

THE STATE AND MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCE BASED CONFLICT IN NIGERIA'S NIGER DELTA

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Abstract

The oil producing states in Nigeria have for a long time agitated for development and increased revenue from oil. The Federal Government on its part has used different antics and intrigues to pacify the people, ranging from Niger-Delta Development Board 1958 to the Ministry of Niger-Delta in 2008. The principle of derivation as regard revenue allocation to these states has ranged between 1.5% (1984), non-existent (1979), to 13% in Abacha's 1999 Constitution. The devastations, neglect of the Oil Producing Communities through environmental degradation, pollution, lowering finance and finance that is not commensurate with pains and output from oil resulted in grievances of the people. The people's continual agitations through protests, youth restiveness, reactive pacifism all these climaxed to outright military confrontation with the state. Using Ex-Post-Facto research design and anchoring analysis on, Frustration Aggression theory, this article aimed at ascertaining whether the mere continuous change of name of the agency of government charged with Niger Delta affairs in response to the yearnings of those who produce 82% of all Federal revenue in the country is sufficient or whether a paradigm shift is needed on the part of the Nigerian State. The findings include dearth of infrastructures, underdevelopment, and widespread restiveness indicating that amnesty and mere change of name for developmental interventionist agencies are not enough. The study therefore recommends a paradigm shift through constitutional provisions in handling the Niger Delta crisis in the form of increasing derivation revenue to not less than 25%.

Keywords: Militarization, Resistance, Oil Exploration, Political Economy Theory, Niger Delta.

Introduction

The Nigerian State is the largest in population in African continent and it is made up of kingdoms, empires and caliphates – Benin, Oyo, Sokoto, Bornu, Itsekiri, Ibibio etc. the British amalgamated these peoples and areas in 1914. This brought together in one polity different nationalities at different stages of economic and political development (Report of political Bureau, 1987: (26-27). Within each region (North, West, East) minority groups which genuinely and legitimately complained about domination by the major ethnic groups sought relief in the creation of more States and enactment of “dogged” fiscal legislation were either ignored or ruthlessly

suppressed (Osunbor-Ojiemuada, 2014). The policies and attitude of the Federal Government to the people and land of Niger Delta, only suggest that the phenomenal change that took place at independence was only a mere change of guard in the management of the apparatus of the state (Otobo, 2003:18). The state remains the main and the citizens as the appendages. This is probably responsible for the leaders deftly use of the instrumentalities of the state to garner the benefits of governance for themselves and their ethnic groups at the expense of the minority Niger Delta, with the politics of deprivation, oppression, and exclusion.

The Niger Delta is defined by the Federal Government to be made up of nine (9) states – Abia, Rivers, Cross-River, Ondo, Imo, Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, and Akwa-Ibom. It is the oil based of Nigeria. Historically and cartographically as posited by Prince (1993: 219), the Niger Delta consists of present day Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States but in 2000, the Federal Government expanded this definition to include the states mentioned above. Other nomenclature includes – Niger Delta from its deltaic nature, BRACED states, the south-south geo-political zone, the oil producing states etc. In its political definition, it is the area co-terminus with all areas where crude oil is discovered, exploited and produced.

The verb “action” which appears almost frequently in policy of government denotes what she (government) does, why, and what effects, positive or negative, on individuals or societies. It is with this understanding of public policy that we evaluate federal government’s actions to the Niger-Delta problems and the reactions culminating into outright militancy with its attendant consequences for the citizens and the state. The Henry Willink’s (1958) commission provides a report which allays the fears of minorities and suggested that... “there should be a Federal Board Appointment to consider the problem of the Niger-Delta” (Barret, 2006:12). This is perhaps what is responsible for the first Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB, 1961) and this trend continued with the establishment of many commissions – Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA) (1972-1983), Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) (1992-2000), Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) (2000-2008) and Ministry of Niger Delta 2008/2009. The events in the Niger Delta suggest that no serious strides in developments as dearth of infrastructures, lack of essential amenities, high level unemployment, and poverty pervaded the Niger Delta. The continuous insurrections and protests in that part of the country over non-increased funds and development are testimonies to the failure of these efforts of government. This study is designed to interrogate the State and management of resource based conflict in Nigeria with a focus on Niger Delta region.

Indigenization Policy of Petroleum Industry (1970 – 1979)

It was against the backdrop of the requirement of Organization of petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that all member countries must own and control its oil resources to the tune of 51% (Kunle, Adigun, Rotimi & Georges, 1998) that the federal government under the leadership of Murtala Muhammed and Olusegun Obasanjo engineered the indigenization policy that nationalized the petroleum

industry. Even though it was not fully nationalized, it was enough to meet the requirement of OPEC.

The process of nationalization started earlier in May 1971, when the Federal Government of Yakubu Gowon created the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC). This was the first major step to garner control over oil revenue. In 1972 it was pronounced that all oil property not currently owned by a foreign entity is legally the property of Federal Government (Kuruk, 2004). This paved the way for the issuance of concessions to foreign investors and of course the government gained the control, sale and allocation of concessional rights to foreign participation or otherwise in the oil industry.

The Federal Government needed more money to finance her '3R' i.e. Reconciliation, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction after the civil war. Therefore, the control over the oil industry was very paramount. The military regime however exploited other avenues by the implementation of a number of laws related to oil. This was why in 1974, the Second Participation Agreement in oil industry by the Federal Government increased equity share to 55 percent. In 1975, Decree 6 was born and it increased Federal Government's share in oil sector to 80%, with only 20% to states. Furthermore, the promulgation of Land use Decree (Act) in 1978 gave the ownership of land and its deposit content to the Federal Government (Nweje, 2007:7). The third Participation Agreement in 1979 saw the emergence of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) as an entity which would come to exert more power over control allocations and sale of concessions than the Nigerian National Oil Corporation which she succeeded. The NNPC was to gain not less than 60% participation in the oil industry on behalf of the Federal Government (Egborge, 2000).

At this stage, the vortex and allocative authority in the oil industry was vested in the Federal Government which decided what she does with the oil revenue, ranging from allocation to patronage, fraternity and personal aggrandizement, without recourse to the humanistic consideration of those who bear the brunt of oil exploitation in the Niger-Delta.

Theoretical Framework

Alienation and Frustration-Aggression Theory

In order to have a deep-rooted understanding of the frustrations, claims, objections, protests, militancy and violence in the Niger-Delta, we shall try to locate and place the Nigerian state, so that the subject matter will be clearly appreciated. Furthermore, we will, for the above reason, try to pinpoint the variants of the theory – Alienation and Frustration-Aggression as they relate to the analysis in the work.

The Nigerian state systematically reduced derivation principle in her fiscal federalism. This was 100%, later 50% in old Nigerian federation around 1946-1967; when agricultural cash crops – cocoa, palm-kernel, rubber, groundnut etc. constitute the main economic earner for the country. Now that oil is the main foreign exchange earner, derivation fund was accorded nothing, at a point (1979) but only given 13% in Abacha's 1999 Constitution, full implementation is distorted by onshore and offshore oil dichotomy.

The leadership of the Nigerian state has used various means – administrative, legislation and insincerity of purpose to manipulate and control the Delta's oil wealth without adequate recourse to the survival of the people in both financial and physical terms. The people after over 50 years organized resistance groups to address this abnormally.

Therefore, as it relates to the analysis of the work Alienation means:

- estrangement from one's possessions
- not as a basis of the social contract theory as posited by Mclean (1966).
- it is a state of estranged or separated from one's milieu, work, products of work or self, and
- Importantly/specifically denial of inheritance.

As a tool of analysis on social relations in social, economic and political affairs, the alienation theory is not a new concept. As early as before the seventeenth century, it means a relationship to property where, for instance, one could be estranged from his/her possessions if or when they are transferred to other people. In the seventeenth century, its usage and meaning was expanded to cover both material and immaterial possessions such as rights and sovereignty over self. This idea not only was it accepted by philosophers of that time but was a necessary prerequisite for legitimate political society. John Locke and others at that time believed that alienating certain rights or powers was basic to legitimate political society. Alienation in this sense became the basis of social contract theory (Mclean, 1996: 6).

In **critical social theory**, alienation refers to an individual's estrangement/separation from traditional community and others in general; the state of feeling estranged. It is considered by many that nucleus/atomization of **modern society** means that individuals have more relationships with other people than would normally have been possible. This has been called commodification; - commercialization of social relations (Ake, 1996). This opens the aperture to look at the relationship between the variants of this work – the Federal Government, her cohorts and the impoverish Niger-Deltans.

The proof of analysis is given by Isike and Okonmah (2010), in applying this nexus between alienation and frustration-aggression theory as an analytical framework to explain "Youth displacement and restiveness in the Niger-Delta.

Berkowitz's (1980) "behaviourist/neo-associationist" position on frustration and aggression argues that aggression is a more general example of the relationship between unpleasant stimuli and negative effect. Negative affect is simply unpleasant emotions and feelings, such as anxiety, anger, annoyance, or pain. According to him, "this negative affect can trigger either 'fight or flight', as well as a set of associated thoughts and reactions related to such experiences" (Berkowitz, 1980). Therefore, frustrating conditions or actions such as thwarting one's goal by denying/depriving them the opportunity to attain personal and legitimate goals can stimulate aggressive behaviour to an extent that corresponds with the intensity of instigation and the degree of deprivation of goal attainment. Although criticized for negative correlation

between frustration and aggression in a number of instances as shown in empirical studies (Bandura, 1973, Zillmann, 1979).

The Frustration-Aggression theory remains useful a tool for explaining aggressive behaviour related to particular frustrating actions. According to Berkowitz's (1989) reformulated version of the theory, aggression can be openly displayed even when the thwarting of goal attainment is socially justified by the "thwarting, and more so when it is perceived as illegitimate by the aggressor. Contending that frustrations are aversive events in that they produce instigation to aggression only to the extent that they are unpleasant to the affected (aggressor), Berkowitz's main contribution in his reformulated version of the theory is that "thwartings, as aversive events, evoke negative affect and it is this negative feeling that generates the aggressive inclinations" (Berkowitz, 1989: 68).

A fervent denial of justice, equal rights and opportunities and lack of committed sense of belonging are also recipe for alienation, which leads to frustration and finally expressed in aggressive behaviour. This is the context of frustration/aggression in the Niger Delta.

The Niger-Deltans have sued for resource control so that they not only benefit more from oil proceeds but have more say in the management of their environment. Adeola (1996), Ake (1995), James (1993), Eboe (1985), Isike and Okonmah (2009), Ikelegbe(2008: 132) and Dibia (2010) contend that it is the peasantry in the oil producing Niger-Delta which, while deprived of the access to the benefit generated by oil surplus, bear the negative consequences of the oil industry, harmful effect of oil exploration – gas flaring, the emissions of gas into the air, which has continued unchecked in every part of the Niger-Delta, since 1958, acid rains from gas flares causes skin burn and other skin related diseases, roof leakages among other hazards including the green house effects which also affect wildlife. Nigeria flares gas than any other country in the world (Ibeanu, 2000; Okeke-Uzodike & Isike, 2009).

In addition to the above, the government's service delivery dilemma associated with previous and present development interventionist agencies such as NDDC, OMPADEC, Ministry of Niger-Delta etc. couple with the state's composite militarist approach of forcefully engaging the Niger-Delta Militants have not only served to exacerbate armed violence in the Niger-Delta but also heightened the militant youths' perceptions and feelings of alienation from the Nigerian state, thus perpetuating a cycle of alienation, frustration, aggression, and counter-aggression.

Methodology

The explanatory tables II & III are products of Ph.D Dissertation by Osunbor-Augustine (2014). The method adopted for the study was based on Survey design. Niger Deltans of adult age were randomly selected on a representative sample of 4200 respondents. The field study was conducted in three '3' States of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers. On the whole only 3800 valid questionnaires from respondents were retrieved, these represented 84.4% of the views of respondents from the Niger Delta

region as researched. The cumulative total percentage shows the sum total response recorded as given from across the entire independent variable from male to rivers.

Revenue Allocation: The Principle of Derivation Perspective

The term “derivation principle in resource allocation” is not a Niger-Delta issue per se but something agreed upon to foster unity in diversity in Federal system of government. This was recognized in the colonial era when derivation principle in revenue allocation was acknowledged. This was actually the period when Nigerian leaders under the hegemony of the colonial leadership had more of the common disposition of unity in diversity of the variegated nationalities comprised in Nigeria. The different commission’s or panel’s recommendations lay credence to this view as follows:

- Phillipson Commission (1946) recommended 50% for the region of origin (derived origin of resources), 35% to be shared among the regions (the rest of the country) as well as the owner region itself and the remnant 15% for the central government.
- Hick-Phillipson (1951) recommends derivations area of origin – 50%; regions (the rest of the country) – 35%, while the Central Government – 15%.
- Chick Commission (1953) recommended 100% rents/royalties.
- Raiman Commission (1958) recommended – 50% for the region of origin, 30% to be shared among the other regions, while the Central Government gets 20%.
- Binn Commission (1964) recommended 50% to the area of origin (region) (Egan, 1999).

Devastations, Neglect and Grievances of the Oil Producing Communities

Environmental Degradation

This means the lowering, worsening and destruction of the biological and physical components of the soil as well as the (pollution) contamination of water, air and the atmosphere through oil exploration, spillages, gas flaring among others. The gases and chemicals can aggravate asthma, causes breathing difficulties, canal pain, and chronic bronchitis, causative agent to leukemia and other blood related diseases (Etekpe, 2007; Oigibe, 2006; Okonmah, 2010). The resultant effects include soil erosions, low fertility of the soil, emissions of poisonous chemicals and gases, acid rain, which corrodes roof and other related structures, cancerous agents, water born diseases, endangering of potable water, etc (Dibie, 2002; Ikelegbe, 2005). Gas flaring combustion by-products include – nitrogen dioxides, sulphur dioxide, methane, volatile organic compounds, e.g. benzene, toluene, xylene and hydrogen sulfide, bezapyrene and dioxin.

Gas flaring and oil spills and other causative elements of pollution in the oil industry have been minimized in developed countries, in Nigeria it has grown proportionally with the growth in oil production with estimated emissions of more than 34.38 million tons in 2002, accounting for about 50% of all industrial emissions in the country and 30% of the total CO₂ emissions (NDES, 2006). The Federal

Government has not gotten the desired political will, the honesty of purpose and the protective passion for the host communities in the Niger Delta. This is in spite of the fact that gas flaring in Nigeria has technically been illegal since 1984 under Section '3' of the "Associated Gas Re-injection Act" (Kuruk, 2004). Gas spillages are caused by multivariate factors, divided into levels of spills i.e. percentage (%).

- Corrosion of pipelines and tankers accounts for 50% of all spills;
- "Sabotage" accounts for 28%;
- Oil production operations account for 21%; and
- Inadequate or non-functional production equipment just 1% (Atlas, 1995; 180-1).

The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) quantified oil environmental pollution annually and placed it at 2,500 cubic meters with an average of 300 individual spills annually (Amaize and Okhomina, 2003). However, this amount does not take into account "minor" spills, the World Bank reason, the quantity of oil spilled into the environment could be as much as ten times the officially claimed amount (Akpofure, Efere, and Ayawei, 2000; Okonmah, 2009).

The Challenge of Underdevelopment, Social-Economic Consideration and Poverty

The concept of development in its human and infrastructural perspective propelled by increased financial base and safety of the people, constitute the main bone of contention in the Niger Delta. Many developmental agencies:

- Niger Delta Development Board (NDDDB), 1961;
- NigerDeltaRiver Basin Authority (NDRBA), 1976;
- Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), 1992;
- Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), 2000; and
- The Niger Delta Ministry.

These agencies and lately the ministry were seen as response to the recommendation by the Willink's commission in 1957. The fact there are still agitations about the lack of development suggests that these bodies have failed. Many factors are responsible for this from corruption, lack of funding, absence of genuine political will and utmost good faith in addressing the Niger Delta question etc.

Economists have expressed that per-capita income and its growth or decline reflects the magnitude and direction of development (Todaro and Smith, 2003; Amaize, 2005). There is hardly any literature on the Niger Delta; that has not pointed to the high level of poverty experienced by the majority of the people living in that part of the country (Diai, 2004). Urban or rural need – electricity, water for domestic uses, good and effective waste and drainage systems, health services, housing, mass transport, education etc. are infrastructures and facilities that are absent in oil-producing communities (Okonma, 2007). Poverty and despair, unemployment and

insecurity impoverishment, marginalization, and exploitation of citizenry have become pervasive in Niger Delta (Odivwri, 2001; Ikelegbe, 2005).

Ravallion and Bidani (1994) and Aluko (1975) refer to poverty as lack of command over basic consumption needs. That is, a situation of inadequate level of consumption giving rise to insufficient food, clothing and shelter. Nigeria, inspite being blessed with abundant human, agricultural, petroleum, gas and large untapped solid mineral resources, has declined in National socio-economic development, retrogressed to become one of the 25 poorest countries of the world at the early years of the twenty-first century, whereas, she was among the richest 50 countries in the early 1970s. The plight of the Niger Delta is even worst as the source of traditional employment on sea and land has been destroyed by years of environmental pollution and government’s “insensitivity”. The result is poverty.

Table I: Regional under-development reflecting Federal Government insensitivity in the Niger Delta

Newspaper	Environmental Degradation	%	Regional Neglect	%	Lack of Basic Amenities	%	Total %
Vanguard	388	79.84	217	89.67	395	83.69	84.40
The Guardian	98	20.16	25	10.33	77	16.31	15.60
Total	486	100	242	100	472	100	100

Source: Okonmah (2009), Youth Restiveness and Federal Government’s Policy in the Niger Delta Areas.

The table above identified major causes of the unresolved development crisis in the Niger Delta region. The crisis is centred around environmental degradation, regional neglect arising from the exploitation of the natural resources, with little compensation, and lack of basic social amenities. The indices of these neglects which attracted an average of 84.40% (Vanguard) and 15.60% (the Guardian) newspapers as presented in table 1 above include – high unemployment rate among youths, the non-provision of basic amenities such as clean water, electricity, hospitals, good roads and other physical infrastructures.

Resource Control Agitations

The issue of resource control means different thing to different people. The advocates, agitators see it as any adjustment of derivation principle from 13 percent to “at least” 25 percent or more. It also could possibly mean the ownership and control of oil wealth by the oil producing communities (Ikelegbe, 2001; Nwajah, 1998; Osunbor-Ojiemuada, 2014). While others may see it as mere politics associated with revenue allocation.

The agitation for resource control is for some of the reasons below:

- Increase finance to the oil producing areas. The history of revenue allocation in Nigeria exposed a drastic fall in derivation principle from 100% (1953),

50% (1960), 45% (1970), 20% (1975), 2% (1982), 1.5% (1984), 3% (1992) and 13% (1999).

- Lack of adequate management of oil spills in the course of drilling, production and transmitting oil. Nigeria is about the only country where oil companies operate without making adequate provisions for anti-pollution and oil spillage measures (Ibidapo-Obe, 1990). This is so because Nigeria's National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) is a major polluter, being the senior partner in the international oil companies (IOCs) as well as an active participant in up-stream and down-stream exploration activities (Othinger, 1970). The Associated Gas re-injection policy 1984 has not been implemented.
- Non-compliance to provision of section 162 (c) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Federal Government since 1999 allocated revenue to different tiers of government but the formula used has been shrouded and guarded by the Federal Government in utter disregard of the provision for derivation in Section 162 (c) of the 1999 Constitution. The agitation for resource control was therefore an outright avenue to express these grievances.
- Lack of development of the Niger-Delta. The most consistent empirical manifestation of governmental policies of manipulation, deceit and oppression in the Niger-Delta is underdevelopment. In spite of the natural endowments of this region, the people are suffering from administrative incompetence, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor and endemic conflict with increasing waves of Youth restiveness leading to hostage-taking of both foreigners and prominent indigenes (Idemudia, 2009).

Security Approximates the State in the Nigerian Context

The empirical realities from when oil became the main economic earner for the country, suggest that the character of the Federal Government to the Niger-Delta question is expressed in oppression, repression, double standard, deceit, cunning, insecurity, nonchalance, and lack of genuine interest for progress and development. The government is enmeshed in the narrow conceptualization of security and state-military centred, which main objective is the survival of the state, it uses the coercive instrument of the state to cow the people – Niger Deltans, into submission and in-turn amass wealth irrespective of the devastating effects from the oil exploration on the people and their land. This gradually becomes the undisputed pre-occupation of the Nigerian state, since security of the state approximates the safety of the wealth of the nation, so the government and her officials resort to the deft use of the apparatus of the state to guarantee its access to public wealth. They therefore, contrive all forms of repression to deny the Niger Deltans even their unalienable rights to existence. In this context, there was the joint Military Task Force (Code-named: Operation Restore Hope). This was followed by the use of brute force as pattern established in the 1990s during the Gen. Babangida, Abacha and Abdulsalam's regimes. It also extended to

Olusegun Obasanjo's civilian government in 1999. According to Okonmah (2007: 22), violence against the people by the government increased as the demands for justice in the region intensified in the 1990s.

In essence, the government is accused of sponsoring intra and inter-ethnic conflicts manifesting in violence, in order to keep the communities of the Niger-Delta area divided, weak and distracted from pursuing the course for equal rights and justice. In 1990, the Nigerian Government in collaboration with Shell ordered Paramilitary Police into Umuechem Community in Rivers State. On October 30 and 31, 1990, Umuechem Youth had peacefully demonstrated against the destruction and neglect of their land by Shell. In response, there was a massacre (Ayanruoh, 2005). After Umuechem, it was Ogoni, where several villages were attacked, burnt down and people arrested arbitrarily, while others were murdered in cold blood. In 1994, Uzere Community in Delta State was attacked. In November 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa and the eight other Ogoni Patriots – famously referred to as Ogoni nine, were hanged after a flawed trial of extra-judicial nature, on the orders of General Sani Abacha. When the Ijaw Youths proclaimed the Kaiama Declaration in December 1998, they met with serious state violence for their peaceful campaigns for resource control. In November 1999, Odi Community was invaded and close to 3,000 youths were killed. The communities that have witnessed violence from the state include – Choba in Rivers State, Odioma in Bayelsa State and several other Niger-Delta communities that are victims of State and Corporate violence. This cycle of offense led to the security dilemma, that has aroused the resistance for survival by the people of the Niger-Delta arising from the state's attempt to secure oil production (Ikhilae, 2007; Bolaji, 2007; Edosomwan, 2006; Saduwa, 1997; Okonmah, 2007). The list and accounts of violence heaped on the Niger-Delta are by no means exhaustive.

The character and behaviour of the Nigerian state is thus both empirically and structurally expressed violence; through the systematic and conscious obliterated revenue allocative policies and through the instrumentality of uncontested and undemocratic state legislations, to all out military action in the activities of the joint military task force and several others.

Table II: Amnesty granted to the ex-militants is the final solution to the Niger Delta crisis

Opinion	Sex		Occupation			Age			Education			State			Cum %
	M	F	C.E M	S.EM	Stu.	18-36	37-54	55-above	Ter.	Sec.	Pry.	Bay.	Del.	Riv.	
Yes	686	620	262	624	411	485	562	267	426	450	432	401	398	512	34.4
	18.1	16.3	6.9	16.4	10.8	12.8	14.8	7.0	11.2	11.8	11.4	10.6	10.5	13.5	
No	1,988	506	495	1,219	789	916	1,066	504	817	857	818	762	757	970	65.6
	52.3	13.3	13.0	32.1	20.8	24.1	28.1	13.3	21.5	22.6	21.5	20.1	19.9	25.5	
Total	2,674	1,126	757	1,843	1,200	1,401	1,628	771	1,243	1,307	1,250	1,163	1,155	1,482	100.0

Source: Osunbor-Ojiemuada (2014), *The State, Oil and Militancy in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria (2005-2010)*.

The table suggests that amnesty cannot be the final solution to the Niger Delta crisis even though it has helped to reduce military hostilities – bombings, hostage-taking, pipeline vandalization, kidnapping etc. This is supported with a cumulative (sex, occupation, age, education, state) “Yes” opinion of 34.4% while 67.6% however with a contrary opinion of “No”. Therefore, it is very clear that we should have a paradigm shift, a kind of change of tactics (Constitution based-solution), in handling the Niger Delta crisis.

Table III: There is possibility of militancy re-emerging if Amnesty fails in the Niger-Delta

Opinion	Sex		Occupation			Age			Education			State			Cum %
	M	F	C.E M	S.EM	Stu.	18-36	37-54	55-above	Ter.	Sec.	Pry.	Bay.	Del.	Riv.	
Yes	2213	949	477	1161	756	883	1026	486	783	823	788	906	645	862	63.0
	58.2	24.9	12.6	30.5	19.9	23.2	27.0	12.8	20.6	21.7	20.7	23.8	16.9	22.7	
No	461	177	280	682	444	518	602	285	460	484	462	257	510	620	37.0
	12.1	4.6	7.4	17.9	11.7	13.6	15.8	7.5	12.1	12.7	12.1	6.8	13.4	16.3	
Total	2,674	1,126	757	1,843	1,200	1,401	1,628	771	1,243	1,307	1,250	1,163	1,155	1,482	100.0

Source: Osunbor-Ojiemuada (2014), *The State, Oil and Militancy in the Niger-Delta Region of Nigeria (2005 – 2010)*.

There is no doubt, Amnesty Programme has brought “temporary peace” with the seizure of hostilities against the Federal Government and oil Multinational Corporations, the data shown above is very categorical about the result of Amnesty Failure – which is re-emerging hostilities called Militancy. This is supported with a cumulative (sex, occupation, age, education, state) “Yes” opinion of 63%, while 37% are however with a contrary opinion of “NO”. Therefore from all intent and purposes, we should have a paradigm shift as regard handling of the Niger-Delta crisis.

Amnesty in the Niger-Delta

The Federal Government over the years believes in the use of force to solve the Niger-Delta question – the establishment and deployment of special military task forces, have not yielded a comprehensive solution to the state of affairs. Instead, the problem seems to have exacerbated as it cannot be solved militarily. A case of people fighting for emancipation, justice and survival cannot be solved militarily, rather some schools of thought believe that Nigeria should reach for negotiated option. South-Africa’s political transition, based on a hard won negotiated settlement and power-sharing political arrangement should serve as a precedence for (inter and intra) national compromise.

Militancy brought a lot of woes to the Nigerian social, economic and political environments:

- reduction of crude oil production to the extent Nigeria could not meet up her quota in OPEC;
- Nigeria was categorized as economically and politically unstable country;
- hostage-taking and kidnapping became the order of the day etc.

The effects of these and many more are enormous and ripple in nature.

The Nigerian government had no option other than to grant Presidential Amnesty on July 3rd, 2009, for the Militant Youths inclusive of an unconditional pardon to all militants and persons on trial for militancy or believed to be unlawfully carrying arms against the Nigerian state. The government set up a Presidential Amnesty Committee headed by the then Minister of Defence, Gen. Godwin Abbe (Rtd.) with other disarmament committees at the state levels of the region.

The militants were given three (3) months to disarm and enlist into initial Amnesty take off programmes (disarmament) and later other programmes which are: Rehabilitation, empowerment, reintegration and proper documentation (*Vanguard*, October 4, 2009:1). The Amnesty proclamation expired on Sunday 4th, October, 2009. Exactly three (3) months from 3rd July, it came on board.

On the processes of the Amnesty, the president then announced at the close of Amnesty:

- a “Presidential Derivation” of 10% equity of production of petroleum resources to the host communities. ₦65,000 each being monthly allowance for the militants while the rehabilitation process lasted. The NDDC to enlist unemployed graduates from the region for a National Technical Aid Corps

(NTAC) where after a month of training, such graduate applicants (Degree and HND Holders) will be posted to various accredited institutions/employers for two years, earning ₦30,000 from NDDC and a minimum of ₦15,000 from the employer simultaneously, amounting to ₦45,000 minimum monthly pay (The Nation, December 4, 2009, pp. 34-35; The Guardian, December 15, 2009, pp. 46-47 and Osazuwa, et al., 2009: 20).

All these measures by the government are; palliative, impromptu, extempore, interim etc. These are therefore designed to provide initial peace so that development issue can be achieved. These are in the mean time, by implication they are not and cannot sustain a permanent peace and security in the Niger-Delta region.

The Federal Government's Amnesty programme is geared towards rehabilitation, empowerment, reintegration and proper documentation of the ex-militants with a view to keeping them in-check. The question is after these programmes, what next? Is the government going to wait for the agitations and arms struggle to continue before another palliative measure will be introduced? Or is there any programme or policy geared towards sustaining permanent peace in the region? Thus one expects the Federal Government to address the issue that will sustain permanent peace and security otherwise militancy might become a recurring decimal in the Niger-Delta region.

Findings

There are a lot of findings as regard the Niger Delta crisis. The very core that addresses the main theme of this paper include:

- dearth of infrastructures and underdevelopment;
- amnesty and mere change of name for developmental agencies are not the final solution to the Niger Delta crisis e.g. Niger Delta Development Board (NDDDB) (1961-1972), Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA) (1972-1983), Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) (1992-2002), Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) (2000-2008) and Ministry of Niger Delta (2008). All these have not been able to address the developmental dilemma of the Niger Delta and they are just created to make the people believe the government is reasoning to meet their plight. It is also argued that, it is an avenue for political patronage and appointments.
- The people are vexed with the Federal Government which they believe is deceitful and not serious with development and other issues of interest survival to the region.
- Government cannot guarantee safety and security from oil's environmental pollution.
- Revenue allocated to the Niger Delta is far less than pains and miseries from oil exploration.

Conclusion

This paper examined how militancy came into the Niger Delta struggle; through years of protests, youth restiveness, reactive pacifism etc which climaxed into outright military confrontation with the state. On the part of the state, the inadequate tackling of the development question and other demands of the region and the quest to use military brute force to cow the people into acquiescence portray structural violence. The people therefore resorted to collective action to protect themselves from extinction ipso-facto the state's ability to deliver in this regard has been lost. Even though the state established many developmental interventionist agencies – OMPADEC, NDDC, Ministry of Niger Delta, the continued agitation and protests after so many years of the existence of these institutions suggest the aim for which they were set-up was never met. The question then is:

Must we continue in the vicious circle of renaming of development agencies of the state? Do we continue to manipulate the revenue derivation formula – onshore and offshore oil dichotomy or does the Nigerian State deserve a change of tactics i.e. paradigm shift that should be guaranteed by the Constitution so that the dream of unity in diversity can be realized. Your guess is as good as mine.

Recommendations

In the light of the foregoing the paper recommends an upward review of the revenue derivation principle to not less than 25%. The eventual granting of full resource control to the region. And a comprehensive review of the constitution to reflect these new realities. Only then can a paradigm shift be said to have occurred with regard to the management of Nigeria's natural resources and the protracted resource- based conflicts in the Niger- Delta region.

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