

GOVERNANCE CRISIS AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA: EVIDENCE FROM THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

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Abstract

Nigeria has remained in economic and political quagmire in the face of overflowing reservoir of resources, even as its populace is torn in violent crisis and penury. The principles of governance have been upheld in its misconceptions and the management of public affairs and society has rotationally fallen below expectation. The drawbacks on governmental affairs in Nigeria's Fourth Republic are perplexing with high manifestation of democratic truncation, poor developmental planning, to leadership ineptitude. These laid the basis for political violence, ranging from electoral/ethno-religious violence to economic sabotage activities. Irrespective of the effort of several existing literatures which bother on the area of governance crisis as well as on the issue of political violence there are still sustaining gaps in this area knowledge. This vacuum is how governance crisis is resultant of political violence. Therefore, the article outlines the parameter of governance crisis in the Fourth Republic and how they drive political violence in monumental proportions in Nigeria. It reveals that the failure of state to provide services to the poor people explains the developmental challenges of many and the struggle for survival. These resentments have transformed into violent attacks, sacrificing lives and property in the nation at the detriment of peaceful co-existence and security for development. The reform of the Nigerian state through improved governance system infused with such attributes as responsiveness, accountability, efficient social service delivery, and equitable allocation of resources would build-up satisfaction among the populace, by alleviating their appalling conditions, thereby reducing frustration and aggression. The paper adopts the theory of state fragility and the use of secondary sources of data.

Keywords: Governance, Governance Crisis, Political Violence, State, Fourth Republic

Introduction

In the wake of independence of Nigeria in 1960, hopes and expectations were high that Nigeria was on the threshold of good governance. Within a few years however, these high hopes and lofty expectations of independence were dashed and frustrated. Good governance has since become a mirage. At the federal, state and local government levels, governance crisis of frightening proportion have become entrenched (Popoola, 2011). The country has undergone perilous crises; ranging from ethno religious conflict to post election violence, infrastructural failure, Unemployment, youth restiveness, pandemic diseases, human rights abuses, high way robbery, terrorism etc. Despite the flare of optimism as evidently demonstrated by its

leaders and policy makers to flicker the hopes of Nigerians, their social condition is worsening on daily basis (Usman, Kyari, Hajja and Goni, 2013).

Today, Africa is seen as the most backward continent, with its economy far-fetched from doing well. Rapid population growth, coupled with high rate of poverty, illiteracy, conflict, diseases, external debt; corruption and bad leadership tend to exacerbate these problems. Thus the twenty first century which many observers described as the era of hope, Africa's life is at the low ebb (Usman, *et al*, 2013; Ghani and Lockhart, 2008). Bekoe (2002:232) argues that 'each passing year reinforces Africa's grim statistics of a continent in which many states are overtaken by poverty and conflict'. For him, it is noteworthy that, the endemic problems have been that of governance crisis which has produced autocratic rule, economic decadence, underdevelopment and conflict.

Paradoxically, Nigeria is seen by the rest of the world as one of the richest countries in terms of natural resources, and at the same time among the most backward countries of the world. More than 60% of Nigerians live below the poverty line of one dollar a day (World Bank, 2011). Given the propensity of Nigerian leaders to indulge in malpractices, it is not surprising that the nation is still plagued by gross underdevelopment. Basic social services including medicare, good roads, pipe borne water, electricity, schools are notoriously inadequate. Living standards have considerably declined over the years, that the elderly look at the past with nostalgia and even say that their lives were better in the 1960s than today (Nnonyelu, 2013). State failure in its capacity to provide services to the poor explains the frustration of many bewildered citizens. The problem in Nigeria has become compounded with the spate of insecurity ravaging the land. In 2012 National Budget dubbed Fiscal Consolidation, Inclusive Growth and Job Creation, about one trillion naira was allocated to security, many times more than the provisions for education, health and other social services (FGN, 2012). Even with this monumental allocation to the Security Sub sector, Nigerians have not slept with their eyes closed as the country is violence infested. These range from arson, domestic violence, kidnapping, murder, politically motivated assassinations, to sectarian induced attacks and killings, and several other forms of violence that inundate the land (Albert, 2007; Akinwale & Aderinto, 2012).

The wrath and damage orchestrated by political violence in the Nigerian society have elicited intense emotions and threats necessitating academic literatures to beam their searchlight in this wise and its impact, locating its immediate and remote causes on factors that pinpoints on the socio-cultural diversities of the people, such as religious intolerance, ethno-religious conflicts, boundary dispute, linguistic barrier and overriding group influences. This study argues that the latent and manifest cause of political violence in Nigeria is attributed to breach in governance (governance crisis) with the Fourth Republic in perspective. Failure on the part of government to execute its responsibilities and functions appropriately has engendered loss of political legitimacy, disloyalty and distrust from the citizenry. Government is fast failing in the political will to maintain law and order among its citizenry that has been frustrated as a result of blocked aspiration and undeserved deprivation. From the

forgoing, the objective of this article is to ascertain the state of governance crisis and its nexus to trends of violence in Nigeria with the Fourth Republic in perspective. It argues that where poverty, deprivation and frustration reached a certain peak as a result of lack of economic opportunities and service delivery by the government in the face of abundant resources, and where extravagance and ostentation by the political elites is palpable, especially in a heterogeneous society-where suspicion and tendency of one group dominating the other is most likely, oppressed and marginalized groups may resort to conflict and violence. There is also weakness in state capacity to enforce its powers on the populace to act aright in all necessary quarters including those vying for political positions via elections and public servants in office. This has engendered political violence among its citizenry in diverse capacity and altitude.

The paper is structured in five sections; conceptual review of key concepts and theoretical concerns for the purpose of analysis; political violence and governance crisis in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: the nexus; the crisis of governance and lastly, understanding governance crisis and political violence in Nigeria.

Theory of State Fragility: Conceptual and Theoretical Underpinnings

Governance essentially refers to the mechanisms, processes and institution for determining and managing public affairs and society. More specifically, it refers to how societal problems are identified and addressed; resources extracted, allocated and utilized; how policies are made and implemented and how societal progress and development are managed (Ikelegbe, 2013:217).

Governance involves the 'exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to manage a nation's affairs' (World Bank, 1989), and particularly the manner in which a government or other authority exercise political power (Wohlmuth, 2000). According to Hyden and Court (2002), governance refers to the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and societal actors interact to make decisions. Governance is good when it is characterized by accountability and transparency in the conduct of public affairs most especially in the execution of policies and decisions on public goods and services. More broadly, governance comprises the complex mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interest, exercised their legal rights and obligations and moderate their differences (Trevor, 1997:133). It means the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development (World Bank, 1992:1) and how the affairs of states are administered and regulated (Landell-mills and Serageldin, 1991).

Governance crisis is beamed on the light of governance replete with malfunctioning and overlapping structures and institutions of governance; the crisis of infrastructure; economic crisis; and political immoralities (Oyovbaire, 2007). For

Rosenthal (2012), a crisis of governance would be manifested in political parties' electoral behavior, the stability of ruling coalitions, the cooperation of parliament and the ability to monitor the bureaucracy. Good governance is the effective exercise of power and authority by government in a manner that serves to improve the quality of life of the people (Obadina, 2000). The exercise of power and authority that undermines these aims points at governance crisis.

Scholarship of development or modernisation has long established five governance crises in the development process. These are legitimacy crisis, meaning the consequences of the proper or improper use of power and authority; participation crisis, meaning the trouble involved in the peoples' quest to own and be acknowledged that authority derives from them; the crisis of penetration, which means the breadth and depth, or the absence of both in governance as it affects the various segments and classes of the nation; the crisis of integration or of identity, means the degree of attachment to or of withdrawal, alienation and detachment from the state and to, or from one another as citizens of the state, communities and classes of people; and finally, the crisis of distribution, which means the feeling of social justice or injustice, equity or inequity, and inclusiveness or exclusiveness in the way governance allocates resources including the dispensation of law and justice, to all the peoples of the state. Where these crises in the development process emerge in sequences and segments, the historical path or development trajectories may cope creditably with them in a manner or manners that progress is experienced as the crises are managed overtime. Where, however - and this is the interesting experience of most developing countries - the five crises well up and are cumulatively experienced together the overall consequences tend to create inevitable breakdown not only for the rulers or power elite, the government, and the regime, but also for the state and the nation. This is the intellectual appreciation of the inevitability of instability or of total collapse of developing states and nations (Oyovbaire, 2007).

Violence is a multidimensional concept cutting across political, economic, social, repressive, alienating, direct and indirect violence. The word 'violence' defies any precise, commonly accepted definition. The concept often serves as "a catch all for every variety of protest, militancy, coercion, destruction, or muscle flexing which a given observer happens to fear or condemn" (Tilly, 1978:74). It is the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation. For Corsini (1999), violence is the expression of hostility and rage through physical force directed against persons or property. It is aggression in its most extreme and unacceptable form, which threat of its use has been seen to be a universal phenomenon. The universality of violence expresses violence as an act that threatens a person's physical and psychological integrity (Alanamu, 2005). Violence as an encompassing phenomenon is organised in nature carried out by the people or government to cause harm or injury with the intents and purposes to carry out a desired objective (Adele, 2012).

There are various factors that lead to violence in society such as: poverty, unemployment, frustration, neglect/deprivation, family violence, government maladministration, corruption, over population, etc. violence creates various degrees of problem in the society. Some of its effects are: insecurity, fear, poverty, and underdevelopment, destruction of lives and property, high cost of living, psychological/emotional trauma etc. Violence can be expressed in the form of kidnapping, murder and manslaughter, outright destruction of property (individual or state), rape, armed robbery, arson, child abuse, carjacking and negligent homicide.

According to Anifowose (2006:4):

Political violence is the use of threat of physical act carried out by an individual or group of individuals within a political system against another individual or individuals, and/or property, with the intent to cause injury or death to persons and/or damage or destruction to property; and whose objective, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation and effects have political significance, that is, tend to modify the behavior of others in the existing arrangement of a power structure that has some consequences for the political system.

The intention to affect the political process directly or indirectly, immediate or futuristic is the underlying objective of any violent struggle that is political. To this extent, political violence can be referred to as all forms of collective attack within a political regime, that is, violent acts with explicit or implicit political motivation which ranges from ethno-religious uprising, coup d'etat, party clashes and election violence, riots and rebellion, arson, assassination, sabotage, hijacking, bombing, war and domestic terrorism, etc. (Alanamu, 2005).

Political violence is a common means used by people and governments around the world to achieve political goals. Its application serves as tool for order maintenance and reforms. The state typically characterized its own use of violence as an order maintenance activity, where its application is seen as justifiable as in the case of 'state of emergency' and other instances (Danzinger, 1998). Many groups and individuals believe that their political systems will never respond to their political demands. As a result, they believe that violence is not only justified but also necessary in order to achieve their political objectives. Some forms of violence that can be perpetuated by groups or individuals to drive home their political demands could involve the taking up of arms against government and its apparatuses, perpetuating diverse social evils and ills such as kidnapping, thuggery, rape, assassination, etc., as well as distorting economic and political activities. These acts could draw governance attention to these sections of the society to formulate favourable policies in that direction as seen in the case of the Niger Delta youths.

The activities of the Niger delta militant struggle distorted economic production for an ample period of time resulted in the birthing of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the amnesty programme. The Niger Delta

Development Commission is a Federal Government agency established by then Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo on June 5, 2000 with the sole mandate of developing the oil-rich Niger Delta region of southern Nigeria. The amnesty programme was a disarmament programme initiated on 25th June 2009 which led to acceptance of the granted Amnesty to restore peace to the region.

The state can be regarded as a set of interconnected and coordinated institutions that are primarily concerned with the organization of power and the structural domination of society. It is a set of institutions for governance and the exercise of public authority, and more specifically for authoritative decision making and implementation. The performance of state roles and the maintenance of the monopolies over power and resources are dependent on its capacity. Capacity underlines the strength, quality and durability of state policies, actions and institutions. It is undermined when the performance of policies and programs and the institutional framework for such performance are characterised by lack of cohesion, stability, legitimacy, durability, security and quality. It is for these reasons that differences in state capacity may account for differences in the performance of state functions (Ikelegbe, 2013). From the foregoing, state fragility principally entails a fundamental failure of the state to perform functions necessary to meet citizens' basic needs and expectations. Fragile states are commonly described as incapable of assuring basic security, maintaining rule of law and justice, or providing basic services and economic opportunities for their citizens.

A responsibility of states is to deliver political goods- security, health and education, economic opportunity, good governance, law and order, and fundamental infrastructure requirements (transport and communications). States fail when they are no longer willing or able to carry out these functions (Potter, 2004). Fragile states are unable to meet (their) population's expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political process, as well as those where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor (Moreno-Torres and Anderson, 2004). A state's success or failure can be assessed by looking at how effectively and efficiently it delivers crucial political goods (Rotberg, 2004). A state that is aimed at resilience must be willing to engage in partnerships for poverty reduction, with an explicit political commitment to policies aimed at promoting human welfare been reflected in actions and outcomes. Secondly, there should be an inclusive approach that does not exclude particular social groups from the benefits of development (Moreno-Torres and Anderson, 2004).

To this end, the indicators of the crisis of governance such as weak social services delivery, democratic evaporations, and the variance of corruption, play down on the principles of governance where access to power is access to wealth as individuals try to escape their economic strangulations sequel their inability to access basic social needs. Chetwynd, Chetwynd and Spector (2003), argue that increased corruption reduces governance capacity, disrupt governance practice and breakdown its moral fabrics, destabilizes state institutions, and reduces provision of service, rule of law and public trust in government and its institutions. Impaired governance reduces social capital, political legitimacy and increases poverty. It is evidently clear

that, increased poverty might lead to frustration, and in turn, lead to conflict or violence. Beswick and Jackson (2011:45), argue that "... the poor are no more prone to conflict than anyone else, but are more likely to choose it because they have a comparative advantage in violence, suggesting it is cheaper for them to do this because they forgo little else in the way of alternative...poverty is so bad that the risk to one's life is worth it.'

At a broad level, fragility is the result of a dynamic interplay between internal factors (including violent conflict, poverty, economic and structural conditions, weak formal institutions), and external factors (including international political economy, regional and global insecurity). All of these are unique in any given context. Fragility is frequently associated (if not synonymous) with violent conflict and sustained poverty. Development agencies have largely adopted a functional understanding, often characterising fragility in terms of bad governance and weak state will or capacity. Increasingly, state fragility is also associated with weak state legitimacy (Moreno-Torres and Anderson, 2004).

Political legitimacy is the support of a significant segment of the citizenry (in particular more influential citizenry and groups) who believe that the state can exercise rightful authority and is entitled to demand compliance. Political legitimacy is greatly affected by the state's ability to 'deliver the goods' to its people through satisfactory economic performance and at least a minimum distribution of economic resources (Kelsselman, Krieger and Joseph 2013:10). This dimension arises where some fail to provide basic services, such as primary schooling, health care or water supply and sanitation, to a sufficient degree and face eroding authority as a consequence. Others are drowning in civil war or criminal violence. Yet others are unable to extend their reach over all parts of their territory, with populations in some areas not recognising the legitimacy of the central state authorities. In some cases, these different types of problems combine and exacerbate each other (Grävingsholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, 2012). Misgivings in governance do not only affect political legitimacy it impacts on patriotism. The inability of the state to demand compliance and support for its policies and programmes among its citizenry reflects acts of citizen's unpatriotic, loss of loyalty and legitimacy, distrust and high level of disregard for state powers and authority. To agitate for inclusion in the 'national cake' citizens indulge in or resort to any available medium of violence.

The state is the primary structure of governance. Governance is about the proper use of legitimate power and authority in the affairs of a nation or the people. The nature and character of the state and of its operators, actors and agencies determine the trajectory and quality of governance. Where and when there are negative turning points in the sequences of the use of power and authority, the nation experiences alienation and instability, and sometimes it experiences extreme trouble and grave danger (Oyovbaire, 2007). The World Bank identifies fragile states by weak performance on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) (World Bank, 2005). Vallings and Moreno-Torres (2005), argues that the central driver of fragility is weak state institutions. Fragility can occur when poverty or economic decline are combined with the presence of weak state institutions that

cannot manage the very real grievances caused by, for example, inequitable distribution of resources or unequal access to formal institutions. Essentially, this means that in fragile states political institutions are not strong enough to manage effectively the natural conflicts that occur in society.

Political Violence and Governance Crisis in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: The Nexus

Elections in Nigeria are no longer free and fair but traded and sold to the highest bidder in a fierce competition. Today, political parties cannot be defined in terms of ideology but in terms of a political competition which is aimed at reaching political power. With this ideological dislocation among political parties in Nigeria, anything goes in practice within the ambience of the 'game' (a game of fraud). Electoral violence is seen as the ultimate kind of electoral fraud (Hoglund, 2006:5). In Omeiza (2009), it is captured as simply violence aimed at the electoral process and is geared towards winning political competition or power through subverting the ends of the electoral and democratic process. He noted that its tool of trade is the intimidation and disempowerment of political opponents. In line with the foregoing, the trend in Nigeria's Fourth Republic was for many political figures to openly recruit and arm the youth to unleash terror upon their opponents and ordinary members of the public during election periods.

A cursory look at electoral politics in Nigeria since 1999 depicts a catalogue of election related assassinations (Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013). For instance, on 23rd of December, 2001, the former Attorney General of the Federation Chief Bola Ige was assassinated and on March 5, 2003, Harry Marshall- the National Vice Chairman for the South-South Zone of All Nigeria Peoples Party was also assassinated (Iduh, 2011). The former Nigerian Bar Association Chairman, Onitsha Branch in Anambra State Barnabas Igwe and his wife were gruesomely murdered on September 1, 2002 and Engr. Funsho Willians, Dr. Ayodeji Daramola former gubernatorial candidates of PDP in Lagos and Ekiti State suffered the same fate (Iduh, 2011). In 2012, a serving Senator from Plateau State, Senator Dantong Gyang Daylop, the majority leader of Plateau State House of Assembly Honourable Gyang Fulani were gruesomely murdered while many were left injured by unidentified gunmen (*Sun*, July 9, 2012:2).

The 2003 and 2007 elections are the worse in the current history of Fourth Republic. These elections are militarized in the sense of a high level of extensive electoral violence, as state officials and political leaders imported massive arms before the elections, and organized, armed, funded and protected hordes of armed groups. In the Niger Delta, the sheer armed proliferation and empowerment of armed groups, who were used but dumped after the election, culminated in a new regime of militia proliferation and activism, criminality and violent political conflicts between 2003 and 2004. The extensive incidence of political violence before, during and after these election were manifested in politically motivated assassinations and violent inter party and factional conflicts. There was abundant evidence of large scale rigging, fraud, and intimidation in many parts of the country (Lewis, 2003:142).

Indeed, incessant political violence in Nigeria could be attributed to over-zealousness and desperation by political gladiators to win elections or remain in office at all cost. A good example is former President Obasanjo who publicly declared that the 2007 general elections would be 'do or die affair' (Nwolise, 2007:165). Such remark does not only endanger political developments but connotes a violent call for everyone to augment political arsenals for the contest (Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013). The 2007 elections when it actually came were most deadly and frightening in nature and condemned by international observers (Isekhure, 2010). Thus in Rivers State, a police station was attacked and burnt by unknown assailants a night before the Election Day. In Anambra and Rivers States, voters were faced with violence and intimidation. The INEC offices in Onitsha North, Onitsha South, Nnewi South and a local government office in Akwa North, Anambra were burnt in protest. In the same vein, violence marred election in other parts of the nation. In Ekiti State, there was a confrontation between the PDP and Action Congress supporters and election results were blatantly falsified in many areas. Violence was equally reported in the northern state of Katsina, where opposition supporters burnt down government buildings in protest at the announcement that the PDP had swept the state's gubernatorial polls. In Nasarawa state, soldiers clashed with angry voters. In Oyo state, PDP thugs beat up opposition party officials and hijacked ballot boxes (Adele, 2012).

The 2007 election therefore was generally perceived as the worst in the history of election administration in Nigeria. The election brought most fraudulent practices. These illegalities were later settled by the judiciary but before this, those affected had their mandates stolen. The international monitors commented that: 'The 2007 state and federal elections have fallen short of basic international and regional standards for democratic elections. They were marred by poor organisation, lack of essential transparency, widespread procedural irregularities, significant evidence of fraud, particularly during result collation process, voter disenfranchisement at different stages of the process, lack of equal conditions for contestants and numerous incidents of violence. As a result, the elections have not lived up to the hopes and expectations of the Nigerian people and the process cannot be considered to have been credible' (Adebayo and Omotola, 2007:207). In every respect, the 2007 elections (State, Local and Federal elections) had come and gone but the wounds created and the injustices perpetrated continue to linger. Apathy increased in leaps and bounds as many were discouraged from taking part in politics.

The 2011 Elections, in spite of the ills that followed the 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections, Nigerians still showed their willingness to elect their leaders which is a demonstration of their deeper love for democracy. Violence swept through the six geo-political zones in the country. There were bloody clashes between supporters of political parties and a wide use of arms, voter intimidation and various instances of ballot snatching as seen in Ondo state, where three people were shot dead in Obanla area with four people reportedly injured in Iro street in a clash between supporters of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the ruling Labour Party (LP) (Adele, 2012). The first taste of such electoral violence started with ruinous political campaigns in

almost all the states of the federation. Ruinous as violent clashes ensued among supporters of political parties which led to the death of several people and many were injured less than nine days to the general elections. To cite a few more cases, in Akwa-Ibom, political campaign took a destructive dimension when both Ikot-Ekpene and Uyo were turned into theatres of political war. The face-off was between loyalists of the PDP and ACN. The ACN had its gubernatorial campaign rally at Ikot-Ekpene while the PDP had its own in Mkpato Enin and Abak Local Councils at Uyo. Different versions of the cases of the quarrel were advanced, but, it was certain that the quarrel took place between the supporters of ACN and those of the PDP which resulted to the death of many while several were wounded. The presidential campaign office of Goodluck Jonathan/Namadi Sambo situated along Abak Road was set ablaze. Some 127 Peugeot, 307 Salon Cars and 157 tricycles 'Keke NAPEP' belonging to the State Government were burnt. About 20 other vehicles belonging to well-meaning Nigerians were equally burnt at different locations. About 51 suspects were arrested in connection to the political violence at Uyo. A Diaspora aspirant also had his mother brutally assassinated in Akwa-Ibom (Adele, 2012).

In Niger State, the trouble there started with violence during the campaign. In Suleja for instance, hand-held explosives were thrown into the venue of the Niger East Senatorial campaign flag-off by unidentified persons. Angry youths protesting the results of the elections stormed the Nigerian Christian Corpsers Fellowship Secretariat in Minna, Niger State Capital and locked 50 corps members serving in the State in the building and set it ablaze. The lucky ones among these corpsers were relocated to the army barracks at Minna for safety (Adele, 2012). The history of elections in Nigeria has consistently taken along with it elements of violence and has not respected the wishes of the electorate as expressed through the ballot boxes.

The Niger Delta militancy marks another political violence orchestrated by governance crisis in Nigeria. Niger Delta is richly endowed with abundant hydrocarbon resources that place Nigeria as the seventh largest producer of oil in the world. Paradoxically, despite its immense contribution to the up-keep of the Nigerian state, the region has suffered monumental neglect and deprivation over the years. This has resulted in widespread poverty, excruciating hardship, complete lack of basic socio-economic infrastructure, plundered environment and high rate of unemployment. This vexed situation has in recent past engendered youth restiveness, pipeline vandalisations, hostage taking, violent uprising and intensified militia activities as well as other economic sabotage activities in the region (Inokoba and Imbua, 2010); Saheed and Egwaikhede, 2012). Against the official position which tends to treat the Nigerian crisis in the Niger Delta as a security issue, Inokoba and Imbua (2010), argued that the violent insurgency of the region is an inevitable product of the crisis of development and failure of the federal government to treat the peaceful demands of the people of the region with seriousness and sincerity. It required measures of sensitivity, but instead it engaged the military to quell the uprising and this triggered it to an almost unmanageable proportions. Thanks to the amnesty programme whose benefits and capacity to tackle the matter are still on evaluation.

The root causes of the Niger Delta anger, restiveness and insurgency are well known. It was an inevitable product of close to fifty years of criminal neglect; inhuman environmental devastation; complete exclusion of the people of the region from the benefits of their natural resources; violent and brutal onslaught on the oil-bearing communities by the Nigerian state; monumental looting of oil revenue at all levels of government; and intolerable poverty in the midst of unimaginable oil and gas wealth. All these issues have thrown up the crisis of development in the region (Inokoba and Imbua, 2010), as the spate of human and materials losses resulting from the ensuing illegal bunkering activities and vandalisation of oil and gas pipelines in Nigeria, has become unquantifiable (Saheed and Egwaikhide, 2012).

The extensive agitation for oil and gas resource benefits and resource control in the Niger Delta was transformed in the late 1990s, when the youth took over and became the vanguard and foot soldiers of the struggle. In this new dimension of endless war, there was armed rebellion against the government led by Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari in 2004 (Musa, 2006). The transformation saw the emergence of more extensive mobilization and solidity, more aggressive and militant actions and the organization of armed militant groups engaged the Nigerian state and the transnational oil companies (TNOCs) (Ikelegbe, 2013). The seizure occupation and stoppage of oil facilities and operations became a common tool of resistance since 1997 as part of their strategy that brought so much public attention and concern to their activities. They operated as pirates in the creeks and high seas, robbing properties belonging to oil companies and their workers and hijacking oil facilities or flow stations. Diverse manner of havoc were wrecked by the militants including the vandalization of oil pipelines and other facilities. Ijaw militants blew up the Extravos crude pipeline that supplies crude oil to the Warri Refineries Petrochemical Companies (WRPC) in April 2003 and disrupted production for several months (Nzechi, 2003). Some estimated that the loss from vandalization of pipelines and flow stations is about 300,000 bpd and about 3.6 billion annually (Abia 2003: 20-30). Kidnapping and hostage taking of expatriates and other oil workers and asking for ransom before they are released was common in the core oil producing states of Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa as well as hijacking of helicopter owned by the oil companies were parts of the resistance against the Nigerian state and the TNOCs. The result is that over the years, the activities of various militant groups in the region have cost the Nigerian government billions of dollars lost due to fall in production level of crude.

To forestall this militant aggression, which became a serious concern to the Nigerian government, came the amnesty programme anchored on the DDR-disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Though the deal restored relative calm to the region, in recent times the seeming peace in the region has disappeared because political settlement is not peace-building. Violence has resurfaces in the Niger Delta as the 'marriage of convenience' induced by the programme between the Nigerian state and ex-militants seems to be hanging in the balance as some re-marginalised ex-militants re-engage the state violently in another round of struggle for benefits (Eke, 2014).

Ethnic-religious violence plaguing communities is also not unconnected to the issue of governance crisis. By 'ethnic-religious' it means "a situation in which the relationship between members of one ethnic or religious group and another of such group in a multiethnic and multi-religious society is characterized by lack of cordiality, mutual suspicion and fear, and a tendency towards violent confrontation (Salawu, 2010:346). The inability of the Nigerian leaders to tackle development challenges, distribute state resources equitably and render good services to the people appear to be one of the causes of ethno-religious violence. Ethnic and religious affiliations determine who gets what in Nigeria; it is so central and seems to perpetuate discrimination (Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013). With over (400) ethnic groups, belonging to several religious sects, Nigeria since independence has remained a multi-ethnic nation state, which has been grappling and trying to cope with the problem of ethnicity and ethno-religious conflicts (Salawu, 2010:345). This has occurred in places like Shagamu (Ogun State), Lagos, Abia, Kano, Bauchi, Nassarawa, Jos, Taraba, Ebonyi and Enugu State respectively (Onyishi, 2011). For instance, the ethno-religious crisis in Plateau State has persisted and implicitly reinforces the problem of indigene/settler dichotomy that seems to lack constitutional remedy. It has become so prevalent in Jos, such that made Plateau State go down with the unenviable record as the first state in the Fourth Republic where a state of emergency was declared (Uhunmawuangho and Epelle 2011; Ikelegbe, 2013).

These conflicts involving indigenous farmers and migrant herdsmen in the State have been persistent for several years. Coincidentally the herdsmen are Hausa Fulani Muslims while the natives are Christians. Over 1,000 persons were reportedly killed between February and May 2004 and between 40,000 and 250,000 persons were internally displaced. At least about 10,000 people were killed and 800,000 internally displaced between 1999 and 2004 (NRC 2005), and several villages have been devastated.

At the root of the conflict is the struggle for grazing land, encroachment on farm lands, and destruction of crops and pollution of waters. As noted by Salawu (2010), the major cause of ethnic-religious conflicts in Nigeria has to do with the accusation and allegations of neglect, oppression, domination, exploitation, victimization, discrimination, marginalization, nepotism and bigotry. The scramble for resources leading to the edging out of one another, results from its limited availability (Adebayo, 2006). Workable policies have not been formulated to accommodate these sedentary and mobile occupational groups of citizens, and having their both rights well spelt out.

The Boko Haram insurgency is yet another platform where political violence and governance crisis congruence. Beyond religious explanations, Boko Haram could be arguably described as a 'home-grown' terrorist group that romances with some desperate politicians in the North (Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013). It appears that the sect enjoys effective support from some well-to-do individuals, religious leaders, allies, admirers of their ideology and highly placed politicians in the North who claim to be Nigerians but are clandestinely working against the State. Some senior military officers have been found guilty of also collaborating with some top politicians in the

country to make the country ungovernable for selfish reasons. No fewer than 15 senior military officers including 10 generals have been tried before a court-martial and found guilty of giving information and ammunition to Boko Haram terrorists, sabotaging the ongoing counter-insurgency operations, while four senior soldiers were found guilty of being disloyal and for working for the members of the sect. This act of information divulgements explains why many soldiers have been ambushed and killed by the Boko Haram (*Leadership*, June 3, 2014). Adagba, Ugwu and Eme, 2012: 85) observed that “it is no longer a sect of Islamic fanatics but has the support of disgruntled politicians and their paid thugs”. Revelations and security investigations into the activities of the sect tend to affirm that the group is sponsored from within the country. This simultaneously transpired within the period when a serving Senator from the North was on trial for aiding the activities of Boko Haram. Thus, a senior official of Boko Haram allegedly granted an interview detailing how the sect had been on the payroll of a few governors of the North (Adagba, *et al*, 2012). The bombing of Nigeria Police Force Headquarters in Abuja on June 16, 2011, the U.N House in Abuja on August 26, 2011 and other high profile bombings attest to this assertion.

Then Nigeria’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Lt.-Gen. Azubuike Ihejirika, had stated that some rogue soldiers had been helping the terrorist group Boko Haram with intelligence and conspiring with them to frustrate military operations against terrorists in Northern Nigeria. The Army Chief who spoke at the opening ceremony of the Nigerian Army transformation and Innovation Centre on Personnel Management and Development at the Command Officers Mess, Asokoro, Abuja, said a rogue soldier gave Boko Haram information on the movement of Mali bound soldiers which led to an IED attack on the military luxury bus conveying the soldiers around Okene where two soldiers were killed (*National Accord*, 2014). Having political and security personnel aiding Boko Haram (*Abusidiqu Newspaper*, May 17, 2014) to wreak havoc on the nation, is indeed a shocker. With this leadership cum governance sabotage, treasonable acts and conspiracy, Boko Haram seems to be more of a destructive political tool with a cosmetic pretension of being religious. The Pan Northern socio-political organisation, Arewa Consultative Forum, had similarly accused the military and other security operatives of complicity in the activities of the Boko Haram sect in the North-Eastern part of the region. The Forum believed that the activities of the insurgents were boosted by the cooperation and support from within the military and security agents, which had enhanced the capabilities of the terrorists (*Punch*, May 2, 2014).

Nigeria does not seem to have been suffering only the economic setbacks caused by Boko Haram’s bombings but also suffers from the battered image and humanitarian disaster the group inflicted on her. For instance, between July 27, 2009 and February 17, 2012, Boko Haram has launched fifty three (53) attacks in which 1157 people were killed and hundreds of people injured in the Northern Nigeria (Adagba, *et al*, 2012). This indiscriminate and sporadic bombing seem to make Northern Nigeria increasingly unsafe and has compelled most non-indigenes of the region to relocate especially the Igbos. This phobia of being attacked especially in

cities like Kano, Kaduna, Maiduguri, Jalingo and Yola was responsible for the exodus of people from the North to other parts of the country (Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013). Furthermore, many from various ethnic groups seem to have followed suit in the exodus, while economic activities in the North drastically reduced as a result of this crisis. The implication is that the crisis is rather under-developing already underdeveloped Northern region and threatens Nigeria's prospect of joining the league of highly developed countries in 2020. Generally, Boko Haram's activities of violence have perforated the peace and tend to have impacted negatively on socio-economic development, security and good governance effort in Nigeria. At the same time, it seems to reincarnate the issue of suspicion among regions which preceded the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970 (Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013).

The Crisis of Governance

Democracy denotes a set of ideas, institutions and processes of governance that allows the broad mass of people to choose their leaders and that also guarantees them a broad mass of civil, social and economic rights. Democracy in Nigeria is truncated. What have been constructed are enclaves of power and authority that are separate from the people (Ikelegbe, 2013). Unconventional/pervasive practices and approaches to participation in politics have not only undermined the imperatives of democracy such as popular participation, governmental legitimacy and acceptance of the people among other, it has resulted in good governance and nation building defaults, owing to an atmosphere of stiff instability, violence and terrorism (Ojo, 2006). In these chapters of Nigeria's democracy, state powers have been hijacked by political patrons and chieftains and their networks of loyalists, sycophants and followers. Hence there is hardly any democracy in government houses either in terms of processes, rules, procedures that are followed or democratic practices or tenets that guild action (Ikelegbe, 2013). The inability of the Nigerian state to organize democratic elections is less surprising when we consider the fact that political parties in the country are devoid of internal democracy. Party flag bearers are selected at the whims of the god-father and imposed on the electorate not on the basis of competence, but on loyalty to the god-father to whom the successful political office holder account for stewardship in cash, which has made a mockery of the Nigerian governance and democratic experience. For example in Oyo State, the late Lamidi Adedibu held sway as he single handedly enthroned and dethroned governors and other political office holders. He told whoever cared to listen that he was the one that made Rashidi Ladoja governor of the state and equally removed him when he (Ladoja) became obstinate (Omotoso, 2013). According to Adedibu:

You (Ladoja) kept government away from me for 28 months? ... The government that, by the grace of God, I gave to you... I put him (Ladoja) there, so if I am demanding money, will it be wrong? Do I need to ask for it before he gives me? (Omotoso, 2013:128).

The patrons can appeal to ethnic sentiments, religious fanaticism coupled with financial inducements and other illegal, obnoxious and violent means of all manner to win elections by installing their candidates whom they subject to their whims and caprices to achieve their goals (Ebohon and Obakhedo, 2010). They recruit vibrant and unemployed youths who become stooge for political thuggery, rioting, looting of the ballot boxes, perpetuation of violence and outright distortion of the entire electoral processes etc. Their activities in a democracy cripple democratic choice which subsequently shrinks democratic space. This often create serious problems for democracy as its fundamental principles are uprooted and the choices of the people which confers legitimacy on the elected are thrown overboard, as elections are rigged with impunity and disregard for the people's sovereign right. Rather than have a democracy, the activities of the patrons confer on the polity an 'era of oligarchy' (Adeyemi, 2003).

Ekiyor (2004:27) contends that Nigeria's democracy has been aborted, heavily compromised, dangerously manipulated, and unwholesomely hijacked by large givers – the rich and powerful. This phenomenon of monumental disaster has accentuated the crisis of electoral fraud of all kinds and violence and other forms of perversion of the democratic process. In this endemic crises, the political elites manipulate the electoral process to suit selfish ends, thereby creating a scenario where major themes associated with genuine liberal and representative democracy, are either 'legislated out of existence' 'outlawed' or flagrantly disregarded with impunity (Ebohon and Obakhedo, 2010). These themes which constitute the essential ingredients of participatory democracy include: freedom, equality, popular sovereignty; participation, the rule of law, representative leadership at all tiers of government; political accountability and transparency, free and fair election, majority rule, independent and transparent election management body and a guarantee of the fundamental human rights of the citizens (Ikelegbe, 2005:287). The democratization process in Nigeria has a very low encouragement for a massive and popular participation in politics (Igwe, 2005), due to not only the prevailing political exclusion, but a high level of citizen's distrust for government and its apparatuses. Citizens level of support for democratic institutions and offices have waned. Perverse political participation embodies within its ambience all the primordial decays, while political stability is a pre-requisite for democratic consolidation in new democracies, Nigeria inclusive.

Weak social service delivery to the people (good roads, potable water, regular electricity supply, qualitative healthcare delivery, education and employment) is an implication of governance crisis that have engendered poverty, illiteracy, diseases which are all endemic in the system in the face of abundance. Close on the heels of this is poor or non-maintenance of existing social services resulting in increased dysfunctional infrastructure at all levels of government in the country. The formal structures of government both in rural and urban areas have increasingly become a fiction in governance. This is because the services they are providing have declined in quality and quantity (Erero, 1996). Olowu (1996) observed that the country's public utilities, as a social sector have virtually collapsed. The education system is epileptic;

hospitals have degenerated into mere consulting clinics. Water which is the most elementary human need is very scarce in rural and urban areas. The services rendered by National Electric Power Authority (which transformed to Power Holding Company of Nigeria and now DISCOs) are subject of continuous lamentation by the citizens. Electric power supply to household, business, and especially to the huge informal sector of our society and economy is a disaster and shame. The existing roads in spite of trillions of money supposedly expended on them by the three tiers of government, have, remained a caricature and death traps. Rather than improving the lots of the people and respond to their needs through effective delivery of social services, governance remain dysfunctional; accounted for by the mismanagement of resources, lack of responsiveness and poor accountability together with bad leadership.

The existence of basic infrastructure is crucial to the provision and sustenance of public welfare, as well as the enhancement of growth and development of any society. Although this responsibility has in recent times, become a diffused one with the increasing involvement of the private sector, overall delivery capacity of public-oriented infrastructure constitutes one of the major criterion for the assessment of governments performance across the globe. The Failed State Index report of 2011, Nigeria ranked 14th among the most failed states, rating as a failure alert state in a rating of 177 countries of the world (Fund for Peace, 2012:6). The availability of adequate and functional infrastructure encourages productive enterprise, employment generation and the capacity of the economy to be self-sustained, attract and retain foreign direct investment (FDI). With the abysmal level of infrastructure in Nigeria, it is not surprising that the country performed woefully over the years in basic economic productivity performance indicators across the globe. In the World Economic Forum Report for Global Competitiveness, from 2002 to 2003, Nigeria was ranked 76 out of a total of 82 countries on the infrastructure sub-index. Also, in the GCI Report for 2006-2007, Nigeria ranked 101 out of 125 countries signaling a worse performance compared with the 83 recorded for the previous year (Abegunde, 2014), while for 2014-2015 Report, she ranked 127 out of 144 countries (World Economic Forum, 2014:15).

A state, through its form of government, has to be able to deliver the benefits expected of it ranging from economic growth, education, to personal and national security, as no meaningful development can thrive in the face of gallant insecurity. A state that is incapable of discharging these functions effectively is regarded as a failing state (Plattner, 2004). Good governance is the effective exercise of power and authority by government in a manner that serves to improve the quality of life of the people (Obadina, 2000). This declaration is also reinforced by Oyovbaire (2007) that governance is about the use of power and authority to affect the human condition. It enables society to maintain, sustain and improve the quality of life, as well as the transformation of the physical environment. Effective and efficient delivery of services is basic to qualitative living for all people. One definite responsibility of any government is to facilitate qualitative and quantitative service delivery to its citizenry. The ability of a government and its agencies to deliver services to its people

effectively and efficiently has become one of the hallmarks of good and democratic governance. When social services are delivered, the development of various units and communities is enhanced and the quality of life is improved. Despite yearly budgetary allocations and formulation of various policies on service delivery, there has been little development and there seems to be a progressive degeneration of the existing social services (Popoola, 2011). Statistics indicate that the Nigerian state has been experiencing developmental reverse in spite of claims to the contrary by most government pronouncements and records. According to the MO Ibrahim Index of African Governance which ranked for the year 2012, Nigeria dropped from the 42nd position to 43rd, pitching its tent in the group of 10 worst performers (Abegunde, 2014). The index for 2012 puts it thus:

Angola, Liberia and Togo have left the IIAG's group of the ten worst performers. They have been replaced by Eritrea, Guinea Bissau and Nigeria... Nigeria, West Africa's powerhouse, has for the first time... fallen into the bottom ten governance performers on the continent (IIAG, 2012: 2).

Following at the heels of weak social service delivery is the mismanagement of resources, corruption and cost of governance. Systemic and political corruption in Nigeria tends to have added another dimension of violent conflicts which has eroded National values (Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013). Nigeria is an amazing paradox, characterized by abject want and poverty in the midst of immense natural and human endowments. Nigeria is the 8th largest oil producer, and also, has the 6th largest deposit of gas worldwide. The country's rich oil deposit has earned it more than 400 billion dollars in revenue since the 1970s (International Crisis Group Report, 2006). Elections, revenue figures, census figures have all been seriously compromised and flawed. Official statistics in Nigeria is but a fraud.

Chief Olusegun Obasanjo laid the foundation of his civilian administration on the belief that corruption would be eliminated in Nigeria. He signed the anti-corruption bill into law. He established the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). However, corruption has continued to grow unabated. Some Western diplomats had the belief that Nigeria lost between \$4 billion and \$8 billion per year to corruption during the eight years of Obasanjo's administration (HRW, 2007). Also, the 2015 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) released by the Transparency International revealed that the country was rated 136 out of 168 countries surveyed (Transparency International, 2015). State Governors who enjoy local constitutional immunity are being arrested outside the country for alleged money laundering. Ostentatious and immodest living standards of many elected and appointed public officials who, in most cases, did not have any visible means of livelihood prior to their assuming the reins of power have set bad standards for the nation. Corruption has become a way of life in Nigeria (Transparency International, 2011). It is so pervasive that it permeates all aspects of our national life. It is found in all public institutions today, Civil

Service, Electoral Commission, Universities, Polytechnics and Colleges, the Judiciary, Police, Military and other Security Organisations etc. are all bastions of corruption.

All the three arms of government and other state institutions are immersed in corruption. For example, corruption created serious setback in the National Assembly in the Fourth Republic. Chief Evans Enwerem, Dr. Chuba Okadigbo and Chief Adolphus Wabara were all impeached as Presidents of the Senate on grounds of corruption. For Senator Okadigbo, it was alleged among other things that he was involved in the inflation of the street light project to the tune of 173million Naira. Okadigbo also authorized the payment of 372 million naira to furnish his residence with a sum estimated above 25 million naira. He equally installed and commissioned a 100KVA generator set of the Senate President residence at an inflated amount of 15 million Naira (Mohammed, 2013). In another development, another Senate President, Adolphus Wabara, was also guilty of receiving bribe of N55 million from Professor Fabian Osuji (the former Education Minister) to inflate the budgetary allocation to the Education Ministry. Senator Chimaroke Nnamani also faced 124 count charges of fraud, conspiracy, concealment and money laundering amounting to about 5.4 billion naira (*Vanguard*, 2008). In a related development, Madam Patricia Olubunmi Etteh, the first female Speaker of the House of Representatives was forced to resign following an allegation of misappropriation of public funds in multiple contracts of N628 million (US \$5 million) for the renovation of her official residence and purchase of 12 official cars. Likewise, the Senate Committee pronounced the former Vice President under Obasanjo administration, Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, guilty of corrupt enrichment, having been said to have diverted the sum of US \$145 million Petroleum Technology Development Fund (Mohammed, 2013). Until February 2012 when the Inspector General of Police sent all policemen packing out of the nation's highways (Human Rights Report, 2013), it was common sight to see policemen extorting money publicly at gun point. What is armed robbery after all? Those who are courageous to resist have had sordid stories to tell, that is, if they survive (Nnonyelu, Uzoh and Anigbogu, 2013).

Still on corruption, the former Delta State Governor, James Ibori, was arrested on 129 count charge by the EFCC of laundering over N9.1 billion. Another notable case of alleged corrupt practice was by Orji Uzor Kalu, the former Governor of Abia State. He was accused of using his loot of N3.1 billion to fund SLOK Airline and two banks in the Gambia and Sierra Leone. He also owned some houses in the U.K. and U.S.A. (Mohammed, 2013). Another ex-Governor, Saminu Turaki of Jigawa State was accused of spending N36million of public funds to acquire oil blocks from the federal government. Ex-Governor Reverend Jolly Nyame of Taraba state was charged with stealing N1.6 billion belonging to the state. Other former Governors charged for various financial crimes are Edo states Lucky Igbinedion, Ekiti's Ayo Fayose, rivers Peter Odili and Chimaroke Nnamani of Enugu state. Ex-Governor Nnamani and two of his former Commissioners, Peter Mba and Spine Ejiofor were alleged of stealing N5.6 billion while some companies were also linked to him (Mohammed, 2013).

Another major national challenge is the cost of governance for which the country has been immersed in crisis and plagued by poor governance and economic decline. The retinue of Ministers, Commissioners, Chairmen of boards and Director-General of agencies are enormous. Each of these including their executives and legislators has his own political appointees comprising special assistants, senior special assistants, personal assistants, media assistants, and other aides. These appointees have handsome salaries, allowances, severance allowances, fleets of cars and spend much of public resources on dubiously relevant conferences, tours and overseas trips thereby accumulating estates and per diem. Nigerian legislators and public office holders are some of the best paid in the world, in addition to accumulation from non-transparent and corrupt dealings (Ikelegbe, 2013). The cost of governance in state and government houses is huge as a result; governance is unproductive because when the huge cost is subtracted from resources available it leaves little for actual development concerns. This hangs on the quality of leadership and administrative deficiency.

Leadership in Nigeria's politics is not development oriented but about the consolidation of powers. The quality of the political leaders and public office holders are far from the best that the country could produce. They place their interest above the national interest with no element of patriotism. The political sphere is dominated by inexperienced politicians whose antecedents in politics are rather unclear. As the credibility of aspiring political leaders is not well scrutinized, unscrupulous persons who are self-serving and corrupt have sought and acquired power (Ibeanu and Egwu, 2007). The former Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, Mallam El-Rufai alleged that two senators, Ibrahim Mantu, the then Deputy Senate Leader, and Zwingina, Deputy Majority Leader, demanded the sum of N54 million from him to facilitate his clearance as minister (Transparency International, 2004).

The state lacks visionary leadership therefore; governance is not directed at goal attainment. The state is prone to incessant military intervention, gross economic mismanagement have driven the economy to a status so weak that it cannot compete favourably with other developed economies, but depend on external support in terms of loans and external debt, relief package, aid and grants for survival. The drive for leadership is not for the purpose of impact in governance, but for self-enrichments and aggrandizements (politics of the belly). According to the EFCC, over N153 billion was misappropriated by four ex-governors of Ogun, Gombe, Oyo, and Nasarawa states. For instance, Ex-Governor Gbenga Daniel is alleged to have misappropriated N58 billion from the Ogun State share of the Federation Account, Ex-Governor Danjuma Goje is accused of diverting N52 billion from the account of Gombe State, Ex-Governor Adebayo Alao-Akala was alleged to be charged for mismanaging N25 billion of Oyo State and Ex-Governor Aliyu Akwe-Doma is faced with corrupt charges involving misuse of N18 billion of Nasarawa State. All the ex-governors have been charged to court and as usual granted bail by the court. The riddle is that over 90 per cent of these cases have been inconclusive or undecided after so many years. Even in those cases that were decided, the convicts received very light punishment by the court through a shady arrangement called 'plea bargain

agreements that involved dropping some of the most serious charges against the accused' (HRW, 2011:22; Mohammed, 2013). The Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offence Commission (ICPC, 2005) reported the cases of Dipreye Alamiyeseigha, the former Governor of Bayelsa State accused of using unregistered companies to defraud his state of billions of naira (Raimi, Suara and Fadipe, 2013).

Administrative deficiencies rupture the Nigerian bureaucracy as it has not displayed competence in administration, policy formulation and implementation. There are no pursuits of merit; favouritism and nepotism are the order of the day. Transparency International (2004) reported a case of Senator Arthur Nzeribe, who declared that he had been bribed by the Presidency as well as some other senators to scuttle the proposed impeachment of President Obasanjo. He was subsequently suspended from the Senate for misappropriation of funds. He was later re-elected to the Senate, but the bribery allegation went into oblivion. Hon Jagoba, a member of the House of Representatives, who brought a duffel bag to the floor of the House with N4million in cash alleging that unknown members of the Executive bribed him and other legislators to impeach the then Speaker of the House of Representatives, Hon Ghali Umar Na'Abba. The matter subsequently died down without being investigated (Raimi, *et al*, 2013).

Lack of responsiveness and poor accountability is another implication of governance crisis in the nation's political terrain. Governance has been so opaque in the way that public resources are received and spent. As it relates to the outcome of revenue, there are no transparency, openness and accountability in the national resources revenue arrangements. The security votes sometimes running into billions at the federal and state levels are not subject to accountability measures and auditing (Ikelegbe, 2013). There are no clear statistics or data as to how much of oil are produced or the amount of revenue generated periodically, as well as the transparent disbursement of these revenue to appropriate quarters. With the scandal in government, the ostentation, extensive property and display of ill-gotten wealth by politicians, is not surprising that there is growing loss of public confidence, distrust and faith in the political structures, public offices and state officials. Sighting a case is the reckless spending of approximately N240 million on hotel accommodation in NICON NOGA Hilton for four years by the erstwhile Group Managing Director of the NNPC (Transparency International, 2004).

At the local and state governments, there is a high level of irresponsible privatization and misuse of state resources. Several ex-governors, ministers, commissioners and other office holders have been investigated put on trial or convicted by the anti-corruption agencies. Report has it that the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission arraigned former chairman of the Peoples Democratic Party, PDP, Prince Vincent Ogbulafor alongside, two others, Mr. Emeka Ebilah and Mr. Jude Nwokoro before an Abuja high court, over a 17-count amended criminal charge, bothering on an alleged N2.3billion fraud (ICPC/2010). The matter is pending in court and the accused persons were on May 10, 2010, admitted to bail of N5million with two sureties in like sum (Raimi, *et al*, 2013).

Corruption, governance dysfunction and lack of accountability attest to governance ineffectiveness in the Fourth Republic.

Resource control and relative deprivation also come under the purview of the implications of governance crisis in Nigeria. Deprivation as a theory given by Ted Robert Gurr (1970) provides that, relative deprivation occurs where individuals or groups subjectively perceive themselves as unfairly disadvantaged over others perceived as having similar attributes and deserving similar rewards to their reference groups. The discontent arising from relative deprivation has been used to explain radical politics, the rise of social movements, industrial disputes and the whole plethora of crime and deviance (Okonmah, 2010).

Most crises in the Nigerian State are about the challenge of how resources are distributed. Nigeria is almost torn apart over the issue of who owns resources and how it is to be shared. The nation has defied almost all recommended revenue allocation formulas. With ethno-religious and cultural diversity cum identity politics, no such formula comes without controversy from one group or the other on the basis of interest. National resource governance in Nigeria is managed in a way that access to power, appointments or offices is access to wealth and resources. Political office holders are rent seeking and accumulative. They have hijacked the opportunities, benefits and resources accruable to the nation. The federal character principle has been swept under the carpet. Everything including employment, appointments, micro-credit, loans and other benefits available are hijacked by the party, state officials and patrons. These positions or facilities are often times commodified and sold. Thus there is hardly anything percolating down by merit and need that reaches the ordinary people. Those in the helm of affairs manipulate these resources that some groups benefit unduly while others losses or are deprived unduly. Equitable gains for all have been sacrificed in an altar of greed and corruption.

Governance in Nigeria is replete with the perversion of justice and the abuse of human rights. In the Judiciary, justice has come to be a cash and carry commodity given to the highest bidder. Lady Justice is no longer blind, but open-eyed engaging in a lusting kindred fraternity with those who grease her palms. Judiciary is no longer the last hope of the common man. Human rights and guarantees of fair and equitable treatments are still poor. The state is repressive and domineering. There have been incidences of lawlessness, abuse of citizens, display of brute power, deployment of state security agencies against the people, harassment and intimidation of opponents, extra judicial killing and excessive force and high handedness of security agencies. Security aides and convoys of state officials have treated citizens as subjects without rights. There has been the use of excessive force and other abuses in internal conflicts disrespect for the integrity of persons and arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life by the government as well as denial of fair public trial. During the year 2013, security forces under the command of Joint Task Force Restore Order (JTF-RO), the Army's Seventh Division, the Police, the SSS, and other commands committed numerous killings. On April 16, 2013, witnesses in the town of Baga, Borno State, claimed Boko Haram shot and killed a soldier with the Multinational Joint Task Force, composed of soldiers from Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. In response Nigerian army

members of the task force shot indiscriminately at individuals and animals and destroyed homes and property. The Chief of Defense Staff and the Police claimed that approximately 36 persons were killed, but Senator Maina Maaji Lawan, who represents Baga in the National Assembly, claimed based on his own field visit to Baga that up to 228 persons may have been killed. In addition reports varied on the extent of property damaged in the incident. Senator Lawan estimated the soldiers destroyed up to 4,000 homes, mostly by fire. HRW reported its analysis of geospatial images of the area affected showed at least 2,275 homes destroyed and another 125 severely damaged (Human Rights Report, 2013:16-17).

The Joint Task Forces (JTFs), composed of elements of the military, police, and other security services, conducted raids on militant groups and criminal suspects in the states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Kano, Kaduna, Kogi, Plateau, Sokoto, Taraba, Katsina, Jigawa, and Yobe. These raids resulted in numerous deaths of and injuries to alleged criminals, militants, and civilians. Local NGOs, international human rights groups, and political and traditional leaders in the affected states accused the security services of indiscriminate and extrajudicial killings (Human Rights Report, 2013).

The police, army, and other security forces committed extrajudicial killings and used lethal and excessive force to apprehend criminals and suspects as well as to disperse protesters. Authorities generally don't hold police accountable for the use of excessive or deadly force or for the deaths of persons in custody. The reports of state or federal panels of inquiry investigating suspicious deaths remained unpublished. Police use of excessive force, including use of live ammunition, to disperse demonstrators resulted in numerous killing. On October 6, police fired into a crowd that had gathered at a police station in Lagos State to protest the killing by police of an innocent motorist the previous week, Ganiyu Adedoyin. No official was charged for the killing. (Human Rights Report, 2013:3).

Understanding Governance Crisis and Political Violence in Nigeria

The crisis of governance is manifested in the way and management of the political process, how public affairs are conducted, the state of governmental delivery of its services and the state of overall development in the country. The inability of the Nigerian leaders to execute their functions appropriately, and be alive to their responsibilities to offer the dividends of democracy for which so much has been sacrificed by the populace, has engendered bitterness, resentments and aggressions among groups, burning out from a feeling of blocked aspirations and deprivation. The inability of the Nigerian leaders to tackle development challenges, distribute state resources equitably, render good services to the people and manage other governmental affairs appropriately appear to be some of the causes of ethno-religious and some other forms of violence (Salawu, 2010). Where government neglects its duty by not fully providing for its populace, communities scramble for limited resources and it is very easy for some to believe that they have been marginalized in the scheme of things or they have been short-changed in the sharing formula. There may also be a scramble among the communities to edge out one another in other to

gain control of the resources or have more resources accruing to themselves. They believe that if the other ethnic group is eliminated, there will be enough for those left behind (Adebayo, 2006).

The absence of infrastructure stymies the prospect of poverty reduction effort by making small and large scale productive engagements difficult to run. A growing number of unemployed needs job and the generation of employment opportunities is highly limited couple with the rising phenomenon of youth bulge have stiffen the economic ordeal of many to resort to any available medium to improve their lives, therefore giving in to daunting criminality in the quest for survival. Extreme poverty have rather complex implication for violent outcomes, giving the low opportunity cost of violence to the poor, they have a comparative advantage in violence (Urdal, 2012). Those without access to legal, cooperative gainful employment are more likely to maximize their utility by recourse to violence, conflict and extortion. The preponderance of young men in a society with few licit earning opportunities would predispose that society to a high risk of civil war. The reverse of this is that more employment opportunities, by raising the opportunity cost of violence, make insurgent recruitment more challenging. Thus, the more plentiful are employment opportunities relative to new job seekers the more difficult is rebel recruitment (Urdal, 2012).

Going by the increasing lose in social decorum, political and moral decadence orchestrated by the crisis of values, anything goes in the bid for survival and therefore, becomes easier to horde and take up arms to perpetuate violence. The widespread proliferation of small arms is contributing to alarming levels of armed crime. The trafficking and wide availability of weapons is one of the major security challenges currently facing Nigeria and Africa at large (Osimen and Akintunde, 2015). In order for individuals to break free from the economic strangulations, setbacks and poverty orchestrated by the crisis of governance to meet their basic essentials, they seek access to politics. Access to power in Nigeria is access to manifold wealth untold. Going by the ostentatious living of many politicians and the propensity to get away with alarming misconduct, politics is indeed a fast and lucrative business where all manner of attitudinal ills are made manifest.

The weak capacity of state to maintain law and order, political decorum and sanity among its citizenry as it is irresponsible in itself has encouraged violent uprisings in the country. Democratic breakdown in electoral process is a major cause of political violence in Nigeria. The crisis of governance vis-a-vis the fragility of the Nigerian state has rendered potent the deviation and departure from the normal norms as a way of life entrenched in the polity. The lack of sanitization of the political system has given room for the robust breed of unscrupulous elements that have redeemed the electoral process to now consist largely of unconventional behaviours. Elections in Nigeria also witnesses violence among party patrons torn in the struggle of whom power is to be consolidated as well as violence among patrons and clients as to where wealth and other resources are to be channeled. Elections in Nigeria have become a 'do or die' affair as aspirants for political positions are motivated by selfish

gains and as a result have shredded Nigeria's socio-political fabric. This national breakdown of the moral fabric of the state accounts for why election becomes war.

Poverty and unemployment increase the number of people who are prepared to kill or be killed for a given cause at token benefit Salawu (2010). It could predispose one to engaging in illicit activities that would undermine security of the environment. Little or no wonder have idle youths become tools for violence in the hands of over ambitious politicians. In a lack instigated distress state, the explosive political potential of youth has been stated as 'resentful of the anxieties that result from role search, youth in new nations characteristically seek its identity through revolt against the system' (Abernethy and Coombe, 1965). A similar condition may be reached by considering unemployed youths to be a potential of actual interest group whose objective conditions of blocked aspirations and physical hardships would heighten their susceptibility to drastic collective solutions. As individuals being in same subjective condition, collectively constitutes a group. As such, when a group experiences a worsening of its condition of life, it will become increasingly dissatisfied until it eventually rebels (Abernethy and Coombe, 1965).

Conclusion

The paper argues that the dimensions of political violence in Nigeria is engendered by the crisis of governance which is linked to the weak capacity of the Nigerian state, especially going by the overwhelming and glaring state of affairs. The failure of the state to provide services to poor people explains the developmental challenge of many communities and the struggle for survival. It is natural that the dividends of democracy would be demanded by those for whom they are meant, and anything short of such expectation can result in fierce anger and frustration. These resentments have transformed into violent attacks, sacrificing lives and property in the nation at the detriment of peaceful existence and security for development. The implication of these setbacks is poor implementation of policies, rising unemployment, hardship, value and cultural erosion, economic and political stagnation, culminating in loss of loyalty and patriotism among citizens, resentment, frustration and aggressions that give rise to the present threatening violence which seems to be growing beyond the capacity of the state.

For citizens to escape the hordes of hardship to provide for their basic necessities of life, wrecking all manner of criminal havoc and taking part in politics could be seen as the way out. Electoral tranquility is an area of political serenity the nation must uphold. Constitutional change of power must be tailored with societal norms and morality and which necessitates the attention of civil societies. Our democratic ethos must be revamped through constitutional reforms to protect voter's choice as spelt out by the ballot boxes to forestall the rape on the system, orchestrated by the gods of our democracy. The Nigerian state can be further reformed through improved governance system infused with such attributes as popular participation, responsiveness, accountability and transparency, equitable allocation of resources and efficient social service delivery. To this end also, there is need for government and stakeholders to explore alternative avenues (basically dialogue when necessary)

rather than force to finding lasting solution to the proliferation of violence. Governments in appropriate quarters should retrace their steps to deliver dividends of democracy as against the present elitist-centred distribution of state resources. The national government should intensify these efforts knowing well that hardship and poverty do not only induce crisis but that financial viability of rebellion sometimes serves as motivation for engagement.

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