries. This article will define, explain and examine all 8 types of globalisation. Globalisation is the increasing interconnectedness of our world among the developed and developing countries. It is understood to have been happening since the beginning of time. However, it has rapidly accelerated since the 1950s. Many scholars define globalization as the shrinking of ‘time’ and ‘space’. In other words, connecting with people takes less time than ever before and moving from one space to another, such as it is seen around the world today is certainly faster than it previously was.

Of Appadorai’s eight types of globalisation

i)Political Globalisation

Political globalisation refers to the interactions between states, which involve the bargain based on use of political power to achieve a foreign policy thrust. It includes the standardisation of global rules around trade, criminality, human rights, democratisation and most essentially, the rule of law. International bodies including the United Nations, European Union and World Trade Organisation are key multinational organisations designed to facilitate increasing political globalisation. This includes growing free trade and multilateral agreements on investment. One of the biggest positives of political globalisation is that it creates international rule of law. It helps prevent war crimes and polices bad actors on the international stage. It can also help speed up other forms of globalization, like economic globalization, because standardized rules around food and trade standards makes it easier for companies to sell their

goods overseas. An argument against political globalisation is that it involves countries meddling in each other's business. Many people think we shouldn't interfere in the decisions of other nations. Another criticism is that it led to the spread of the political ideology of neoliberalism that increases the gap amid the rich and the poor.

ii) Social Globalisation

This refers to sociological or social globalisation which implies the integration of various societies into one another, which must not be confused with cultural globalisation. Sociological globalisation refers to the idea that we now live in a shared society. Understanding that, there are many different *cultures* within a society, and that a society is not just a group of people who live together. Now more than ever, it feels as if we all live in one society instead of in a group of different societies, as for instance:

- a) Happenings in the Middle or Far East can affect happenings in the United States, Europe or Africa or elsewhere.
- b) A contamination in China can spread to all corners of the world.
- c) The use of nuclear weapon in North Korea can threaten lives in New Zealand.

So, it appears, we are now all a common society who need to learn to get along despite our different cultures and beliefs because what we do affects people all around the world. Another aspect of social globalisation is the movement of people. People can go from one country to another easily, and those who are most highly educated can get jobs in different nations with more ease than ever.

iii) Economic Globalisation

Economic globalisation refers to the ways corporations do business as multinational organisations in the modern world, irrespective of the character of pricing and labour mechanisms which do not favour development decolonised states in Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia. Whereas once McDonald's only existed in the USA and HSBC only existed in the United Kingdom, now these companies are all over the world in a 'globalised economy'. You will also notice the movement of manufacturing industries to developing nations to make the most of low wages and lowers the price of goods. This can help developing nations increase overall employment but can be considered exploitation of nations with poor working conditions. It also takes good paying jobs away from developed nations.

iv) Technological Globalisation

Technological globalisation implies the spread of technological around the world, except in the postcolonial African states, which have remained the beneficiaries of the dearth of technology, in spite of the orchestrated phenomenon of technological transfer or globalisation. Examples of this include the spread of the internet, solar panel technology and medical technologies, which can all help improve the lives of people around the world. The spread of technologies can be interpreted as the ‘rising tide lifts all boats’ argument. Globalisation means we can make the most of the best technologies from all around the world to make everyone’s lives better and improve everyone’s economies. Technological globalisation is closely connected to the anthropological scapes of globalisation theory by Arjun Appadurai. He came up with the term “technoscapes” to explain how technology spreads around the world.

v) Financial Globalisation

Financial globalisation connotes the ease at which money can be spread around the world. The growth of stock exchanges like the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) as well as internationalisation of financial markets has made it easier for people to transfer money internationally. The benefit of this is that it’s easy and cheap to get investments for new business ventures. You can find a Chinese, French or Canadian investor to wire you some money to start your business instead of just relying on local investors. But many nations also face backlash because of the sense that overseas companies buy out too much of their businesses, real estate and farming land which could be a threat to a nation’s sovereignty.

vi) Cultural Globalisation

Cultural globalisation refers to the spread and mixing of cultures around the world. But this is deceptive, because, while the West maintain and perpetuate its cultural values, the West encourages postcolonial African states to eradicate their own cultures in order to imbibe Western economic, political and social values, which they call globalisation (Asobie 2002, Asobie 2005). Arjun Appadurai talks about the possible effect of homogernisation of culture, where dominant nations like the United States spread their cultures through television and movies, which leads to the dilution and loss of local and indigenous cultures and the rise of a global culture. One example is the spread of punk music from the UK and USA around the world in the 1970s. Other examples include the spread of Disney music, secularism and consumer culture. Concepts related to cultural globalization include cultural adaptation,

cultural diffusion, and hierarchical diffusion. We can also see that, as migrants move around the world, people are increasingly developing transnational identities.

vii) Ecological Globalisation

Ecological globalisation refers to the idea that the world needs to be considered one international ecosystem, except that, this idea is turning out against the development of postcolonial African states, because the rich ecosystems in postcolonial African states with several species of endangered wildlife is exploited with alacrity by the West. For instance, huge deposits of raw materials, which the West and China extract with reckless abandon come from the sense of global ecosystem (Rodney 1972, Dumont 1988). This means that postcolonial African states need to protect to their ecologies. For instance, the ozone layer, which affect the region's climatic conditions, otherwise called climate change, which affect the poorest nations (particularly low-lying nations in the Pacific, South-East Asia and Africa) even though much of the damage is caused by developed nations in the armpit of Western civilisation. To address these issues, the several climate accords such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Climate Agreement need concerted application by investing in lowering world's carbon emissions.

viii) Geographical Globalisation

Geographical globalisation refers to the idea that, the world is no longer seen as group of distinct nations much as people perceived it previously, rather, now, nations supposedly work in multinational and multilateral blocs to make decisions for solving problems. However, in the conduct of international relations to achieve these goals, postcolonial African states are negated and relegated into underdevelopment (Kirku 2013, Ayana 2013). It also refers to the fact that people can now travel between nations with increasing ease. For instance, someone can travel with the United States and Europe within a day. Furthermore, people can identify as belonging to multiple geographic regions, especially if they hold multiple passports. Heritage and ancestral ownership of territory is getting weaker and weaker. All these happen in objective senses, where Western civilisation does not impel itself upon people in conditions of subjugation and exploitation. Actually, nothing is practically wrong in globalising, except that it supposedly represents Western civilisation's values, which must be imbued by non-Western civilisation as the best path for human development.

Conclusion

I tried examining issues of associated to imperial politico-economic policies, which I consider as the most pernicious against the development of the people of postcolonial African states. Here I argue that, relations galvanised by Western civilisation, with postcolonial African states, essentially

stimulate postcolonial African states with longstanding unstable politico-economic policies, undemocratic political regimes, people's impoverishment and widespread underdevelopment. Actually this thinking preoccupied the mindsets of top levels of British government and administration during and after World Wars I and II. For instance, in India, The Indian question and the Imperial-preference debates of the twenties were suppressed for fear of inadvertently prodding India into economic growth as the chagrin of British imperialism. This was chiefly because Britain had explored their thinking in other developing economies, such as Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Egypt and so on. It should now be clear that we cannot understand imperial Western economic diplomacy during this period if we approach it without the spirit of exploitation in mind. British politicians were not trying to exploit anybody; they were preoccupied with the Dominions, where they lacked the political power to impose policies of subjugation, imperialism and domination.

Finally, for the benefit of postcolonial African states, by using the mechanisms of international relations, Western civilization wittingly propels globalisation that transcends the somehow self-governing states' boundaries. Nevertheless, these relations are essentially the internationalisation of Western sets of values, mostly couched in capitalist exploitation, foisted to fragilise non-Western societies, such as in postcolonial African states. More importantly, these relations and its globalising trends falsely address underdevelopment issues related to global politics, economics, social, science, technology (especially technological transfer) and culture. Contestably, these relations and its globalisation are purveyors for disregarding the basic needs of industrial capabilities beyond states in the Western hemisphere.

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